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Abstract 
 
This is an ethnographic history of child soldiering in the eastern regions of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. It focuses on deployments of mai (Swahili: “water”) medicines 
and charms during periods of intergenerational conflict from the late 19th century to the present. 
Why do recurring insurgencies invoke the discourses and practices of these particular medicines, 
wielded primarily by the young? At the heart of this question lie the antecedents, events, and 
afterlives of the 1964 Simba Rebellion: likely the most massive mobilization of child soldiers in 
post-colonial Africa. The Simba’s roots are traced through ruga-ruga movements in the late 19th 
century, Anioto leopard-men violence in the Belgian Congo, and carceral sites like the National 
Penitentiary for Delinquent Youth at Niangara in the late colonial era. The dissertation concludes 
by examining the proliferation of mai-mai movements in contemporary eastern Congo and the 
international development industry that seeks to manage the violence of these young warriors. 
Working across time and scale, from a microhistory of an individual child combatant to deeper 
regional histories of generational dynamics, the focus remains on links between violent children, 
war charms and medicines, and forms and practices of adult authority. The study invigorates 
contemporary analyses of child soldiering by foregrounding temporally deep, emic 
interpretations of links between age, violence, medicine, and immaturity. It builds arguments 
from a broad array of evidence, including oral interviews, vernacular narratives such as 
the Mwindo Epic, mission archives, periodicals, and colonial security archives. The geographical 
focus is on the northern parts of what is now North Kivu province. 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 
This dissertation traces an entangled history of violent youth, insurgency, and 
intergenerational conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo from the late 19th century to 
the present. At the heart of the study are the antecedents, events, and afterlives of the 1964 Simba 
Rebellion. This was likely the most massive mobilization of children in conflict in post-colonial 
Africa and the most successful insurrection in Congo prior to the First Congo War in 1996. From 
ferocious beginnings in mid-1964, borne forth by thousands of young people fortified with mai1 
war medicine, the rebels controlled—at peak—over half of Congo. By the end of 1964, however, 
the movement was crushed. International mercenary reinforcements to the Armée Nationale 
Congolaise (ANC) halted the Simba’s explosive expansion from June through late October. 
During the five months of Simba rule, insurgents purged customary, religious, and economic 
elites, foreigners, and government forces in eastern and central Congo. Despite its brevity, and 
the maelstrom of concurrent crises throughout Congo, the intensity of the Simba Rebellion made 
it a “defining chronological marker” in the life histories of those who experienced it.2  
                                               
1 Mai is, in Congolese Kiswahili dialect, the word for “water,” which is maji in standard Kiswahili. This dissertation will use the 
term “mai” to describe the medicine, and “mai-mai” to describe the insurgent movements predicated on the medicine. This 
reflects norms of usage at work in eastern Congo during the period of research. Mai is alternatively spelled as “mayi” in other 
scholarship.  
   
2 Nancy Rose Hunt, A Colonial Lexicon of Birth Ritual, Medicalization, and Mobility in the Congo (Duke University Press, 
1999), p 248. 
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Memories of the time are vivid, sometimes ghastly. Simba rule was marked by what 
Benoit Verhaegen called “violence and terrorism.” 3 While reclaiming territory in 1964 from the 
rebels, government forces proved keen to retaliate. One anecdote, recounted to a journalist in 
November 1964, stands out. Witnesses claimed a chief—himself captured, imprisoned, and 
tortured by the rebels during their ascendancy—dragged an imprisoned Simba in front of the 
village after “liberation.” “While everybody watched, the chief carved out a piece of meat from 
[the rebel’s] side and drank blood from it…. Their chief said the best meat is the fingers of small 
children. They all roared, laughing.”4 
The account is grotesque and complex.5 The soldier may have been a child—placed in a 
category of “small children” by the chief. The tale’s “eruption of laughter,” performance of 
cutting flesh and consuming blood from a living body, and further cannibal threat reverberate 
with cliché and cannibal tropes.6 The account, whatever its veracity, raises a number of 
interpretive quandaries and analytical dilemmas. Why would an authority figure claim to savor 
children’s flesh? Despite the laughter, this cannot be read as simply tongue-in-cheek; it was far 
from a ribald joke told in the glow of nighttime fires for the benefit of peers. The chief reportedly 
spoke with blood in the mouth, as if to bring credence to dubious claims. The village population 
served witness to the macabre performance, staged for them as a constituency. Combining threat, 
                                               
3 Benoît. Verhaegen, “Les Rebellions Populaires au Congo en 1964,” Cahiers D’etudes Africaines 7, no. 26 (1967): 355. 
 
4 Andrew Borowiec, “City of Death: Horror Shadow Lies Across Stanleyville Terror Casts Red Shadow in Stanleyville,” Los 
Angeles Times; Los Angeles, Calif., November 26, 1964, p 8. 
 
5 We can question the reliability of the source of this story and acknowledge mediation. That said, its very clichéd nature 
suggests the register of genre. It is worth examining why such claims emerged in the aftermath of the rebellion.  
 
6 Nancy Rose Hunt, “An Acoustic Register, Tenacious Images, and Congolese Scenes of Rape and Repetition,” Cultural 
Anthropology 23, no. 2 (May 1, 2008): 223, on "eruptive laughter" in discourse around violence in Congo.  One the consumption 
of blood see Luise White, Speaking With Vampires: Rumor and History in East and Central Africa (University of California 
Press, 2000); Luise White, “Blood Brotherhood Revisited: Kinship, Relationship, and the Body in East and Central Africa,” 
Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 64, no. 3 (1994): 359–72. 
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joke, argument, and anathema violence, the chief’s act of consumption was a warning: it 
suggested the fate of all those who sought to undo and recreate the forms, figures, and modalities 
of authority.  
The act specifically targeted wayward youth. Those whose “meat” was “best.” Emerging 
from a time of rule by the young—a framing of the rebellion this dissertation will present—
during the Simba era, the performance marked a full reversion to gerontocratic order. The chief 
demonstrated the extent to which those forces were willing to go to preserve their reclaimed 
power. No longer would the young spill the blood of elders. Once again, the lives and labor of 
youth would be under literal and metaphorical hands of male elders: kin, priests, chiefs, teachers, 
business elites, and state officials.  
And yet the words of a key figure in the tale do not enter the record. The rebel, though 
captured, cut, and consumed, gives no rejoinder. His body served as an object lesson, but the age, 
condition, motives, and intentions of this Simba were unaccounted for. This dissertation attempts 
to provide such an accounting, not of his particular story, nor a representation of his voice, but of 
the deep histories and trajectories that compelled figures like this young man to join a movement 
that would cost many their lives.7 It also seeks to interpret the actions of authority figures, like 
the chief, whose unbound violence against young people begs explanation. What justified such 
deeply anti-sociality? What manner of threat did elder men perceive in “small children” to justify 
acts of erasure and vicious displays of power? This study approaches and interprets the forms of 
violence that shaped the era under study.  
                                               
7 Luise S. White, Stephan F. Miescher, and David William Cohen, African Words, African Voices: Critical Practices in Oral 
History (Indiana University Press, 2001). 
 
 4 
Fragmented stories like the one recorded above provide the evidentiary grist of this 
dissertation. Accounts are culled from newspapers, interviews, personal communications, and 
archival sources. Among these recollections sits, however awkwardly and partially, my own. I 
first traveled to the site that is the focus of this project, northern North Kivu in eastern Congo, in 
June 2003, during the tailing months of the Second Congo War.8 My experiences during that 
time ultimately generated the perplexities that came to animate the lines of inquiry of this 
dissertation. My journey was to Beni, a town of about 200,000 at the crossroads of the national 
north-south and east-west roadways of northeast Congo. It was and remains a strategic town. 
Occupying the city enables control over the movement of people and goods throughout the 
region. At the time of my arrival, Beni was occupied by militia allied with the Rassemblement 
Congolais pour la Démocratie – Kisangani Mouvement de Libération (RCD-KML) a rebel 
government purportedly protecting the interests of the predominant Kinande-speaking 
communities of northern North Kivu.9 The mood in town was tense, the population deeply 
wearied from enduring six years of cataclysmic violence. The sounds of fighting were woven 
into the tapestry of life in the city.   
Militia were in constant motion. Unmarked Mitsubishi Canter trucks, laden with 
ununiformed warriors, rumbled through town at all hours. The rattle and growl of the improvised 
troop transport’s diesel engines would mix incongruously with the pure, high tones of garrulous 
singing from the soldiers, crammed together in open-air trucks. Most remarkable to me: many of 
                                               
8 Jason K. Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa (PublicAffairs, 
2011). Stearns account remains the most detailed, comprehensive scholarly narration of the period.  
 
9 Judith Verweijen, “Pompier-Pyromanocracy: Mbusa Nyamwisi and the DR Congo’s Inflammable Post-Settlement Political 
Order,” in Warlord Democrats in Africa: Ex-Military Leaders and Electoral Politics, by A Themnér (London: Zed Books, 2017), 
41–67. Verweijen translates the movement’s name as “Rally for Democracy/Kisangani-Liberation Movement.”  
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the occupants of these vehicles looked like children. Their small bodies were mostly hidden 
behind the aprons of the truck beds. Rows of shoulders and heads peaked over the metal sides. 
None seemed to be carrying guns.  
I was mystified. Were these children warriors? If so, why were they, of all people, being 
mobilized to fight? Where were their weapons? I would crane my neck to follow their movement 
until out of sight, wisps of melody from their songs burned into memory. My traveling 
colleagues explained, in response to my repeated questions, that these were mai-mai, as though 
the appellation itself explained all. 
 A South African photojournalist, Guy Tillim, traveled to Beni near the same period. He 
was intrigued by these same figures. Tillim captured a series of portraits at a “mai-mai training 
camp.” Black and white, composed in medium close up, his prints portray boys in drab clothing, 
holding thick sticks, heads and waists wrapped in grasses and leaves. The images are striking. 
Newspapers like London’s Telegraph reprinted the photographs with their own commentary: “He 
should be in school, or out playing football with his friends. Instead, he is one of the many 
thousands of children sucked into the vortex of a bloody civil war that has raged across the vast 
expanse of the Democratic Republic of Congo since the late 1990s. The conflict, which has 
claimed an estimated 3.8 million lives, has spawned scores of rebel armies and militias - but 
none more tragic than the child soldiers of the Mai-Mai who believe they are immune to combat 
death because of their magical ability to repel bullets.”10   
These words ring like an echo of others, published nearly forty years prior, on November 
28, 1964, during the waning days of the Simba rebellion by a Canadian journalist named 
                                               
10 Derek Bishton, “Viewfinder: Mai-Mai Militia Training, Democratic Republic of Congo,” The Daily Telegraph, August 5, 
2005, sec. Culture. 
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Frederick Nossal. As the rebel movement died, Nossal argued it “failed for it had no direction 
and no real aim… Using a hodgepodge of Marx, Lenin, Mao, African tribal tradition and black 
magic, the Congo rebels this year again burst across the countryside—adding more confusion to 
the highly complicated and cluttered political scene in the country.”11 Here, as in the Telegraph’s 
commentary on Tillim’s images, the analysis foregrounded incoherence, perplexity, magic, and 
the senseless waste of young lives to anchor interpretations of mai-mai movements in eastern 
Congo. Much scholarship on mai-mai clings stubbornly to these analytical tropes.  
Neither this manner of scholarship, nor the Telegraph, nor Nossal’s interpretations 
capture the deep ambivalence present in Tillim’s portraits. The mai-mai featured in these images 
are, inarguably and preponderantly, young men—even boys. Their faces are impassive and 
postures purposeful. They do not present themselves, nor are they posed, as victims. They are not 
depicted alongside or among the adults reportedly co-opting their childhoods for shadowy 
political ends. They are figured as I recall them: simultaneously powerful and vulnerable.  
                                               
11 Frederick Nossal, “Focus on the Congo: Rebels Believe in Mao and Magic,” The Globe and Mail; Toronto, Ont., November 
28, 1964. 
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Figure 1.1 “Mai Mai Training Camp” Guy Tillim’s portraits of mai-mai in a “training camp” in Beni in 2003. Tillim 
photographed at least thirty-one militia members in Beni. He posed these figures either staring directly at the camera or 
in three-quarters address. One print in the series is now in the permanent collection of the Museum of Modern Art 
(MoMA) in New York city.   
  
From itineraries and provocations spurred by my memories and accounts and renditions 
like those described above, this dissertation sketches a deep history of links between power and 
vulnerability in eastern Congo for over one hundred years. It examines the recurrent emergence 
of mai-mai-like figures and movements throughout the 20th century in the eastern Great Lakes 
region. It connects the events of 1964 with those occurring in places like Beni at the turn of the 
21st century, and in earlier periods, by grounding the analysis in interpretations of the mai 
medicine and its “therapeutic procedures,”12 as well as the debates mai indexed, notably 
contestations over obligation, reciprocity, class, and intergenerational conflict. It questions 
                                               
12 White, Speaking With Vampires, 50. 
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monolithic narratives that position adults coercing young people, using magic, and stirring 
ideological confusion. It stands in contrast to much contemporary and historical analyses of the 
mai-mai groups in eastern Congo.13  The study follows a number of threads, persistent images, 
and enduring narratives, including the visual hook of African children in battle posture, as in 
Tillim’s portraits, that were produced for consumption by audiences in the global North since at 
least 1872. This dissertation will argue that tracing the logic of mai, and the debates, ideas, and 
representations its use sought to address and settle, opens up interpretive possibilities for more 
robust understandings of both the Simba Rebellion and contemporary mai-mai movements in 
eastern Congo.  
The dissertation engages with three domains of scholarship. First, it draws on histories of 
medicine and healing in sub-Saharan Africa—arguing that mai-mai movements van best be 
understood via a deep examination of the origins and workings of the mai medicine.14 Second, it 
argues that framing mai-mai movements as youthful therapeutic insurgencies alters how we 
interpret histories of the social category of youth in colonial and post-colonial eastern Congo.15 
Third, it argues that mai-mai insurgencies, propelled by youth, ultimately called into question the 
                                               
13 Catherine. Coquery-Vidrovitch, Alain. Forest, and Herbert. Weiss, Rébellions-Révolution Au Zaïre, 1963-1965, Racines Du 
Présent (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1987); Verhaegen, “Les Rebellions Populaires Au Congo En 1964”; Benoît. Verhaegen, Rebellions 
Au Congo., Études Du C.R.I.S.P. (Bruxelles: Centre de recherche et d’information socio-politiques, 1966); Renée Claire Fox, 
Willy De Craemer, and J. M. Ribeaucourt, “The Second Independence”: A Case Study of the Kwilu Rebellion in the Congo 
(Mouton & Co., 1965); Ludo. Martens, Pierre Mulele, Ou, La Seconde Vie de Patrice Lumumba, EPO Dossier International 
(Berchem (Anvers) : Bruxelles: Editions EPO ; distribution, Editions Vie Ouvrière, 1985); Ken McMillan, “1964 Remembered: 
The Congo Simba Rebellion, Then and Now,” 4 Corners: Magazine of UFM Worldwide, 2014; Emizet F. Kisangani, Civil Wars 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 1960-2010 (Boulder, Colo. ; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012); Kiangu Sindani, 
“Pierre Mulele, Martyr Ou Traître? Les Langages de La Mémoire,” Likundoli : Enquêtes D’histoire Congolaise 10, no. 1–2 
(2006). 
 
14 Nancy Rose Hunt, A Nervous State: Violence, Remedies, and Reverie in Colonial Congo (Duke University Press, 2016). 
 
15 Ch Didier Gondola, “Makers and Breakers: Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa (Review),” African Studies Review 50, 
no. 1 (April 25, 2007): p 188. 
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legitimacy of postcolonial vernacular authority, building on debates that ground recurrent 
intergenerational and interclass conflicts in eastern Congo through the present day.  
 
War Medicine 
This dissertation interprets mai talk and practices as neither a ruse to dupe naïve youth, nor a 
confused mélange of Marx and magic, but rather an enduring war medicine.16 Medicines, David 
Schoenbrun argues, in Great Lakes Africa are best understood as “substances with powers to 
transform bodies” that require both speech and “actions of persons and collectivities” to gain 
efficacy.17 To borrow Wyatt MacGaffey’s description of nkisi objects: medicines are “things that 
do things.” Medicines are simultaneously social and material objects. Individually imbibed yet 
constituted by and within community, medicines function within kin networks, language groups, 
and other social aggregations.18 It is to deployments of one war medicine, mai, along boundaries 
of bodies and polities that this dissertation focuses.19 
                                               
16 This approach differs somewhat from that of Danny Hoffman who in the "Magic of War" chapter of The War Machines: 
Young Men and Violence in Sierra Leone and Liberia (Duke University Press, 2011), describes a similar regime of "bullet-
proofing" in Liberia . Hoffman approaches the process as a form of “occult” action. He challenges the negative framing of occult 
force and argues for its “inventive” capacities. I share his view of the ambivalence of the mai but see it fundamentally as a 
creative, productive force with harming qualities. Medicine suits such an approach more than notions of “occult,” or “magic” 
power.  
 
17 David L. Schoenbrun, “Conjuring the modern in Africa: Durability and Rupture in Histories of Public Healing between the 
Great Lakes of East Africa,” The American Historical Review 111, no. 5 (December 1, 2006): 1418. He links medicines to 
healing, writing that “public healing has wrestled with shifting boundaries between a porous social body’s moral communities 
and the starker outline of an embodied, autonomous individual.”” 
 
18 Randall M. Packard, Chiefship and Cosmology: An Historical Study of Political Competition (Indiana University Press, 1981). 
Packard, following Steven Feierman’s studies of Shambaa chiefship, focuses on the role of the chief in “healing” and “harming” 
the land—as the ultimate healing talisman within a clan group.  
 
19 In “Conjuring the modern in Africa” Schoenbrun further suggests that, though “flawed and freighted, the history of public 
healing emphasizes the discourses and practices that people have used in the boundary crossing struggle over the conceptual and 
moral bases of political and social organization.” Defining the stakes, limits, and elements of this struggle is a core focus of this 
dissertation.  
 10 
This dissertation’s interpretations of mai medicine touch on genealogies of public healing 
in Africanist scholarship.20 From earlier roots21 public healing emerged in the 1980s as 
innovative interdisciplinary methods were brought to bear on enduring healing discourses and 
practices in Africa.22 The goal was to break free from the “encapsulated or bracketed” 
positioning of healing in previous scholarship. Steven Feierman and John Janzen forged 
foundational lines of inquiry by exploring the “social basis” or “social roots” of therapies contra 
individuated “private healing” practices.23 Feierman sought to link healing practices to 
“fundamental institutions” in African communities and connect them to “larger historical 
narratives,” showing them to be integrated and coherent, despite the impact of disruptive colonial 
legal interventions.24 He argued that healing work should not be framed as religious practice, but 
rather as part of “therapeutic movements with political and remedial dimensions.”25 Healing 
movements and political authority were cast as deeply, even inextricably, connected—even as 
                                               
20 A comprehensive, evocative overview of this literature is found in Nancy Rose Hunt's contribution: “Health and Healing” to 
the The Oxford Handbook of Modern African History, 2013. Hunt delves into the roots of this scholarship in early ethnography 
through emerging trends in the historiography on healing in Africa.  
 
21 Nancy Rose Hunt points out the significance of a 1976 study by W. De Craemer, Renee C Fox, and Jan Vansina, (“Religious 
Movements in Central Africa: A Theoretical Study,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 18, no. 4: 458–475) in helping 
to shape the foundations of this scholarship in A Nervous State, p 12. 
 
22 Here scholars like Steven Feierman and David William Cohen, trained in both anthropological and historical methods paved 
the way with ground breaking work. Victoria E. Bonnell et al., Beyond the Cultural Turn New Directions in the Study of Society 
and Culture, Studies on the History of Society and Culture ;34 (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1999), p 19. 
 
23 Steven Feierman and John M. Janzen, The Social Basis of Health and Healing in Africa (University of California Press, 1992); 
John M. Janzen, The Quest for Therapy in Lower Zaire (University of California Press, 1982); Steven Feierman, Peasant 
Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990). 
 
24 Steven Feierman, “Colonizers, Scholars, and the Creation of Inivisible Histories,” in Beyond the Cultural Turn (University of 
California Press, 1999) p 186. Feierman argues that the state outlawed public healing even as it permitted “private” healing. 
Public healing was seen by the state as an avenue for dissent and rebellion.  
 
25 Nancy Rose Hunt, “Health and Healing,” The Oxford Handbook of Modern African History, 2013 p 379. 
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they frequently operated in tension.26 Exploring therapeutic dynamics, and points where the 
biomedical and other regimes interfaced with public healing practices generated field changing 
work on the region.27 This scholarship inspired work on debility, the generative potential of 
illness, and careful studies of links between public health and witchcraft.28  Looking at social, 
cultural, and political phenomena through the lens of healing enabled scholars to bring seemingly 
disparate, even contrary, practices together in productive ways.  
Too tightly linking medicines like mai to work on public healing, however, misleads. Mai 
protects individual bodies and empowers its wielders but, crucially, towards ruinous ends. Mai 
warriors do not seek to heal, but rather to desolate their enemies. As we will see, their 
antagonists can be their own kith and kin. This medicine serves the violent desire to undo—
evoking the “punitive… secret, negative, and harming” work of medicines war. Mai warriors 
sought to protect and renew their communities, but this is an example where, as Nancy Rose 
Hunt writes, “the protective achieves force through being brutal, harmful, ruinous.” 29 Here 
Hunt’s framing of therapeutic insurgency is useful. Mai was deeply destructive but also 
generative of forms of community. The medicine knit young warriors together with a shared 
power and common purpose. It empowered marginal figures Mai was a war medicine, not simply 
                                               
26 Adam Ashforth, Witchcraft, Violence, and Democracy in South Africa (University of Chicago Press, 2005); Packard, 
Chiefship and Cosmology; Megan Vaughan, Curing Their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness (Stanford University Press, 
1991); Neil Kodesh, Beyond the Royal Gaze: Clanship and Public Healing in Buganda (University of Virginia Press, 2010). 
 
27 Hunt, A Colonial Lexicon of Birth Ritual, Medicalization, and Mobility in the Congo; Vaughan, Curing Their Ills. 
 
28 Julie Livingston, Debility and the Moral Imagination in Botswana (Indiana University Press, 2005); Julie Livingston, 
Improvising Medicine: An African Oncology Ward in an Emerging Cancer Epidemic (Duke University Press, 2012); Ashforth, 
Witchcraft, Violence, and Democracy in South Africa; Adam. Ashforth, Madumo, a Man Bewitched (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2000). 
 
29 Nancy Rose Hunt, A Nervous State: Violence, Remedies, and Reverie in Colonial Congo (Duke University Press, 2016), p 14. 
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a form of anti-social, occult practice.30 Child warriors using mai responded to, were symptomatic 
of, and contributed to, social breakdown. At the same time, they were creative, generative agents 
drawing on deep reserves of language, meaning, and practice to channel and deploy novel forms 
of power. Pursuing the logic of the mai medicine orients focus toward the origins, rules, and 
targets of the movement, not merely to the demographic spectacle of its participants. Looking 
closely at movements inspired by mai medicine looks beyond the private victimization of 
individual soldiers to their public action. This is a vital move: child soldiers in eastern Congo 
wielding medicine are continually subject to interpretive encapsulation—the charm objects and 
tactics of contemporary mai-mai, as the Simba before them, threaten to be continually viewed as 
an egregiously dangerous version of “exotic local color.”31 This study aims to bring 
interpretations of child soldiering in Congo back into engagement with deep historical discourses 
and practices around violence, maturity, and power.  
This dissertation interprets mai in several forms: as a material, a set of practices, and a 
social logic animating certain persistent therapeutic insurgencies that recurred from the mid 19th 
century through the present day in eastern Congo.32 It attends to the political and social dynamics 
such movements sought to engage and, often, transform through destructive power. Tracing the 
logic of the mai medicine is central to understanding the nature and stakes of intergenerational 
struggle in eastern Congo’s 20th century. The Simba movement, I argue, cannot be understood in 
                                               
30 See my comments on Danny Hoffman, The War Machines: Young Men and Violence in Sierra Leone and Liberia (Duke 
University Press, 2011) above. 
 
31 Feierman, “Colonizers, Scholars, and the Creation of Invisible Histories,” p 206.  
 
32 Indeed, while I construe it as a therapeutic insurgency, it is important to note that the mai was not simply generative of power. 
Violently attacking social affliction was a condition of possibility for healing to commence—just as mai demanded its wielder to 
engage in pure behaviors for efficacy, so too the social body was compromised by corrupt constituents and would founder. This 
is where the mai played its public role.  
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isolation from the “conceptual and moral bases of political organization” that ignited the desire 
for mai and motivated the sacrificial commitments of adherents.33 The dissertation argues that 
mai was not a generic substance, able to be “taken” by anyone in need of its power. The 
medicine’s effects were sometimes muted or non-existent, the elements of its production 
disputed. Mai is a medicine, however, that was and is only deployable by a certain segment of 
society. In the case of mai, these figures belong to the profoundly complex and overdetermined 
category of youth. 
 
Youth and Intergenerational Conflict 
The category of youth in Africa, John and Jean Comaroff argue, “stands for many things at 
once.”34 The polyvalence of the concept threatens to reduce its analytical power even while 
imbuing it with great flexibility as in debate, disputation, and conversation in both scholarship 
and in the lived experience of African social worlds. While Didier Gondola once suggested the 
category of youth often served as a “theoretical and disciplinary contraption” recent studies 
reveal how broad and malleable the concept can be.35  Emerging scholarship traces how youth 
                                               
33 Schoenbrun, “Conjuring the Modern in Africa.” 
 
34 Alcinda Honwana and Filip De Boeck, eds., Makers and Breakers: Children & Youth in Postcolonial Africa. (Dakar, Senegal: 
CODESRIA, 2005). 
 
35 Ch Didier Gondola, “Makers and Breakers: Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa (Review),” African Studies Review 50, 
no. 1 (April 25, 2007): p 188. 
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are creative and agentive, engaged in sartorial,36 expressive,37 consumptive,38 and transnational 
economic projects.39 Other studies, particularly when focused on the Great Lakes Region of 
central Africa, focus on youth violence as a form of agency: as part of militia movements,40 
fighting with or against the state,41 or as the engines of supposedly ethnic conflict.42 Little in 
either body of literature, however, attempts to locate the junction where the creative, generative 
aspects of young dynamism engage the violent, destabilizing actions of destructive youth. Even 
when violence is a primary analytical frame young people are cast simultaneously as victims of 
social breakdown and as key agents of instability—constituting a dangerous group of unmoored 
people “uncaptured” by the state. The struggle to bring the generative and destructive aspects of 
youth action into the same frame is an enduring one and comes from deep roots within the 
genealogy of scholarly thought on the subject. 
                                               
36 Charles Didier Gondola, “Popular Music, Urban Society, and Changing Gender Relations in Kinshasa, Zaire (1950-1990),” 
Gendered Encounters: Challenging Cultural Boundaries and Social Hierarchies in Africa, 1997, 65–84. 
 
37 Nicolas Argenti, The Intestines of the State: Youth, Violence, and Belated Histories in the Cameroon Grassfields (University 
of Chicago Press, 2007); Filip De Boeck, Marie-Françoise Plissart, and Jean-Pierre Jacquemin, Kinshasa: Récits de la ville 
invisible (Renaissance Du Livre, 2005); Johannes Fabian, Remembering the Present: Painting and Popular History in Zaire 
(University of California Press, 1996); Bogumil Jewsiewicki, Jean-Claude Lefebvre, and Frieda Sewald, Cheri Samba: The 
Hybridity of Art, 1 (Galerie Amrad African Art Publications, 1995). 
 
38 Jean-François Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (Polity, 2009). 
 
39 Janet. MacGaffey, Entrepreneurs and Parasites: The Struggle for Indigenous Capitalism in Zaire, African Studies Series ;57 
(Cambridge University Press, 1987); Janet MacGaffey and Rémy Bazenguissa-Ganga, Congo-Paris: Transnational Traders on 
the Margins of the Law (Indiana University Press, 2000). 
 
40 René Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009); Gérard Prunier, 
Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe (Oxford University Press, 
2011); Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters. 
 
41 Jean Francois Bayart and Béatrice Hibou, The Criminalization of the State in Africa (International African Institute in 
association with James Currey, 1999); Laurent Fourchard and Simon Bekker, Governing Cities in Africa (HSRC Press, 2013). 
 
42 Stephen Jackson, “Sons of Which Soil? The Language and Politics of Autochthony in Eastern D.R. Congo,” African Studies 
Review 49, no. 2 (2006): 95–123; Mahmood Mamdani, “Preliminary Thoughts on the Congo Crisis,” Social Text 17, no. 3 
(1999): 53–62; Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
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Foundational scholarship on youth in Congo by scholars like Mary Douglas, Claude 
Meillasoux, and Jan Vansina focused attention on the role of lineage youth within frameworks of 
social reproduction, and as key sources of labor within the lineage modes of production. In 
eastern Congo, Robert Harms examined how upper Congo’s Bobangi-speaking community was 
transformed with the rise of trading elites in the precolonial period. Individual elites accumulated 
durable personal wealth at the perceived expense of their young kin. The social dynamics Mary 
Douglas highlighted in case of the Lele—of instability produced by elites who greedily 
prevented juniors from advancing to social adulthood in order to maximize their labor—
manifested itself in Bobangi communities, and intense fears about witchcraft violence, social 
disorder and burdensome obligations to kin pushed elites into repressive positions against 
Bobangi youth.43 Youth, then, sought their revenge through flight or violence. Some attempted to 
wrest control out of the hands of avaricious elites. The powerful economic transformations that 
generated intergenerational violence in the precolonial milieu Harms studies find echoes in 
decolonizing eastern Congo in this dissertation.  
But the concept of youth can become unwieldy—unhelpfully capacious or too narrowly 
defined and functionalized. Scholarship focusing on intergenerational conflict and exploitation 
misses much about the process of being young, including how young people sought to construct 
their selves, and young men forged masculine identities on their own terms. Failing to track such 
processes risks simply adopting the perspective of powerful social figures within African 
communities—seeing youth as a social problem to manage. Some young men refused to adhere 
                                               
43 In Lemba: A Drum of Afflication in Africa and the New World, Garland (1982), John Janzen described how in the lower 
Congo/Atlantic region similarly positioned elites suffered from lemba—a complex of breathing issues and stomach pains—
brought on by their economic activity and the unequal social relations it engendered. This required all manner of ritual activity 
and economic sacrifice to repair the strained relations these senior elites produced through their accumulation.  
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to prevailing notions of maturity— either via direct dissent or choosing to ignore social 
obligations foisted upon them. Paul Ocobock argues that often young men “pointedly 
interrogated and then flatly rejected the expectations of their elders and peers.44 There were 
many ways to be young and not simply in relation to elders. There were paths to adulthood not 
shepherded by lineage and economic elites. Some aspirations of authority, however, were not 
linked to maturity. States of immaturity could sometimes be gateways to immense power. This is 
the case for young men and boys in the Simba Rebellion via engagement in the discourses and 
practices of the mai war medicine.   
This study aims to explore how adult practices of categorizing young people—as 
children, adolescents, delinquents, challengers, inheritors, and juniors—generated both 
possibilities and constraints in relations between the old and young. Andrew Burton and G. 
Thomas Burgess argue that no concept “surpassed generation both in terms of its importance in 
governing relations and as a source of values and sensibilities” in African history.45 The 
dissertation’s focus on mai-mai as a therapeutic insurgency fought by youth raises the question 
of the object of violence and restoration. Against whom was insurgency directed? From within 
what polities did it emerge? These fundamental questions probe the links between war medicines 
and moral communities.   
To interpret such dynamics, this study leans on John Lonsdale’s approach to processes of 
identification in Kenya, particularly engagements between “high” and “low” political actors 
                                               
44 Paul Ocobock, An Uncertain Age: The Politics of Manhood in Kenya, New African Histories, (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University 
Press, 2017). 
 
45 Andrew Ross Burton, and Helene Charton-Bigot, Generations Past: Youth in East African History (Ohio University Press, 
2010), p 1. 
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within language groups.46 Lonsdale focuses on the “deep politics” of a shared moral logic of 
interdependence that animates such communities. He explores processes of generational power 
transfer and related debates, tensions, and contestations.47 To Lonsdale, moral disputation over 
the bonds and bounds of obligation and reciprocity is key. This study attends to such dynamics in 
eastern Congo during times of social change. Rather than focus, as other work, on relations 
between state actors and the rebels, this study focuses on the internal dynamics of reciprocity and 
responsibility in eastern Congo’s Kinande-speaking communities that animated forces on both 
sides of the conflict.   
In Gikuyu communities in 1950s Kenya, Lonsdale studies changes in ituika, a “mythical 
transfer of power between generations,” subject to elder control.48 Ituika was structured but not 
orderly; it produced ambiguities and conflict that were “costly, dangerous” and potentially 
divisive.49 The idiom of power and transition afforded by ituika produced a shared domain of 
disputation around the bounds, maintenance, and legitimacy of forms of authority. It could 
establish ties between old and young. Ituika also provided a channel for youthful 
rebelliousness—perceived as an inevitable—toward productive ends. When “coming-of-age 
stalled by the 1950s” for Gikuyu youth, the Mau Mau rebellion emerged in the context of this 
“crisis of maturity in the late colonial period.” The rebels sought, in part, to resolve young men’s 
“ambiguous age.”50  
                                               
46 John Lonsdale, “Moral and Political Argument in Kenya,” Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa, 2004, p 76. 
 
47 John Lonsdale, “Globalization, Ethnicity, and Democracy: A View from the Hopeless Continent,” Globalisation in World 
History, 2002. 
 
48 Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya & Africa Vol II  (J. Currey, 1992), p 334. 
 
49 Berman and Lonsdale, p 346. 
 
50 Ocobock, An Uncertain Age, 11. 
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Tensions were similar in decolonizing eastern Congo, but opportunities for resolving 
intergenerational conflict more limited. Ituika, even stretched and strained, offered a common 
framework for disputation for Gikuyu elites and juniors. “Intellectual entrepreneurs” could work 
to shape its contours and attempt to justify changes to the existing order in a mutually 
comprehensible fashion.51 In decolonizing eastern Congo, by contrast, such frameworks were 
largely absent. The colonial state feared that the secret worlds of initiatory practice could foment 
insurrection. Outlawing these activities weakened possibilities for practices of generational 
continuity and the maintenance of shared registers of social maturity between old and young. 
When customary authorities and rising economics elites in eastern Congo in the 1950s sought to 
draw on strained generational ties within Kinande-speaking communities to mobilize juniors 
against perceived ethnic interlopers on their lands, the tactic backfired. Widening economic 
inequality and deprivation, and frustrations over foreclosed paths to social maturity, turned youth 
who were sent to fight purported ethnic competitors against elder kin. A medicine-based 
insurgency soon took hold in the form of a mai movement. Elites were the primary targets of 
violence.  
Against ituika, therefore, this study places another myth of intergenerational relations, the 
Mwindo Epic. Mwindo’s story is not about cross-generational notions of social maturity but 
rather how, in certain periods of moral crisis, regenerating moral community requires youth to 
enact violence against elites. I argue that mai medicine fits within the logic of Mwindo’s tale. 
Simba’s engagement in such registers of power, where immaturity is valorized, pushes analysis 
beyond exploring how youth engaged in self-fashioning or demanded access to respectable 
                                               
51 Derek R. Peterson, Creative Writing: Translation, Bookkeeping, and the Work of Imagination in Colonial Kenya (Heinemann, 
2004), p 18. 
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adulthood. Rather the movement drew its moral authority from the efficacy of a medicine that 
required self-sacrifice and self-denial to spur the revivification of moral order. Mai’s generative 
capacities required its agents to engage in acts of erasure, violence, and self-abnegation. Simba 
was at once a project of deep continuity and restoration as well also ruin and rupture.  
Alongside such debates and actions, the study places the colonial state’s management of 
unruly youth. It explores how religious leaders, village headman, business elites, and customary 
chiefs sought in similar and distinct ways to contend with dissident young people. Simba sought 
to contest such elite claims to authority and remake moral bounds of authority over youth in a 
decolonizing Congo. A focus on intergenerational conflict allows us to see how and why young 
people engaged en masse in the Simba movement. It explores why this particular kind of 
violence was deemed essential for social renewal well beyond the Congo Crisis period, into the 
late 20th century and the present day.  
 
Sources and Evidence 
 
Evidence supporting the arguments in this dissertation are drawn from archives, interviews 
conducted in the field, and other troves of primary source material including personal 
correspondence, memoirs, and news reporting from the period. Archival collections consulted 
include the Archives Africaines, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, in Brussels, Belgium (AA), 
the Ethnographic and Contemporary History Archival Collections at the Musée Royal pour 
l’Afrique Centrale in Tervuren, Belgium (MRAC), the Kabarole District Archives in Fort Portal, 
Uganda (KDA), the Beni Territory Archives at the Beni Territorial Administrative Headquarters 
in Mbau, North Kivu, Congo (BTA), the Oicha Hospital Archives in Oicha, North Kivu, Congo 
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(OHA), and the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library Archives in Ann Arbor, MI (GRF). Private 
collections were consulted in Beni and Rwenzori territories and in Ituri province.  
Each archive is replete with idiosyncrasies and treasures. Each needed to be approached 
with a particular strategy. In the Archives Africaines I focused on the largely uncatalogued 
Governor General files. In this collection I located a series of documents concerning the 
management of criminal children throughout the colonial period. Much of this data shaped key 
arguments in the third chapter of this dissertation.  My goal entering the archive was to locate the 
places where children emerged as subjects of colonial concern, not just as future laborers or 
soldiers, but as targets of mobilization for insurgency. I wondered if the state would misinterpret 
therapeutic insurgency as anti-state violence. While I found some evidence of this concern, I 
found far richer veins of material related to how the state “managed” rebellious children through 
experimental carceral techniques.52 The focus of state agents on these debates and innovations 
suggested connections to the evolving methods other elites in religious, economic, and political 
spheres deployed against unruly youth in their respective ambits.  
Engaging the Territory Archives at the Beni Territorial Administrative Headquarters was 
a qualitatively different from my experience in the metropole. The administrator in charge 
informed me that virtually all archival materials were burned on three occasions: in 1964, 
destroying colonial records, in 1996, destroying Zaire-era documents, and in 2002, destroying 
                                               
52 One example of such a trace in the colonial archive was a set of documents concerning the conception and development of a 
children’s prison in Niangara that operated during much of the Belgian Congo era. Typical correspondence between officials 
concerned what constituted a child, what crimes were considered “adult,” and the tension between seeing the prison as a place for 
reform versus a method for inflicting punitive measures on delinquent children. As I continued to examine these materials, 
however, a shadow history of decades of sexual abuse of children by Belgian parochial administrators of the prison and the 
physical and sexual assault of children by adult prisoners emerged in confidential documents that eventually forced officials to 
close the prison. The history of what these children suffered during their incarceration is, to date, unpublished. While my project 
does not focus on the incarceration of children, the dilemma of state authorities to address the status of violent children as 
criminals while simultaneously casting them as vulnerable victims of adult coercion and violence is emerging as a theme of my 
research. This example illustrates how my archival research led me in new research directions and unearthed unexpected 
evidence but allowed me to maintain my focus on the inconsistent and incoherent colonial perception of criminal children as 
simultaneous perpetrators and victims. 
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materials from the Congo Wars period. He told me the office was just beginning to reconstitute 
surviving archival materials but, due to my patience in waiting for two days in his office to see 
what they had, I could look through what was there.  
There was no coherence whatever in the materials. One document was a laissez-passer 
from 1943, another a requisition order from 1997, another a memo about salaries from 1983. 
Nothing was in folders or boxes, nor was their evidence of chronological, thematic, alphabetical 
or any other organizational logic I could discern. I asked if I could digitize the existing records to 
preserve them and was refused. I took notes on what I found and left, feeling a bit deflated if 
unsurprised. On my way out I was stopped by a local appeals judge. He handed me a self-
published book called a Petite histoire Nande: Les Banisanza hier et aujord’hui by Jean-Pierre 
Mufunza Lussenge, a prominent local intellectual and lawyer. The volume, a 109-page history of 
the Banisanza clan of the Kinande-speaking people, proved a trove of data, providing insights 
into the political imaginary of Beni-based elites, and described networks of thought and debate 
among emergent Nande ethno-nationalist figures. Where the formal archive failed to provide 
meaningful data, other sources of information sometimes emerged unexpectedly.   
 
I also conducted dozens of one-on-one and small group interviews between 2010 and 
2017 in Congo and western Uganda. In 2010 I traveled to Beni to conduct preliminary research 
on this topic with a small research team. We interviewed thirteen people in Oicha and Beni and 
took one excursion to the town of Lume in the Rwenzori Mountain zone. In May through July, 
2011 I returned to conduct interviews on the Uganda side of borderlands of the Ruwenzori 
Mountains north of Kasese. I interviewed forty-one Bakonzo and Banande veterans of 
decolonization-era conflicts, Rwenzururu and the Simba Rebellion, from Uganda and Congo. In 
the summer of 2012, I was affiliated with the Hertog Global Strategy Initiative at Columbia 
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University and spent July in Beni conducting research, interviewing six core subjects several 
times. In September 2013, I relocated to Beni for two years with my family. The bulk of the 
interview work contained in this dissertation was conducted during that time. I became familiar 
with the core group of Simba veterans that would shape much of my thinking on the rebellion 
during this time. I conducted many dozens of formal and informal interviews with them and 
members of their kin. These interviews were conducted in Beni territory—including Mangina, 
Mavivi, Ngadi, Butembo, and Beni—as well Rwenzori territory and Ituri province. 
Interview methods varied, but broadly the approach was straightforward. I sought to meet 
interlocutors in their homes. This frequently required travel to remote areas. Security 
deterioration made this increasingly difficult after October 2014.  While I produced, in advance, 
question sheets of points I wished to raise in meetings, and also recorded and took notes during 
the interviews, my goal was to treat the conversations in a semi-structured fashion, allowing my 
interlocutors to help shape the dynamic of engagement and the themes that emerged. Typical 
interviews would begin with research subjects describing their lives in as much detail as they 
cared to share, and I would follow up relevant points in an as open-ended a fashion as possible. I 
sought both to respect the narratives provided while also push and probe on inconsistencies and 
generic elements in my interview subject’s accounts.53 Return visits would involve reviewing our 
previous conversations and exploring areas I wanted further detail on or felt unclear about. 
Interviews were conducted in Swahili and, occasionally, Kinande with the aid of a translator.  
 
Chapter Overview 
 
                                               
53 White, Speaking With Vampires. 
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This dissertation uses the assembled evidence to explore core themes across six 
substantive chapters.  
Chapter two explores the role of youth and children in contestations over authority in 
eastern Congo between 1876 and independence in 1960. The focus is on internal debates and 
struggles for control within Kinande-speaking communities in the western Rift Valley.54 Volatile 
alliances and allegiances in this region generated insecurity and opportunity in the precolonial 
era when young men’s violent labor enabled elites to consolidate trade routes and protect key 
resources. Youth also served to discipline internal dissent. The chapter traces how lineage groups 
in the region managed the colonial “pacification” of Kinande heartlands in 1929 and their role in 
subsequent rebellions in the area through 1945. It explores how newly commissioned customary 
authorities in the east sought to capture “floating” youth as followers; efforts complicated when 
initiation rituals were outlawed by the state amidst fears of a leopard-man insurgency called 
Anioto. I use linguistic evidence and re-read ethnographic work to suggest that Anioto were 
agents of elite power in conflicts between forces aligned with wild power, wielded by women 
and children, against domestic authority, dominated by male lineage seniors. Mai is shown to be 
an enduring countermedicine against elite practices of control like Anioto. Using this framework, 
I engage in a deep reading of the Mwindo Epic to trace how juvenile delinquency—a challenge 
to customary power— was narrated in the late 1950s as both socially destabilizing and renewing 
in a time of leadership failure. The epic’s child protagonist, Mwindo, embodied the political 
dangers of stubborn, deliberate immaturity epitomized by children seen refusing political 
obligations of adulthood. Mwindo sought to marshal wild power against domestic authority, to 
unbuild and rebuild social order. This chapter uses immaturity—a logic and characteristic found 
                                               
54 This was a zone of interface between the eastern expansion of Belgian colonial power and the earlier westward expansion of 
Zanzibar-linked trading dynasties from in the 19th century. 
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in archival records, linguistic evidence, and ethnographic material— to explain the significance 
of “wild power” to mai medicine, a vital component to therapeutic insurgencies, notably the 
Simba Rebellion and contemporary mai-mai movements.  
The third chapter traces how “lost” children increasingly occupied adult attention in the 
Belgian Congo from the interwar period to independence. It follows the state attempts to define 
“juvenile delinquents” as a criminal category with special regimes of carceral intervention from 
1931 forward.55 Drawing on evidence from the colonial archive, this chapter traces the 
techniques that the Dominican Fathers at a special juvenile prison colony deployed to transform 
criminal youth into productive subjects. I analyze the strategies of the penal colony until the state 
abruptly shuttered it in 1957 amid backchannel panic over abuses and mismanagement. In the 
same period, American Protestant missionaries entered newly “pacified” regions of eastern 
Congo bearing urgent desires to bring children’s wayward souls into the Kingdom of God. This 
process came with imposing humiliating sartorial and economic restrictions while also offering 
opportunities for new forms of respectability.  The chapter juxtaposes these two colonial 
itineraries of youth transformation away from waywardness. State authorities sought to convert 
delinquent “perversity” into respectability through a threshold of “moral reeducation.” Protestant 
missionaries sought to transform fallenness into salvation through a threshold of baptism. 
Despite the limited possibilities afforded to young people by both projects, each foreclosed 
promising paths to social adulthood. The subjects of these reforming visions attempted to 
refashion these transformational projects in ways that caused each to collapse. On the eve of a 
national threshold, from colony to post-colony, state disciplinary power and Protestant church 
authority converged within a class of vernacular elites in eastern Congo.  
                                               
55 Nancy Rose Hunt explores multifarious forms of colonial “carceral techniques” to great effect in A Nervous State working 
from language developed by Michel Foucault in Discipline and Punish (1975). 
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Chapter four further explores the formation of this elite class, and how and why juvenile 
frustrations against these powerful figures rose to the level of violent rebellion by 1964. The 
chapter focuses on key political, social, and economic dynamics taking place in Butembo, a 
strategic urban zone in eastern Congo, between independence and the onset of the Simba 
Rebellion. The focus is on the consolidation of novel, forms of elite power and class, and the 
response of excluded young people to these developments. It tracks how traders used the 
economic opportunities of independence to form a class of vernacular, urban Kinande-speaking 
elite in eastern Congo between 1958 and 1964, and then used their rising influence to shape 
CEREA, a politically radical, Nande-dominated political party. Young people became vital 
laborers and political constituents but found little opportunity for personal advantage within the 
projects of local elite. At the same time, elite sought to mobilize young warriors to repel 
Kinyarwanda-speakers immigrants from lands they claimed in a surge of xenophobic violence in 
1963 that ultimately backfired.  Simba rebellion months later.  
The fifth chapter is a microhistory of the 1964 Simba Rebellion, focusing on Henri, a 
young teenager from a subsistence farming family near the town of Mangina. It follows his 
experience as a Simba for three years. He and a compatriot were among the last to desert the 
embattled Simba in their last strongholds within the forests of Equateur in 1967. Using 
microhistory to reorient the scale of the dissertation’s analysis, this chapter works against 
simplistic histories of coercion. Instead, it focuses on attractions to songs, clothing, medicine, 
alcohol, love, and camaraderie that enabled Henri and his peers to make sense of their 
involvement in the movement. Working out from memories of one subject, this chapter seeks to 
capture the sensory experience of being part of the movement and taking mai. This moves the 
argument toward a focus on possession and trance as ways to access wild power, while 
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unpacking the concept and practices of mai. It explores the perspective of child soldiers and the 
members of communities their violence affected. Finally, this chapter attempts to use the history 
emphasized in earlier chapters to interpret some of the tactics of the Simba, such as mass trials 
and summary executions of “enemies of the people” conducted by child combatants.  
 Chapter six is concerned with the afterlives of the 1964 rebellion in eastern Congo. It 
explores how creative writers used death to shape social meaning for the living in the post-
rebellion era.  A rebel newspaper called The Martyr, a biography pulled from a genre of 
Protestant missionary martyrdom literature, and Vivant Afrique, the official magazine of the 
White Fathers, are analyzed. Following arguments and evidence from each source, the links 
between death talk and social action are probed. What types of communities did writers seek to 
constitute with their interpretations and arguments about the meaning of death? The chapter 
moves from individual experience toward globally circulating discourses around the Simba and 
the implications of their violence. Threads link back to the dynamics of the first chapter: it 
examines how delinquency and martyrdom shared a common register of self-sacrifice. Finally, 
this chapter explores what forms of excavated memory and memories of trauma tell as subjects’ 
recall, reframe, and recast their experiences within the context of proliferating “death talk” in 
postcolonial Congo.  
The final chapter moves to the present and very recent past. It centers on a 2013 
accusation of cannibalism against UN agents in eastern Congo.  It argues that the UN, despite its 
overwhelming logistical presence, is seen as a deeply resented “bad neighbor” in the 
communities it occupies. The UN’s bad reputation is attributed to its refusal to share resources 
equitably, the hiddenness of its quotidian activities, and the ineffectiveness of its interventions.  
This perception of venality recalls the logics of medicinal insurgency that animated mai-mai 
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movements in eastern Congo’s history. The chapter examines how UNICEF’s work to “disarm, 
demobilize, and reintegrate” young combatants became a mechanism by which the “child 
soldier” category has been reproduced in local debate.  Child soldiers constitute a pariah class 
with limited options for community reengagement after passing through UNICEF DDR efforts. I 
argue that UNICEF interventions unintentionally reduce possibilities for reintegration that do not 
rely on state and state-like entities like the UN. I describe three vernacular categories for child 
combatants, les bandits, shege, and kadogo. Flattening of these categories into one of “child 
soldier” by development organizations led to the emergence of a new “floating” cohort of young 
men unable, or unwilling, to engage in projects of social advancement and integration. I draw 
upon the ideas of moral re-education and threshold experiences from the first two chapters. I 
argue that the logics of delinquency continue. The complex position of violent children as 
simultaneously perpetrators of violence, objects of violence, and subjects of “protection,” carry 
echoes of colonial-era juvenile criminal management. The chapter closes by re-examining layers 
of discourse and practice around the contemporary power of mai relative to perceptions of its 
uses and roles in the 1964 rebellion. This chapter’s arguments are drawn from interviews in 
contemporary Congo, newspaper accounts of cannibalism in the local press, the historiography 
of cannibal claims in Congolese history, UN official responses to these claims, and UN 
documents on child rehabilitation. 
 
Congo’s Child Soldiers and International Law 
While the dissertation uses this array of sources to focus deeply on vernacular debates over 
authority, war medicines, and notions of youth circulating within eastern Congolese 
communities, it also aims to move between scales, from discourse within kin and language 
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groups, to relevant regional and national debates, to globally-circulating interpretations of 
movements like the Simba Rebellion. Studying mai-mai movements over time allows us to make 
these scalar moves. Today the question of the role of the young in war in Africa remains an 
intense, contentious contemporary debate with significant legal consequences.   
In March 2006, Congolese warlord Thomas Lubanga Dyilo became the first person 
arrested by the International Criminal Court (ICC). The charge was “conscripting and enlisting 
children under the age of fifteen years and using them to participate actively in hostilities” in 
eastern Congo.56 Six years later, Lubanga was convicted and sentenced to fourteen years in 
prison. One key debate during the trial concerned the agency of those who fought under 
Lubanga. Could individuals under the age of fifteen who claimed to join the movement of their 
own volition be considered child soldiers. A Special Representative to the Court submitted, as an 
expert witness, an amicus curiae arguing that: 
 
“The distinction between voluntary enlistment and forced recruitment is a distinction 
without meaning in the context of armed conflict because even the most voluntary of acts 
can be a desperate attempt to survive by children with a limited number of options in the 
context of war.” 
 
 Just as the scale and character of violence threatened to overwhelm analysis in the Simba 
Rebellion, so too the question of agency and manipulation threatens to overwhelm the debate 
about the role of children in conflict in places like eastern Congo today. Once again, I return to 
the ambivalence of the position of young soldiers in movements like mai-mai that I witnessed in 
Beni in 2003. Again, we are faced with the dynamic of figures moving between extreme poles of 
vulnerability and power.  
                                               
56 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, No. ICC-01/04-01/06 (International Criminal Court October 7, 2012). 
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This dissertation attempts to provide a richer, more complex, historically-rooted portrait 
of insurgent movements involving the young, one that does not undermine the victimization of 
children in conflict. It seeks to locate and trace out logics of power and authority that go beyond 
the global juridical assessments of how and why the young make war. This study follows Pamela 
Reynolds argument that “a more careful analysis of the role of the young in conflicts could 
contribute to a more accurate description of the nature of war and of the international rules that 
are established to contain it and to respond to its aftermath.”57 There are times when 
attentiveness to uncomfortable ambivalence can open space for new understandings of violence 
and social change, ones that illuminate landscapes of political conflict and social change in 
Africa. 
  
                                               
57 Pamela Reynolds, War in Worcester, Fordham, (2012), 182. 
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Chapter Two: Killing the Talking Baby: Authority and Immaturity in Eastern Congo, 1870 
-1960 
 
In September 1872, an item appeared in newspapers throughout the British Empire advertising a 
series of photographic prints of “the Negroboy that accompanied Mr. Stanley to Europe.”58 The 
seller offered four portrait variations, each with a child posed alongside the well- known 
explorer, Henry Morton Stanley. In the images, Stanley’s posture evokes heroism: he stands 
contrapposto in pith helmet, safari khakis, wading boots, and a Winchester at the ready.59 The 
boy, by contrast, is ramrod straight in the background—diminutive, bare-chested, eyes fixed on 
the ground, a rifle slung over his shoulder, carried in the manner of a porter: hand gripping the 
end of the barrel.60 This is Kalulu, the ten-year-old whose image an enterprising trader hoped 
would interest an audience of elite imperial consumers. Though unstated, the ad marketed 
something novel: the very first photographs to enter global circulation of an African child with a 
firearm.61  
                                               
58 Advertisement by Wyman & Company, “Mr. Stanley, Discoverer of Dr. Livingstone,” The Pioneer, September 28, 1872, sec. 
9. 
 
59 Wyman & Company. Consumers would choose from images of Kalulu by himself, available in images depicting “three 
positions.” A further “five positions” depicted both Kalulu and Stanley together, “en route to find Dr. Livingstone.” All eight 
variants were available in carte de visite, (2.125 x 3.5 inches) or cabinet formats (4.25 x 6.5 inches).   
 
60 Simon Gikandi, Slavery and the Culture of Taste (Princeton University Press, 2011). This framing Gikandi demonstrates how 
over the centuries the visual trope emerged of “a black standing on the margins” in paintings where African-originated figures 
became the literal shadow of powerful whites, witnesses of difference and deference “to enhance the standing of the masters,” p 
267.  
61 While difficult to conclusively establish this, it is clear that Africans were not featured in European traveling shows or 
photographic galleries (see Bernth Lindfors, Africans on Stage: Studies in Ethnological Show Business (Indiana University Press, 
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The pairing of a powerful cosmopolitan figure with a young African combatant in his service 
sold in great numbers as a collectible and curio to British colonists and admirers at home.62 In 
late 19th century Great Lakes Africa, where the portraits’ subjects first encountered one another, 
relations between powerful, elder males and young, militarized boys were preponderant. 
Powerful men redefined the social, political, and economic dynamics of the region. Rival figures   
like Stanley, Zanzibari warlord Tippu Tip, and Mirambo of Unyamwizi, consolidated small 
polities in new trade-based inland empires. These big men made war for wealth, influence, and 
authority with armies comprised of young men much like Kalulu.  
This chapter explores the relationship between patriarchal authorities and young warriors in a 
region—now called eastern Congo—at key moments between 1870 and the outbreak of the 
Simba rebellion in 1964. It argues that the actions of the core subjects of this dissertation—tens 
of thousands of juvenile63 combatants who purged religious, customary, and customary political 
authority in 1964—are best understood within a longer history of contestations and complicity 
between lineage juniors and their elders. It examines the historical persistence of three kinds 
violence that featured juvenile Congolese actors over a nearly ninety-year period. The first was a 
                                               
1999)) until 1893. Thus, this series seems to present first image of an African holding a weapon with European or American 
provenance.  
62 No doubt the perception of a ready market for such images was linked to the high volume of sales of books and engravings 
achieved by Henry Morton Stanley through his bestselling In Darkest Africa, vol. 1 (S. Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, 
1890).  
 
63 I use the term “juvenile” to represent the youth and pre-adult status of this category of person, while attempting to avoid using 
a biological referent of “adolescence” or legal frameworks “minor,” and the too capacious “child.” The focus is to use, as in  
Emmanuel Kwaku Akyeampong, Themes in West Africa’s History (Ohio University Press, 2006) p. 120 a term both particular 
and broad. I define juvenile as an unmarried male without children. It does not refer to chronologically measured age or age set.  
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system of violent labor and laborers called ruga-ruga.64  The second, Anioto,65 emerged as an 
assassination movement against dissident junior figures within lineage groups and become the 
source of immense colonial anxiety. Deemed a threat to chiefly authority, Anioto usually targeted 
women and children. The last and most enduring logic of violence is embodied by a single 
figure: Mwindo, a mythical character. Versions of his epic tale capture a set of practices, 
medicines, and discourses that suggest the imagined foundations of recurring therapeutic 
insurgencies that leveraged wild powers to do violence against venal elite male authority. 
Our geographical focus is eastern Congo’s Albertine Rift zone.66 During the period under 
study this area was subject to immense economic, political, and social flux and change, even as 
enduring logics of violence and contestations over authority persisted. My basic argument is not 
that these forms of violence reveal what Steven Feierman has critically called a “secret 
continuity” between the precolonial and postcolonial. I contend that decades of colonial power, 
                                               
64 Ruga-ruga lacks specific definition, but for examples of historians’ attempts to define it, see pages 37-38 of this dissertation. 
One definition would be: figures who comprised a “permanent standing army” as opposed to the mobilizable but predominately 
civilian young men in other Great Lakes societies in the 19th century.  
65 The literal meaning of the word anioto (or as it also frequently appears: aniota) is “leopard-man” and its variations appear in 
many languages in the Albertine Rift zone. In Kinande, for instance, the word is “ekinyota” and is translated by Ngessimo 
Mutaka and Kamable Kavutirwaki in their Kinande-English/English-Kinande Dictionary (Rutgers University: African Anaphora 
Project, 2008) as “leopard-man,” p 336. Note that this is a completely different word, and shares no root form, with the word for 
leopard: “eboha” and is also distinct from the non-hyphenated word, “leopard man” which is “ekihokohoko.” 
66 This is a geographic subzone of Great Lakes Africa from the western escarpment of the Rift Valley including the Rwenzori 
and Virunga mountain ranges to the west, and the westernmost rim of the Congo basin rainforest to the east. The Albertine’s 
lower elevation zone passes from Lake Malawi in the south to Lake Albert in the north—nearly 1000 miles. It drains many of 
Africa’s Great Lakes: gathering waters that flow, eventually, to the Nile River. The Albertine Rift’s particularly lush ecology 
allowed for agricultural intensification and subsequent population growth. It’s remote situation, far from both the Atlantic and 
Indian oceans meant it would become the zone of interface between the eastern expansion of Belgian colonial power (embodied 
by Stanley and his band) and the westward expansion of Zanzibar-linked trading dynasties (like those who had initially captured 
Kalulu) in the 19th century.  As the slave trade advanced from both east and western coasts to converge in this area volatile 
alliances and allegiances generated insecurity and lent existential importance for African elites to the management of young men, 
in particular, for the purposes of consolidating trade routes and protecting access to key resources, as well as disciplining internal 
dissent. See David Lee Schoenbrun, A Green Place, a Good Place: Agrarian Change, Gender, and Social Identity in the Great 
Lakes Region to the 15th Century (Heinemann Educ Books, 1998) for a good overview of this region prior to this dissertation’s 
scope.  
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state violence, and social change did affect relations and ideas.67 Instead, the chapter traces how 
“durable bundles of meaning and practice” regarding the roles of young male combatants in 
social stability and change shaped discourse and action in eastern Congo over several 
generations both with and against the grain of colonial order and violence.68  Elites made use of 
juniors and mercenaries to achieve their own political and economic projects in eastern Congo.69 
Moreover, I show how social positions of immaturity and marginality became a source of power 
for juvenile males and also a powerful source of concern for patriarchs in the region.70  
 
Kalulu, Stanley, and Ruga-Ruga 
In 1876, four years after his likeness became an item of exchange in the imperial world, Kalulu 
travelled back to Africa. He was part of King Leopold II’s International African Association 
(IAA) expedition sent to survey and legitimize the king’s land claims in central Africa. 
                                               
67 Steven Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1990), p 17. 
68 David L Schoenbrun, “Conjuring the Modern in Africa: Durability and Rupture in Histories of Public Healing between the 
Great Lakes of East Africa,” The American Historical Review 111, no. 5 (December 1, 2006): p 1403. 
69 There is a deep history of managing social “aging” and maturation, especially of age sets in sub-Saharan African history. 
Perhaps most notably, and linked to the history this dissertation seeks to track, is Shaka’s management of age set marriage for his 
warriors, see Elizabeth A. Eldredge, “Sources of Conflict in Southern Africa, C. 1800–30: The ‘Mfecane’ Reconsidered,” The 
Journal of African History 33, no. 1 (March 1992): p 27. Making warriors beholden entirely on Shaka for access to reproduction 
produced a direct, unmediated, linkage between him and these figures.  
 
70 Both coercive forms of armed work and the complex labor relations between juniors by seniors were not new in eastern 
Congo. The difference between slave and mercenary was ambiguous. Douglas Northrup argued that “slavery was eastern 
[Congo’s] first form of ‘employment.’” (Beyond the Bend in the River, pg.123) This supposes that slavery encountering societies 
without labor regimes and forms of exchange. Rather it is clear that the mobilization of youth by elites as productive of kinds of 
initiation to power were common in pre-colonial northeastern Congo. For many years scholars, building on pioneering work by 
Claude Meillasoux, argued that the “lineage mode of production”—Africa’s precolonial economic regime—was based on the 
exploitation of youth labor by seniors. The two key engines of growth were long distance trade and war. But this relied on 
continuity and stability… so there was tremendous flux against which stabilization happened: leading to violence. Central 
African youth, in these early anthropological studies, occupied an ambivalent social position where their labor necessarily 
constituted and perpetuated elite power. They were the engines of social reproduction. At the same time, male youth in particular 
needed careful management—being provisioned with wives, offices, and wealth in good time—as their dissent and flight could 
unravel the very fabric of social cohesion, should they feel misused or blocked from advancement and the possibilities of 
accumulating wealth as social adults. 
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Publically, the IAA purportedly aimed to “eliminate the terrible scourge of slavery” in the region 
and find a “means of opening up the interior of the continent to the commerce, industry, and 
scientific enterprise of the civilized world.”71 Leopold’s grandiose imperial motives also 
eminently commercial, justifying the “liberal expenditure of his private means” to establish 
sovereignty over a vast expanse of Africa.72 One lavish expense of this endeavor involved 
retaining the services of the famous Stanley to lead the expedition.73 Europeans imagined the 
journey to be highly dangerous. The region was roiling with competing militias and slaving war 
bands. With much hyperbole Stanley’s explorer peers sent him on his way as a likely “martyr in 
the cause of geographical enquiry.”74 In the light of the strategic importance, expense, and risk of 
the trip, it is noteworthy that a key member of the retinue would be the boy from the curio 
postcards: ten-year-old Kalulu.75  
Stanley purchased Kalulu from a slave trader in Tabora (Tanganyika) in 1871, less than one 
year before they posed for portraits in a New York City studio.76 Stanley once described Kalulu’s 
purchase in emancipatory terms but the child’s status was complex. Kalulu was not free to decide 
his own fate nor return to his family or place of origin. Instead, he worked without pay for five 
                                               
71 E. Delmar Morgan, “The Free State of the Congo,” Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of 
Geography 7, no. 4 (1885): 223–30. 
72 Ibid. In addition, much has been written about Leopold’s intentions behind establishing the “Free State.” The most popular of 
these texts is Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa (Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt, 1999) and Nancy Rose Hunt’s critique of such a perspective in A Nervous State beginning on page 3. 
73  Morgan, “The Free State of the Congo,” p 225. 
 
74 Charles P. Daly and Alexander Crummell, “The Plan of the King of Belgium for the Civilization of Central Africa, and the 
Suppression of the Slave Trade,” Journal of the American Geographical Society of New York 9 (1877): 88–103,. p 90.  
 
75 Stanley recorded his birth name as Ndugu M’hali.  
 
76 Tim Jeal, Stanley: The Impossible Life of Africa’s Greatest Explorer (Yale University Press, 2007), p 111. Kalulu was 
purchased in September of 1871. 
 35 
years as the explorer’s “faithful body servant.”77 Stanley, like many contemporaneous foreigners 
in complex kin relations with African children, described Kalulu as his “adopted son.”78 Most 
likely his status was similar to many living in the Congo Basin region. People like Kalulu 
continually passed, as Nancy Rose Hunt writes, “from one form of subjugation to another.”79  
Whatever the precise relation with Stanley, Kalulu became a permanent member of the 
explorer’s entourage. He was part of the expedition to locate David Livingstone. As such he 
featured in public fetes in the United States and Europe during Stanley’s publicity tours after 
locating the famous missionary. Kalulu’s role was to come on stage, talk and sing in Swahili, and 
demonstrate the Islamic prayer posture of salah.80 He grew famous in his own right. Kalulu’s 
likeness was cast at Madame Taussaud’s alongside waxworks of Livingstone and Stanley. 81  
After the grueling publicity tour of hundreds of lectures across the United States and Europe, 
Stanley enrolled Kalulu in a parochial boarding school in England for 18 months. At 
Livingstone’s funeral on April 18, 1874 the only African present was Kalulu. 82  
                                               
77 “Stanley’s Journey Across Africa,” The American Naturalist 11, no. 11 (November 1877): 695. 
 
78 Henry Morton Stanley, “The Land of The Moon. A Graphic Pen Picture of Unyamwezi,” The New York Herald, August 9, 
1872, p 3. 
 
79 Nancy Rose Hunt, A Colonial Lexicon of Birth Ritual, Medicalization, and Mobility in the Congo (Duke University Press, 
1999), p44. 
 
80 “Stanley and Kalulu. The Presents and Tokens of Sovereigns and Sages to the Traveller;,” The New York Herald, November 
22, 1872. 
 
81 From The romance of Madam Taussuds, p. 183 by John Theodore Tassuad, 1920. In addition the November 16, 1872 edition 
of the Rhode Island Mercury, indicates that Stanley with “his boy Kalulu” was engaged in 100 lectures across the US in 1873, 
each for a $500 fee—equivalent to about 10,000 dollars per lecture in 2016 currency. The tour was not as successful as he’d 
hoped, but had it sold out it would have yielded the equivalent of approximately one million dollars revenue for Stanley.  
 
82 Dr. Livingstone et al., “Report to the Council on the Arrangements for the Funeral of Dr. Livingstone,” Proceedings of the 
Royal Geographical Society of London 18, no. 4 (1873): 445–50. Kalulu’s title in the funeral program was as “an African boy,” 
pg 450.  
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Stanley wrote intensely, even erotically, about his charge: “Kalulu understands my ways and 
mode of life exactly… Kalulu—young antelope—is frisky. I have but to express a wish and it is 
gratified. He is a perfect Mercury, but a marvelously black one.”83 No doubt to capitalize on 
Kalulu’s growing fame, and for other reasons that can only be speculated, Stanley published a 
lengthy “romantic novel” about an African noble entitled My Kalulu: Prince, King and Slave in 
1873. In the preface, Stanley promised his readers: “I can assure those interested in Kalulu that 
someday, if I live, I shall attempt to take him back to his own country, through numberless 
adventure, incidents, and scenes, in the hope that he shall enjoy his own again. But if I have 
failed in this venture, then Kalulu must stop at Zanzibar, where the reader may fancy him, if he 
likes, eating mangoes and oranges, until I fetch him out.”84  
Kalulu’s thoughts about his patron were not recorded, but events suggest Kalulu was not 
content with his situation.85 When the IAA expedition reached eastern Congo in 1876, likely the 
region of Kalulu’s birth, he escaped.86 Stanley halted the group’s progress and sent out teams to 
find him. When recaptured, Stanley forced Kalulu to wear chains—marking slave status—as 
punishment. As the expedition traversed a rapid part of the Congo River by foot, Kalulu was 
swept away and drowned in September 1877. He was fifteen-years-old at the time.87 Stanley 
                                               
83 Henry Morton Stanley, “The Land of The Moon. A Graphic Pen Picture of Unyamwezi,” The New York Herald, August 9, 
1872. 
 
84 Henry Morton Stanley, My Kalulu, Prince, King, and Slave: A Story of Central Africa (C. Scribner’s Sons, 1873), p ix. 
 
85 The absence of Kalulu’s words on the record is due, at least in part, to the fact that Stanley served as Kalulu’s sole translator 
on publicity tours.  
 
86 We can make an assumption about Kalulu’s origins for two reasons: his place of purchase and the location he chose to attempt 
to escape Stanley. First, Tabora was a site, among others, where slavers operating in eastern Congo would send many slaves for 
purchase via Indian ocean routes. See Sarah Croucher and Stephanie Wynne-Jones, “Slave Routes in Western Tanzania: A 
Preliminary Report on Survey in Tabora and Ujiji,” African Diaspora Archaeology Newsletter, December 2006. In addition, we 
can speculate that Kalulu would likely to attempt escape in a region with which he possessed some familiarity rather than in parts 
totally unknown. That he attempted escape in northeastern Congo implies some familiarity with the region.   
 
87 He died in the region now called Inga Falls. Stanley gave the section of the river where the boy died Kalulu’s name. 
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reported being abject at his death.88 We may never know the mood of the recently re-enslaved 
youth who lost his footing. Perhaps the vagaries of despair, enslavement, and the possibility of a 
lifetime under the hand of Stanley presented the rushing waters as a means of permanent escape 
for Kalulu.  
Kalulu’s international fame, unique and bombastic patron, experiences of violence, and 
overseas travels, cast him as a complex, enigmatic figure. Placing him at the core of this 
chapter’s key arguments, provides a uniquely individuated—if profoundly mediated—portrait of 
an African youth who hailed from a militia band in late 19th century east and central Africa. In 
some ways, only his unique international trajectory beside Stanley makes Kalulu exceptional. In 
other very important ways, many young men in what is now eastern Congo lived lives much like 
Kalulu’s in his era. Coerced into a series of complex relationships with powerful elder male 
figures, they were enticed, compelled, or coerced them to participate in violent activities.89 There 
are many whose names, unlike Kalulu’s, are not recorded, and who left behind no pictures. All 
served in the keep of powerful adult men with violent ambitions. Each sought money, political 
control, sometimes territory, and always clients and followers. Among the most strategically 
important of these followers were ruga-ruga.  
Ruga-ruga warrior movements thrived in the late 19th century east and central Africa.90 Most 
ruga-ruga were active from 1860 through 1897, some professionally so—moving between 
                                               
 
88 Tim Jeal, Stanley: The Impossible Life of Africa’s Greatest Explorer (Yale University Press, 2007), p 23. 
 
89 This depends, of course, on which elite one served under. Figures under Nyungu-ya-mawe or Mirambo anticipated marriage 
and land if they survived their martial adventures. Most others, like Kalulu, had uncertain futures.  
 
90 Aylward Shorter, “Nyungu-Ya-Mawe and the ‘Empire of the Ruga-Rugas,’” The Journal of African History 9, no. 2 (1968): 
235–59. 
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leaders.91 The interplay between the increasing penetration of slaving economies into the Great 
Lakes region and pre-colonial European exploration catalyzed novel forms of organizing young 
male labor. The primary innovation involved a shift out of kin relations to other economic and 
political arrangements. Unlike relations within lineage, ruga-ruga were typically temporarily 
engaged. John Iliffe summarized ruga-ruga as “wild young men without family ties” who served 
as for-hire or press-ganged warriors under the region’s powerful men.92 Andrew Roberts 
suggests ruga-ruga bands consisted of “runaway slaves, war-captives, deserting porters, social 
outcasts and restless young men eager for adventure.”93  
Powerful east and central African traders and others elites relied on ruga-ruga labor in the 
latter half of the 19th century to make war and establish and maintain extensive political and 
economic control in the region.94 These leaders established kin-like relations with ruga-ruga 
warriors. Among these were Mirambo of Unyamwezi, an expansionist leader who consolidated 
smaller polities in the Great Lakes region,95 his rival Nyungu-ya-Mawe, a leader of a competing 
                                               
91 Beyond Shorter’s work, a review of other early studies of this subject can be found in Michael Pesek, “Ruga-Ruga. The 
History of an East African Profession, 1820-1919,” in German Colonialism Revisited: Asian and African Responses to German 
Colonialism, by N.A. Berman, P. Nganang, and K. Muelhahn (University of Michigan Press, 2014), 85–100 where he cites them 
as: Edward A. Alpers, "Nineteenth Century-Prelude to Colonialism," in Zamani. A survey of East African History, ed. B.A. Ogot 
and J. A. Kieran (Nairobi: East African Pubishling House, 1968); Ralph A. Austen, World War I Northwestern Tanzania under 
German and British Rule. Colonial Policy and Tribal Politics, 1889-1939 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); R. W. 
Beachey, "The East African Ivory Trade in the Nineteenth Century," Journal of African History, no. 8 (1967); Norman R. 
Bennett, Mirambo of Tanzania, 1840?-1884 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971); John Iliffe, A Modern History of 
Tanganyika (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); on p. 21. 
92 John Iliffe, Honour in African History (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 89. 
 
93 Michelle R. Moyd, Violent Intermediaries: African Soldiers, Conquest, and Everyday Colonialism in German East Africa 
(Ohio University Press, 2014) p 78. She is drawing on Andrew Roberts chapter "Nyamwezi Trade" in Richard Gray and David 
Birmingham, Pre-Colonial African Trade: Essays on Trade in Central and Eastern Africa before 1900 (Oxford, 1970) p 175. 
94 Jonathon Glassman, Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion, and Popular Consciousness on the Swahili Coast, 1856-1888 
(Heinemann, 1995) argues that for elites like Bushiri in Tanzania, it was only the erosion of “popular support” that led such 
figures to enlist mercenary forces like ruga-ruga. 
  
95 Currently Tabora district of Tanzania, a prominent warlord from 1860 to 1884.  
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emergent “business firm,”96 and Tippu Tip, the major Zanzibari slave trader and warlord.97 Rival 
“ruga-ruga empires” emerged in the late 19th century and went to war over valuable slaving, 
commodity, and transportation routes from central Africa to the Indian Ocean coast.98 These 
powerful big men transformed the roles of ruga-ruga during this period; through the 1860s, 
ruga-ruga seem to have been primarily roving guards who protected the many porters carrying 
goods along valuable trade routes. It was only during the ascendance of consolidating figures 
like Mirambo and Nyungu-ya-Mawe that the term came to signify a stabilized fighting force 
aligned with warrior-trader elites.99 Some ruga-ruga were affiliated with formal military 
movements, provisioned with firearms and bedecked in imperial costume.100 Others entered 
battle intoxicated with marijuana, wearing “ghastly finery” including human entrails and teeth, 
beads and feathers, charms and medicinal objects—otherwise nude.101   
What linked the movements were the core relations that animated them. Ruga-ruga were 
young men enlisted into the expansive political projects of powerful non-kin elder men. Some 
ruga-ruga undoubtedly enthusiastically embraced the expansionist opportunities afforded them. 
Violence and threat compelled others to join against their wills. Brutality characterized ruga-
                                               
96 A contemporary of Mirambo, called “emperor of the Ruga-Ruga” in Shorter’s piece.   
 
97 Michael Pesek, “Ruga-Ruga. The History of an East African Profession, 1820-1919,” in German Colonialism Revisited: Asian 
and African Responses to German Colonialism, by N.A. Berman, P. Nganang, and K. Muelhahn (University of Michigan Press, 
2014), p 4. 
 
98 John Illife initially calls describes the organization in this way, and the imperial language is taken up by Pesek. “Ruga-ruga” p. 
6. 
 
 
99 Michelle R. Moyd, New African Histories : Violent Intermediaries : African Soldiers, Conquest, and Everyday Colonialism in 
German East Africa (Ohio University Press, 2014). 
 
100 Pesek, “Ruga-Ruga. The History of an East African Profession, 1820-1919.” 
 
101 Aylward Shorter, “Nyungu-Ya-Mawe and the ‘Empire of the Ruga-Rugas,’” The Journal of African History 9, no. 2 (1968): 
241. 
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ruga tactics, and many feared their scorched earth approach. As German forces began to enlist 
their own ruga-ruga in pre-colonial east Africa in the late 19th century, one officer wrote: “The 
ruga-ruga are of use if one likes to destroy entire regions. In that they are top-notch."102 So feared 
were they, and so diverse the aspirations and ambitions of the powerful elder men who 
marshalled them, that on occasion African communities would pre-emptively attack some of the 
first Christian missionaries traveling with their African entourages into central Africa; they 
feared they were ruga-ruga.103 
It was not only African elites and official colonial agents who engaged their services. 
International fortune seekers were also eager to take part in the extractive economies of the Great 
Lakes milieu. Stanley was a member of this cadre. So too was Oscar Baumann, a German 
explorer, who brought a retinue of 138 persons through what is now eastern Congo and Burundi 
in 1892, including dozens he called “ruga-ruga.” 104 Emin Pasha famously established a base of 
followers and ruga-ruga to consolidate and protect his interests. Another prominent European 
warlord was the Irish missionary turned trader and smuggler, Charles Stokes, who gained 
prominence after the establishment of the Congo Free State in 1885.  Stokes abandoned his 
religious calling, married into the prominent Congolese Mtinginya family, and by 1893 exported 
as much as £20,000 of ivory out of Congo annually.105 He gathered a retinue of Sukuma-
speaking followers and coordinated various legal and illicit trading activities from eastern Congo 
                                               
102 From the Bundesarchiv R1001/1030 Schwessinger to Soden, November 26, 1892 quoted in Pesek, “Ruga-ruga” p. 14.  
103 Charles F. Holmes, “Zanzibari Influence at the Southern End of Lake Victoria: The Lake Route,” African Historical Studies 
4, no. 3 (1971) pg 498.  
104 Jean-Pierre Chrétien, “Le Passage de L’expédition d’Oscar Baumann Au Burundi (Septembre-Octobre 1892),” Cahiers 
d’Études Africaines 8, no. 29 (1968): p 92. 
105 This is worth over $2,000,000 in 2018 dollars. From Holmes, “Zanzibari Influence” p 495. 
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into east Africa. In 1895, the Belgian General Hubert Lothaire began investigating Stokes under 
suspicion of treason against the Free State government. Lothaire accused Stokes of selling guns 
to insurgent Africans in exchange for ivory.106 When evidence emerged that armaments that 
Stokes imported into Congo were being actively used in clashes with Free State forces in the 
region, Belgian officials summarily executed the Irishman. Stokes’ death caused “much 
excitement” abroad, escalating into a serious diplomatic incident between the United Kingdom 
and Belgium. The outcome was a 205,000 franc compensation payment from King Leopold’s 
Free State to the British government and also to the “natives of… Mr. Stokes’ 
caravan…deprived of their chief.”107 Across Congo’s extractive zones figures like Stokes found 
a ready place and ripe social and economic milieu for their big man aspirations, but competition 
was fierce and the stakes of failure high. The death of Stokes coincided with the collapse of 
Zanzibari influence in eastern Congo in the face of Belgian military might in the last decade of 
the 19th century. It was a twilight time for the ruga-ruga in Africa’s Great Lakes region and well 
beyond. General Lothaire’s successor, Francis Dhanis, led a campaign in 1897 to suppress 
internal competition and drive out the last warlords from eastern Congo. This so-called “Arab 
War” was the last major colonial military action in the region for almost two decades.  
What is lost in existing analysis is that ruga-ruga formed a kind of process-structure that 
did not end with Belgian colonialism, but rather found place within it and beyond it. One can see 
strong traces of these relations in post-colonial Congo. Mutual advantage, and sometimes 
coercion, that knit elders and juniors together in common violent purpose remain part of the story 
of Congolese politics throughout the colonial and postcolonial periods.   
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The young men who comprised Dhanis’ army, and won eastern Congo for Belgium were, 
in clear ways, simply a late iteration of the ruga-ruga of the 1870s and 1880s.108 As Belgian 
colonial forces standardized (and in many cases ethnicized) their armed forces, engagements 
with ruga-ruga reached a different zenith.109 These figures became part of the apparatus of 
imperial power. No longer tied to regional big men and explorers, these violent laborers served 
the men of the colonial metropole. For the officers of the Force Publique, the Free State and later 
Belgian Congo police forces, the legacy of ruga-ruga style organization was obvious. These 
security forces of the emerging Belgian colonial system were not built on metropolitan standards 
of a disaggregated, multilevel policing and armed forces stratification.110  Rather the Force 
Publique “resembled a series of small disconnected military bands” with powerful individual 
leaders but any other form of “hierarchy was vestigial.”111  The personalized, relational 
management structure reproduced the intense forms of dependence on elites that animated many 
earlier ruga-ruga movements.  
As colonial forces sought to monopolize violent young labor, African big men either lost 
control of youth including ruga-ruga or joined the colonial apparatus as proxy forces. Emergent 
structures of indirect rule slowly took hold in the colony, particularly after World War I. Steven 
Feierman argued that the arrival of colonial rule generally generated, at the regional and local 
levels, resentment and “contempt” against the newly created structures of “customary 
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authority.”112 Some of these structures—including the domination of big men and their young 
followers—were simply reconfigured version of late pre-colonial social formulations. Chiefs, 
slowly and haltingly, were brought into colonial structures as they paid the state taxes and, 
crucially, provisioned the Force Publique with young men. A monopoly over the power to 
marshal youthful violence was ceded to the colonial state.113 Emerging colonial economic 
entities in the form of concessionary companies mobilized their own young men for violent 
work. Force Publique officers sought to preserve the ruga-ruga era tactical capacity to “destroy 
entire regions” that refused entrance into the extractive colonial economy.114 Domination was 
aspirational. Real control proved elusive in the face of ongoing self-interested competition 
between powerful figures at multiple levels and scales. The army also underwent significant 
restructuring in the early Belgian Congo years, in advance of World War I, culminating in 
policies that made the Force Publique at least nominally conform to metropolitan standards from 
1914.115  
 
Pacifying Wanande-land North 
Ruga-ruga youth, bands, and sometimes “empires” gave way to emerging colonial regimes. 
European warlords in the region acceded to the state or self-destructed before it. Colonial control 
was consolidated and enacted. Nonetheless, scattered throughout the Belgian Congo were zones 
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of territory yet to be “pacified.” One such region was dominated by Kinande-speakers in the 
northern part of what is now North Kivu province in the heart of the Albertine Rift zone. The 
Belgian authorities called this area Wanande Land North. Examining the pacification one of 
these last pockets of violent anti-colonial resistance brings into our frame a second major form of 
violence in this era, Anioto.   
The fighting climaxed in 1897, when Lieutenant Francis Dhanis marched on what is now 
Beni-Lubero territory with his armed followers, ruga-ruga-like bands of Tetela-speaking youth. 
His aim was to disrupt remnant forces of “Arab” ivory traders whose trading outposts were some 
10 kilometers from Butembo at “Katwa, on the northeast corner of Lake Edward, at Kirimi, on 
the southern slopes of the Ruwenzories; and at Beni, west of the Semliki River.”116  Kinande-
speaking clan groups long dominated all these regions. Dhanis’ campaign was partially 
successful. His forces destroyed armed men linked with Swahili coast ivory traders. He was 
unable to continue occupying the region after these victories against “Arabs” and their allies. In 
part this failure was due to a mutiny within his armed band. In addition, the vacuum created by 
the disruption of the Zanzibari monopoly over ivory trading created intense battles over this 
lucrative trade. Space opened up for powerful Kinande-speakers to achieve control over many 
profitable networks in an economic region that stretched into British territory in Uganda. A low-
level guerilla network emerged linking Kinande-speaking big men traders and ruga-ruga-like 
bands. This new formation soon confronted the gathering strength of the colonial state’s armed 
forces.  
The wars between the Force Publique and ruga-ruga proved long lived. Growing 
international humanitarian pressure on King Leopold, the subsequent transfer of sovereignty 
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from the monarchy to the parliament of Belgium in 1908, and Uganda/Congo border disputes 
delayed for years Belgian efforts to “penetrate” the Mitumba Mountains and “pacify" these 
unruly residents of eastern Congo. An imagined final surge of a “pacification” campaign began 
in 1912. Belgian-led forces established a military encampment at Luhofu to serve as a base of 
operations. 117  African laborers completed the construction of this boma in 1913.  Soon after, the 
campaign to quash Nande insurgencies halted with the onset of World War I.  It was only in 
1922, in the new context of postwar empire118 that the Belgian Congo’s forces again turned their 
attention to a “complete subjugation” of Wanande Land North. Two years of asymmetric 
fighting followed. The Force Publique finally secured a road from Beni to Butembo and from 
Beni to the Ugandan border at Kasindi-Mpondwe. The authorities also converted the Lubero 
military post into a permanent territorial administrative headquarters. In the core zone of 
conflict—what is now Beni territory—a further four years of overt fighting was required to 
quash vestiges of visible guerrilla activities.119  As violence dissipated by 1928, state authorities 
finally authorized Catholic and Protestant missionaries, who has been operating in the area only 
in a piecemeal fashion since the 1910s, to set up permanent mission stations. A year later, the 
first Greek merchant and other trading families began to arrive, lending logistical support to the 
first Belgian settlers.120  
The newly subjugated Kinande-speakers, Randall Packard argues, had not leveraged their 
common linguistic heritage into a shared precolonial political culture.  Kinande-speaking groups 
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shared “very little corporate identity" prior to colonial rule; they were neither "geographically 
cohesive, nor [shared] totemic or exogamous units."121 Nande elders confirm these claims. The 
oldest argue that umbrella terms currently used for Nande-speakers—“Banande122 and 
“Bayira”—are derogatory words linked to the nomenclature of Zanzibari slave traders in the 19th 
century.123  In some Nande zones the absence of any shared precolonial political hierarchy left a 
shaky basis for the necessary bureaucracies of indirect rule. In others, strong houses and 
patriarchal regimes proved ready ground for such political transformations. Regardless, in the 
late 1920s in eastern Congo, chiefdoms, taxation, and residence requirements forced the last of 
remnants of ruga-ruga into colonial coherence. Still the challenges of governance were 
enormous, and open to much resistance. Emerging chiefs and notables were in need of strategies 
to control their potentially unruly subjects. 
 
Anioto 
As intense wars of “pacification” gave way to the bureaucracies, venal possibilities, and 
everyday oppressions and opportunities of colonialism, anxieties about colonial subjects 
persisted. The most vexing fears revolved around the authority figures, at multiple scales, 
inability to eliminate dangerous “sects” operating in the region. The motives of such movements 
were difficult for colonial administrators to discern. The most concerning to the colonial 
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government went by the name of Anioto. “The tale of the Anioto Leopards… is enough to make 
the blood run cold and keep the imaginative awake at nights” wrote an Englishman named T. 
Alexander Barns while exploring eastern Congo in 1922. In purple prose, Barns described how a 
“sinister streak of extravagant superstition in their natures has been appealed to in some way by 
the cannibals known…. as the Anioto—which claims many devotees” in eastern Congo.124 He 
continued, “The Anioto sect of Human Leopards are amongst their savage customs. These are as 
singular as any to be met with in Africa today.”125 In hyperbole, Barns captured the deep fear 
Anioto produced in colonizing agents in the region.   
Barns recounted that after Anioto killed 128 people, the authorities mounted an expedition to 
eradicate the movement. While it failed to capture or kill all Anioto,  
“some interesting facts came to light about the Human Leopards. For instance, it was 
found that a novitiate of an Anioto consisted in his having to live in the forest alone for eight 
weeks on food he has to kill or find for himself as best he can, but firstly, before he can enter 
on this stage of the initiation, it has to be known that he has killed a man of his own tribe. 
Having accomplished these two feats, he is tattooed on the chest above the Mamhela 
cicatrisations [healed-over scarification]. A notable Anioto ishumu or ‘high priest,’ who was 
captured and hanged, had three such cicatrisations on each side of the chest as a mark of his 
order, and as the identity of the Anioto is unknown save by these cicatrices, everyone is on 
the look-out for them when passing natives in the forest. Three men have been hanged for 
being in possession of the Anioto knives.”126  
 
Barns account suggests that youth initiates were behind Anioto violence— for whom 
assassination became a source of prestige and a tactic of inclusion into elder male circle. 
Colonial nervousness was profoundly provoked by this seemingly inscrutable insurgent 
movement. The costumed, scarified figures of Anioto so agitated European fears that the mere 
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possession of a steel blade led to summary execution in interwar eastern Congo. Despite their 
fear and fascination, Europeans seemed to have nothing to fear from Anioto. Anioto never 
targeted whites. “Fortunately,” wrote Barnes, “the prey of this sect are blacks—principally 
young and defenseless women and children—not whites.”127  
This is a key observation. If whites were not the targets of Anioto violence then who were, 
and why? It seems untenable to argue, as Osumaka Likaka, that the rending of bodies at night 
with claw-shaped knives was an attempt to “restore social harmony and recover local autonomy” 
in the face of colonial oppression.128 If this were the case, why were chiefs, colonial 
sympathizers, and colonists themselves not targeted? Perhaps, instead, Anioto was a response by 
powerful male elites to resentments over emergent “customary authority” in newly pacified 
eastern Congo. Barn’s observation that the targets of violence were “defenseless women and 
children” is crucial. Anioto murders eliminated and terrorized figures who posed a threat to 
patriarchal control—unruly sons and belligerent wives and daughters—in the fraught new 
colonial political culture of customary chiefdoms.   
Colonial authority’s nervousness was behind their misinterpretation of Anioto. They sought 
to violently suppress it as an anti-colonial movement targeting foreign figures when in fact 
Anioto were protecting chiefs and state-aligned agents. Colonial anti-Anioto campaigns 
inadvertently became self-defeating. Attacking the Anioto, who served the very chiefs the state 
sought to empower and utilize, in fact aided the true insurgents: anti-chief women and children in 
eastern Congolese communities.  Despite the cost to male elders from anti-Anioto actions, the 
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internal battle for authority within eastern Congolese polities was intense, and the power of 
Anioto was not easily relinquished.  The movement proved exceedingly difficult to for the 
colonial state to erase. In the face of suppression, it took new shades and shapes. Tensions and 
violence indexed by Anioto—triangulated between Belgian officials, the local chiefs that worked 
with them, and the dissident members of those communities who resisted both forms of 
authority— persisted for decades.  
The new district commissioner of freshly controlled Wanande Land North, soon rechristened 
Beni-Lubero, reported in the early 1930s that “the Anioto sect remains present in the territory. 
The natives are more afraid than ever of these leopards who have taken a number of victims ... In 
1932 more than 40 natives… were killed by leopard. Several times the population has been in 
turmoil over this. Unfortunately, many investigations have failed to discover who is behind the 
leopard-men murders. The execution of Anioto in Aruma and the relegation of Aluta will be a 
great blow to this sect.” 129  Aluta, a local notable, informed the police in 1927 that his son was 
murdered by Anioto.130 Over subsequent weeks twenty more were killed in the area that would 
become Beni territory. Though Aluta’s son was murdered, military figures grew convinced that 
Aluta was ordering Anioto killings himself. Authorities found that Aluta’s son’s death was 
connected to a deep rivalry between big men in the region who were using Anioto to kill 
dissenters within their communities and murder the loved ones of competing male elites in the 
region.131 Despite piecing together what they imagined to be the motives of the killings, the 
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state-aligned policing forces were unable to identify suspects who actually carried out the 
killings. Aluta was relegated for his purported role in the violence despite scant evidence.  It is 
possible that investigations failed to yield suspects because the Congolese customary authorities 
supporting the investigation were, in fact, aligned with the movement that would protect their 
own interests and authority.   
Our knowledge of Anioto is mediated by the rapportage recorded in colonial archives. The 
fragments and glimpses found on documents are prismatic and potentially misleading, much like 
the field data that colonial agents struggled to gather and analyze at the time. Colonial 
investigators found it virtually impossible to solicit witnesses to testify to the identities of Anioto 
killers. In the face of silence and confusion they ultimately “ascribed [much of the killing] to 
wild animals.”132 
Anioto would continue to be a campaign of disciplinary murder in Beni territory until it was 
finally driven underground by a campaign of relegation—internal exile—of all suspected 
members in 1935.133  Despite this brutal suppression, low-level Anioto activities continued for 
the next decade. The last recorded attacks occurred in 1945.134 Both the existence and 
suppression of Anioto exposed deep anxieties—of the colonial state and erstwhile partners 
among African customary authorities—over inabilities to assert control and mobilize productive 
labor. Anioto violence and colonial counter-insurgency campaigns were at odds, incoherent and 
counterproductive. In an unacknowledged, but shared concern over dissenting members at the 
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bottom of lineage pyramids, state authorities and lineage notables revealed common weaknesses 
in the “fundamental compatibility” of their strategies of governance.135  
From florid accounts by figures like Barns and the framing of Anioto as tropical bogeymen in 
the Belgian popular imagination, from Tintin to menacing statues at the Royal Central African 
Museum at Tervuren, Anioto became a subject of fascination far outside of Congo.136 Observers 
on the global political left imagined Anioto as the first stirrings of a broad anti-colonial, anti-
capitalist movement, going so far as to say, tongue-in-cheek, that “every human-leopard knows 
the communist manifesto by heart.” 137Anioto was not, however, an ideological movement. 
Membership was regulated by those already inside. Most were brought in through lineage 
practices mediated by elders such as “marriage, adoption, exchange, etc.”138 In what became 
Beni territory of eastern Congo Anioto was inextricably connected to lusumba initiatory 
practices. While not all “young men and children” brought into lineage through lusumba became 
Anioto, one could not be mobilized as a leopard-man without passing through the initiation.139 
After initiation, the final test for Anioto was to be the murder of an intimate, “often it was the 
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mother, the wife” of the initiate. That the target of violence would be female kin, not political 
rivals within or outside lineage, provides more meaningful evidence that Anioto was focused on 
disciplining unruly women and children and not, in particular, about pushing back against 
colonial order. Elites managed Anioto affiliation, and its enduring modalities concerned with 
bolstering the lineage authority. Long after Anioto’s suppression, its avatar—the leopard—an 
ancient symbol of chiefship and authority remains, deeply connected to discourse around formal 
political authority in Congo.140   
In Anioto, as in earlier ruga-ruga movements, youth served as the primary means of 
expressing male power in the region. There are key differences, however. Ruga-ruga, in Jean-
François Bayart’s terminology, was an extraverted force, engaged in establishing linkages and 
networks that linked people to those outside their own communities and connected with global 
economic flows.141 Despite drawing on the same youth for violent labor, Anioto figures were 
likely less concerned with looking outward to engage with other worlds. Instead, elders 
compelled juvenile males to suppress and displace internal dissent over the decisions and 
exertions of patriarchal authority. The architects of Anioto were primarily concerned with 
quelling internal dissent, to protect their authority and silence upstart internal critics. Anioto was 
introverted—a disciplinary movement coordinated by lineage leaders with the muscle of their 
junior male followers.  
In these three manifestations—ruga-ruga, Force Publique, and Anioto—coopted young 
warriors served the interests of powerful patrons. Against these, another concurrent framework 
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of youth violence was operating. It existed outside, and often functioned against, these forms of 
authority. Its validating logic was less political authority, but rather access to the powers of the 
wild, beyond the controls of domestic elders. The figures behind it were the very dissidents that 
Anioto sought to control and, if necessary, destroy. The movement introduces the notion of 
medicinal power into this dissertation. The medicine of this insurgency was borne by children 
and persons on the margins. Its users aimed to do violence against those corrupted elder power in 
the service of the community they belonged to. The archetype of this movement was a powerful 
mythical figure, a talking baby with astonishing powers. His name was Mwindo. 
 
“A Man Seeking Only Daughters”142 
In 1956, Daniel Biebuyck, with several research assistants, collected four “oral traditions” that he 
aggregated and translated as the Mwindo Epic. The epic came from Kinyanga speakers. These 
people lived to the south of the Kinande-speaking zones of eastern Congo. Biebuyck described 
the tales he collected in structural functionalist terms: this was a myth reflecting Nyanga-
speaking people’s core beliefs and values. The tale is of its time—compiled by Nyanga bards and 
poets in a 1950s late colonial context. It is simultaneously an enduring narrative that circulated in 
various forms through the region for generations.  
The tale centers on a character named Mwindo, and follows his war against his erstwhile 
father, Shemwindo.  In late colonial Congo, when the story was first written down, the context 
can be characterized by layered and polyvalent forms of “reverie” and “nervousness:” over the 
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possibilities afforded by impending decolonization, developmentalist and securitized colonial 
governance tactics, and the paranoia of various authority figures over the potential loss of power. 
Debates about the future of the colony, what independent Congo might be like, and the trajectory 
of communities throughout Congo partially revolved around the futures for youth.  
Anthropologists working in late colonial Congo, like Mary Douglas, argued that this 
interest in the role of youth in social reproduction was not new. Youth, she argued, were always 
key in the stabilization and reproduction of central African societies, not least because of their 
role in producing wealth for social elders—though that dynamic could take novel forms, as it did 
with the ruga-ruga.143 Along with economic production, elders sought to manage reproduction. 
Young women brought forth the next generation of juniors who would produce wealth through 
labor or exchange. Youth were the base of “wealth in people,” and social elders sought to 
consolidate them for themselves and their lineages.144 However, because youth controlled 
productive power, Douglas argued they “held the whip hand…in saying how much they could 
contribute to the productive side of the economy.”145  If elders abused their power, by engaging 
in excessive accumulation for example, youth would respond by fleeing from or confronting 
authorities, causing elites to accuse one another of having “driven the youth away,” threatening 
the community’s survival.146  Douglas, drawing on work by Shmuel Eisenstadt,147 argued that 
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intergenerational tensions presented the greatest threat to lineage-based societies, particularly in 
moments where “the social maturity of youth was deliberately delayed by men who controlled 
wealth, wives or [customary] office.”148 We see here, again, shades of the social upheavals 
associated with South Africa’s mfecane and the militarization of “frozen” age sets in armies of 
big men like Shaka.149 In light of such dynamics, members of competing age-sets would be in 
conflict and the period would be “characterized by hostility between the generations.”150  
The Mwindo Epic captured key elements of the late colonial moment in northeastern 
Congo. It narrates a time when the dynamic described by Mary Douglas began to break down: 
labor and reproduction shortages perpetually vexed the authorities, and both young people’s 
aspirations and elders’ venal overreach threatened communal stability.151 The growing need for 
workers in mines, and on coffee, quinine, and tea plantations in the region made the provisioning 
of young laborers a tense and fraught process. The resettlement of Rwandans in the 1940s and 
late 1950s, in response to famine and the need for more workers in eastern Congo, produced 
deep resentments and violence between Kinyarwanda-speakers and other groups living in the 
Kivu Rift. Chiefs complicit in such migrations and resettlements were sometimes seen as “selling 
out” their people and their land to dangerous outsiders for their own profit. This dynamic 
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recurred for generations in eastern Congo, across decolonization, and stimulated increasing 
tensions within communities under new political and economic arrangements.  
In the tale of Mwindo, his primary antagonist is his father. Shemwindo is a venal chief 
whose decisions can be interpreted as a distillation of the toxic dynamics described above. The 
epic tale begins with a powerful illustration of Shemwindo’s passion for accumulating wealth 
and prestige at the expense of lineage juniors. In an opening scene, Shemwindo gathers all his 
followers—wives, daughters, counsellors, and male juniors—and orders that they murder any 
male child born to any of them. He says: “All of you must each time give birth to girls only.”152 
With this proclamation Shemwindo seeks to eliminate the possibility of a lineage junior 
threatening his absolute control of wealth and power among his followers. Shemwindo’s 
murderous proclamation rejects his obligation and responsibility to rising juniors. He seeks 
instead the annihilation of male competition. His venality extends to all manner of corruptions: 
he consorts with dangerous water serpents and spirit beings to acquire wealth, and gives his 
female relatives in marriage to unworthy suitors for his exclusive personal benefit. Nonetheless, 
his fame grows due to his extravagant prestige expenditures, and his violent suppression of 
young males in his community allows him to avoid dividing his plunder. He continues to 
consolidate his enormous wealth.  
When one of his wives becomes pregnant, she fears she might give birth to a son and be 
compelled to kill him. Her concerns diminish as she realizes her fetus is immensely powerful, 
fetching her water and raw vegetables while still in utero.153 It is to this woman, the chief’s 
                                               
 
152 Bieybuck, Mwindo Epic, p 42.  
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 57 
seventh and most favored wife, that a son is “born at the time of [the baby’s] own choosing,” 
emerging from the middle finger of his mother’s right hand rather than through the birth canal. 
Mwindo’s name emerged at birth—not bestowed by any adult—and means “Little-One-Just-
Born-He-Walked.”154 At birth he spoke, laughed, and carried a scepter in one hand and an axe in 
the other. Right away Shemwindo heard of his son’s arrival and wife’s disloyal refusal to kill 
Mwindo. The chief arrived at the birth site to murder Mwindo with his own spear. After many 
attempts, he is unable to destroy the child, and Mwindo issues a judgment on his father: 
Mwindo shouted up the sky, “I am Mwindo, the little one just born, he walked. 
Hatred fills my heart! I have come to take vengeance upon my father… may he become as 
dead as dry leaves. My father’s counselors and nobles failed to advise him well. May they 
become as dead as dry leaves. My father’s villagers supported him… may they become as 
dead as dry leaves…” 
 
Shemwindo is unmoved by his infant son’s obvious power and precocious speech. He replies:  
 
 “Why should I fear the power of a small boy who comes alone to fight us?” he 
exclaimed. “If he comes any farther, we’ll cut his throat and send his life rushing forth 
from his body.” 
“You are wrong,” the villagers said. “Small though he is, Mwindo is more 
powerful than we are. He will force us to run from our own village! Do not stand against 
your son!” 
 
Shemwindo and his cadre of male elites refuse to head the chorus of constituents. Instead, 
they seek continually to end Mwindo’s life. This is not an easy task. The campaign to destroy 
Mwindo reveals deep divisions within the community. Throughout the tale Mwindo gathers 
strength from allies outside of gerontocratic authority structures: marginalized women, forest 
animals, lightning, and power objects. From these figures and forces on the margins, Mwindo 
builds a coalition against his father’s corrupt leadership. Despite his growing strength, Mwindo’s 
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154 Newbury, “Review of Heros,” p/ 365.  
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beloved and betrothed, the beautiful Iyangura, serves as a check on Mwindo’s own instincts to 
consolidate power. She continually challenges Mwindo’s own hubris as he brings together his 
followers and gathers the experience he needs to be prepared to challenge his father. Her counsel 
compels him to produce his first settlement though he initially denies the responsibility to 
provide stable living spaces for his followers. Iyangura’s prodding results in Mwindo converting 
forest to village by verbal command. She is not always listened to, however; Mwindo’s passive-
aggressive humming to himself sometimes drowned out her insightful critique. Inyangura serves 
to redirect Mwindo when he begins to follow a path that would lead him toward Shemwindo-like 
self-interested, anti-social, accumulative practices. 
The source of Mwindo tale’s power comes from how it inverts expectations—a topsy-
turvy take on how political authority should be won. Mwindo ultimately takes control from his 
father and ends Shemwindo’s immoral reign. Mwindo is never authorized to do so by another 
man, nor granted power by a lineage elder, nor is he initiated into domestic authority. Instead, as 
a newborn, he possesses tremendous power provided solely by forces of the wild: forest objects, 
lightning, animals and women peripheral to the centers of political power. Small though he was, 
he powerfully unraveled the social order, ended the domestic status quo, and ushered in a new 
era. His final acts of reconstitution and social renewal of elder male dominated hierarchy 
coincide with an abdication of access to the spirits, substances, and advisors that provide his 
potent powers as a child.  
The story suggests that key sources of unmaking and remaking power reside within 
figures who are perceived as immature. This representation of mythological, potentially socially 
transformative, power helps explain the targets of intense violence by Anioto figures in eastern 
Congo’s history. The power of Mwindo-figures, concealed amongst the politically weakest in 
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society, could undo the authority of the most established, wealthy gerontocrats in society. Anioto 
was not simply oppression of the socially weak—rather it was an attempt to suppress the 
potentially devastating nexus of women and children’s access to “wild” energies that could bring 
big man power to its knees. 
 
Ethnography and the Epic 
This argument emerges partly by reading with and against anthropological field work conducted 
by Randall Packard among Kinande-speaking people in the 1970s. Packard’s work, coming a 
generation after the Mwindo Epic’s collection helps place the tale within a regional political 
culture, and situates the tale more firmly within a historical milieu.  Packard, who conducted 
fieldwork as a student of Steven Feierman, argued that the key social and political tension 
animating “Nande cosmology” lay between eka (domesticated homesteads) and ekisoki (bush 
areas) “inhabited by untamed and chaotic elements of nature, including powerful medicines and 
spirits.”155 He suggested that the hallmarks of patriarchy and gerontocracy, including chiefship, 
agrarian production, male fertility and orderly community life, were under the domain of eka. 
The power needed to bring rains and exert control over elements of power key to social welfare, 
however, could not be accessed without managing the chaotic ekisoki forces of the bush, the 
wild, and femininity. Balancing these forces was the responsibility of ritual experts who could 
ensure a “utopia of absolute health” if they were effective, or threaten the very integrity of 
society if they lapsed in their duties.156 Chiefly figures, like Shemwindo, bore final responsibility 
                                               
 
155 Packard, Chiefship and Cosmology, 72. Packard is drawing, in part, on the foundational work of his dissertation advisor, 
Stephen Feierman’s work on Shambaa kingdom and, in particular, the division between wild and domestic power.  
 
156 Packard, Chiefship, 27. While the Mwindo Epic appears in the bibliography, Packard does not directly site the source in this 
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the minds of those who recounted the epic to Bieybuck.  
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for ensuring balance between these fields of power and protecting community from the dangers 
of slipping toward extremes. When male elites sought to overemphasize the power of eka, a 
counter-power emerged from ekisoki to stabilize society again. Within this reading, we can see 
how the figure of Mwindo condenses157 such a polysemic gendered, wild force brought to bear 
against the excessive accumulation of eka power by venal chiefs, like Shemwindo.  
For Packard, women were vital boundary figures between domains of power. Childbearing 
women were important “liminal figures” in Nande cosmology as they were both “members of the 
homestead… [and had] strong associations with the world of the bush.”158 This liminality made 
women susceptible to spiritual dangers from ekisoki, “frequently possessed by spirits of the bush 
that cause sickness and death in the homestead.”159 Possession was worrisome since a “woman’s 
violation of social prohibitions” or “her susceptibility to possession by forces of the bush can 
result in the introduction of malevolent spirits into the homestead and thus in misfortune.”160  
Male elders sought to limit the influence of bush forces in domestic spheres by exerting control 
of women. Women could also leverage possession and illness to push back against men who 
overstepped the healthy boundaries of their own authority.  
An additional method used by women to manage their liminality for productive social benefit 
was through childbirth. When balanced, child rearing brought infants from the forces of the wild 
into the bounds of the homestead, where they were taught the values of social order and 
hierarchy. The greater the social maturity of the child, the less access they had to the power and 
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productive energies of the wilds. At the same time, they pursued avenues for accessing domestic 
authority. Elite men needed to access—“borrow”— power of the wilds from women and children 
to succeed in war. This included the use of juvenile’s themselves in combat. Some, however, 
then sought to escape the burden of obligations such borrowings demanded. These figures 
refused their responsibilities of sharing and reciprocity. These were men like Shemwindo. In the 
Mwindo Epic, children and child birthing women in eastern Congo were at the crux of social 
tensions, riding the boundary between wild and domestic power—both helping to constitute and 
manage male elder authority. 
In light of these observations, Mwindo’s exceptionality becomes specific and obvious. 
His uniqueness lay not simply in his remarkable powers; he embodied both wild (child, female, 
dangerous, powerful, illness) and domestic (adult, male, productive, disciplinary) powers. He 
held these disparate forces simultaneously and from birth. Mwindo’s position was fraught and 
dangerous, born of the spontaneous reaction of ekisoki forces to the corruption of lineage elders, 
and ripe with potential for social renewal and regeneration through renewal of the eka. In the 
epic, people continually acknowledge Mwindo’s transformational potential, and are attracted to 
his duality and uniqueness. “Mwindo was devoured by the many longing eyes.”161 What protects 
Mwindo from temptation – falling prey to the same venal logics of power as his father—was his 
age and his compatriots. As a child, albeit an exceptional one, Mwindo was imagined to be in a 
state of before—uncorrupted by the temptations of domestic power, without aspirations beyond 
revenge against his father and the renewal of Mwindo’s community. The assumption was that a 
child’s temporality and horizons of expectation were profoundly shallow, bound by the 
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present.162  Venality, self-interest, individual accumulation and the aggregation of followers was 
not yet the dominate mode of decision-making for the young. Rather, theirs was an interest in 
securing bounds of reciprocity and management of the obligations of hierarchy. They wanted 
responsible fathers. They sought to restore the proper scope of eka power, not end it. This 
tension was critically important. For the young, and other dependents, imbricating within the 
social was of primary concern, where for the lineage leader establishing and maintaining 
individual prestige was central.  
One observer of Kinande-speaking societies in decolonizing eastern Congo suggested 
that when a child is acting in a seemingly political fashion, “no power relation is assumed.”163 
Children were prestige figures as followers, but not yet productive or socially reproductive. 
Children indexed power—and a capacity for a social future, if not of their own making or 
envisioning. So, it was not in spite of Mwindo’s immaturity that he represented power. His 
power could be interpretive as politically pure—the bush was open to him because he was not 
engaged in domestic authority. His age and inexperience did not allow for the kinds of political 
and economic self-interest that consumed his father. The epic presents a tale in which only a 
child, a figure like Mwindo, could renew society in the face of corrupted elders—reestablishing a 
healthy future for all of society.  
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 In the climax of the Mwindo Epic, the hero becomes a full adult, renowned, and 
victorious over his father, though he spares his life. His final words in the epic are directed 
towards followers who now accept him as their leader: 
Grow many crops of many foods. Live in good houses and make your village beautiful. 
Agree with one another, for argument is the path to anger and hatred. Do not pursue 
another’s spouse, for the man who seduces another man’s wife will be killed. Onfo, the 
god of creation, gives only what is good to you. Accept all of your children, whether they 
are male or female, tall or short, healthy or disabled. Be considerate of the sick person 
who walk along the village paths. Accept, fear, and protect your chief as he should 
accept, fear, and protect you. 
 
The bards of the Mwindo Epic sketched out a utopian ideal in its finale. Political authorities 
accept and fear their charges, even as the people accept and fear their leaders. Tension remained 
at the core of social order. Balance was reestablished, and the entire community was responsible 
for its maintenance. 
These kinds of stories are products of time and place, told to particular constituencies in 
order to address pressing concerns. For whom, then, was the Mwindo Epic meant to be 
performed? Some clues emerge from its provenance. There were 27,000 Kinyanga speakers in 
the 1950s as the tale was collected—a relatively small language group.164 The full performance 
of the story took place in 1956, and required twelve days of song and dance to complete. Only 
for the benefit of Biebuyck was it reduced to an oral recitation by a single speaker.  The bard 
tasked with distilling the tale, Kandi Rureke, was a key informant and provided much of the 
structuration that shaped the final written epic. Other elements of tale were compiled and 
synthesized from three other separate tellings of the story by Kinyanga-speaking bards named 
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Sherungu, Shekarisi, and Shekwabo.  Biebuyck and his collaborator, a young Hunde-speaking 
scholar, Kahombo Mateene—who would later earn a PhD in linguistics from the Sorbonne and 
lead the African Union’s Center for African Languages—translated, synthesized, and edited the 
tales into a single, richly annotated account. The epic possesses similarities, in both the format 
and content, to the kubandwa songs collected and analyzed by, among others, Neil Kodesh his 
monograph on public healing in Buganda.165 These were preponderant, complex, sung tales 
prevalent throughout the inter-lacustrine region.166  
Beibuyck’s interpretation was that Mwindo was about chiefly succession. There are 
obvious warning’s in the tale against venality and corruption. This interpretation is enriched by 
noting that those who performed the tale were advisors to the chief. The bards sung reminders of 
chiefly obligation for the benefit of leaders. No doubt, however, Mwindo performances were also 
opportunities to narrate the ideals of moral community in the tumultuous late colonial context. Its 
content also suggests an ideal constituency—loyal but also willing to challenge unjust authority. 
In sum, the Mwindo Epic’s meanings are polyvalent, but revolve around utopian ideals 
propounded in a time of social and political complexity.  
As the tale concludes, Mwindo reaches adulthood. He endured a phase of wild power and 
used its force to inherit the burdens and opportunities of domestic political authority. As the 
embodiment of an ideal lineage senior, he no longer sought to draw on potentially corrupting 
force from the wild and, likely, no longer could, given his imbrication in the world of the eka. 
Instead he drew support from his followers and agreed to protect them from one another and to 
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make space for difference and weakness. Mwindo embodied the big man, if a conscientious and 
generous one. A prophecy of his ascension was fulfilled, a lineage loop closed, a cycle ended, 
and another begun. The warning was clear for Mwindo: a future chief in his lineage could, if 
accumulation and exclusion prove too great temptations, be born an upstart child to challenge his 
venality and, if necessary, remove him from the seat of authority. 
  
Conclusion 
The Mwindo Epic, as gathered by Biebuyck and Mateene, was the product of enduring and 
durable frameworks and debates. It was told at a particular time and within a specific place in 
Congo’s history. Bards spoke and sung the story a decade before the emergence of a massive 
mai-medicine based insurgency took most of the country. The mai medicine, as will be discussed 
in chapter five, drew deeply from reserves of wild power to challenge the venality of male elites. 
The sentiments and moods that Mwindo evoked—focused on concerns over elders consolidating 
power in an antisocial fashion – was in the decolonizing air. The tale was recited a decade after 
the last Anioto campaigns terrorized many in the region: Belgian state officials, customary 
authorities, and lineage juniors and women alike. It was performed in living memory of ruga-
ruga movements that found new, if not novel, forms within the colonial apparatus. The bards of 
the tale sought, in part, to paint a portrait of ideal relations within a lineage framework. Their art 
suggested moral power could be regulated through the exertions of youthful violence in times of 
venality and corrupt authority. Such stories implicitly worked against dangers posed by Anioto 
and ruga-ruga, both of which could bolster, even expand, elite male venality. Instead the 
performance of Mwindo evoked a yearning for internal balance—the right ordering of society, 
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responsibility, and age progression. The focus was not on the antisociality of Shemwindo, but 
rather on the renewing power of Mwindo.  
Why does this chapter triangulate three different movements of juvenile violence across 
scales, time periods, and actor groups, given the inevitable incommensurability such an approach 
produces? In placing these three movements—ruga-ruga, Anioto, and Mwindo-like 
insurgencies—in the same frame two key moves are made. First, it aims to disaggregate, with 
historical evidence, a seemingly similar kind of action: violence wrought by young men. It pulls 
apart a type of intergenerational engagement—big men and junior boys engaging in conflict over 
authority—that is often conflated in historical and contemporary analysis. Despite surface 
similarities between such movements, this chapter has revealed the polysemic quality of such 
movements. Ruga-ruga movements engagements were often extraverted, concerned with 
establishing economic control of key supply chains through coercion and complicities between 
elders and juniors. It always also sought to bring throngs of new followers and subjects into 
emerging constituencies. Ruga-ruga was also about exerting authority over novel polities and 
economies. These elements were introverted but unstable—less successful in stability than in 
growth. Often youth and male seniors collaborated, if incompletely and in complex ways, via the 
frame of ruga-ruga.  
 Second, arguing that Anioto sought to discipline internal dissidence suggests we must 
resists attempts in the colonial archive to read such movements as insurgencies. Anioto was, at 
least in part, meant to prevent and quash potential rebelliousness, not engender it. Juvenile 
violence is as complex as the forms of disorder its seeks to redress or invoke. The materials, 
initiatory practices, and substances of Anioto were not medicine. They were emblematic of male, 
elder power—Anioto was, in part, a technique of governance. Anioto sought to discipline the 
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homestead by exaggerating its regulations and disciplinary regimes—sharpening to a razor edge 
the power of customary authority. By contrast, the logic of Mwindo, even as it deals with the 
same social problem of breakdown between chiefly power and core constituencies, connects 
deeply to the logic of mai medicine.  We will see that mai was used against elites. The violence 
wrought by its wielders was often terrible, destructive and ruinous. At the same time, it also 
followed in the frame of Mwindo: one goal was to restore relations of reciprocity. This framing 
suggests that movements that drew on mai were a direct rejoinder to Anioto-like violence, and 
the systems such violence supported. Mai functioned as check on male, adult, lineage and state-
based power movements. Mwindo’s story, read with Packard’s ethnography, shows how this 
violence can be at once ruinous, socially constitutive, and functioned as generative, radical, 
internally directed critique.   
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Chapter Three: Lost Children in the Belgian Congo, 1929-1960 
In late 1957, a panic permeated the Belgian Congo’s sole children’s prison. The National 
Penitentiary for Delinquent Youth at Niangara, a decades long colonial experiment in the 
“carceral techniques” of juvenile rehabilitation, was to suddenly and unexpectedly close.167 The 
Penitentiary’s demise was frantic, set into motion with the filing of a damning inspection report 
months earlier.  The author, P. Borie, hoped to report to colonial administrators that the 
Penitentiary was fulfilling its purpose: turning wayward youth into productive adults under the 
guidance of Dominican Fathers. Borie found, instead, a community seething with abuse, 
violence, and predation.  
“It is obvious,” he wrote, “that under current conditions we cannot be talking about moral 
reeducation.”168 He recommended immediate closure, the transfer of all inmates, and total 
overhaul of the prison’s hierarchy. “Pending the results of these reforms, we should focus on the 
gravest problem at hand, namely the contamination of the not-yet-perverted elements in contact 
with ordinary inmates. The only remedy… is segregation.”169 To Borie, the “ordinary” criminal 
children of Niangara were vectors of viral perversity. All would inevitably be corrupted, even 
those who were “not-yet” affected. Far from reformed—“morally reeducated”— the 
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Penitentiary’s population were voraciously pathogenic: uncontrollably toxic. The Dominicans 
failed, the criminal children were unreformed, and the Penitentiary, in this official reckoning, 
was a disaster.  In its final months, Niangara essentially functioned as a temporary quarantine 
center for the “perversion” of young inmates who awaited transfer to far-flung facilities across 
the Belgian Congo.  
In the same period, elsewhere in eastern Congo, another project of youth reform was 
imploding. A dominant Protestant missionary figure, Paul Hurlburt, was facing an insurrection 
within the church he established at Katwa near Butembo, a city perched on the escarpment of the 
western Rift Valley near the Uganda border. In the late 1920s, as Belgian officials were first 
conceptualizing colonial child prisons, Hulrburt and his colleagues in the Unevangelized Africa 
Mission (UAM) among the first Euromericans to arrive in the newly “pacified” parts of eastern 
Congo, drawn by a sense of spiritual calling to this “savage area.” 170 Their background in 
missions in Kenya left them yearning for frontiers where conditions were difficult and the gospel 
not yet preached. As hundreds of porters hefted their possessions, the missionaries arrived in the 
Albertine Rift zone with visions of transforming a generation of wayward youth into passionate 
evangelists for the Kingdom of God.171  Unlike Niangara’s overseers, they believed change 
would never come via the state through pedagogy, but rather that renewal needed to from within 
the soul, through purified spirits. Early converts came to evangelical rallies to receive small gifts 
of salt from the missionaries. After a time many were convinced to take on the waters of 
baptism.  
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Thirty years later, many of those converted as children mounted an ecclesiastical 
insurgency against Hurlburt and his peers. Young men once called Bahorobe—Hulbert’s 
people—were now furious with their erstwhile mentor. His stubborn intransigence to ceding 
control of the church to Congolese leadership compelled an attempt to remove him from his 
position with violence.172 As Hurlburt made his way toward the pulpit on a Sunday morning in 
June of 1960, one the eve of national independence, a former protégée named Gabriel Kulala 
blocked his path.  
Kulala demanded Hulrburt allow church affairs to be overseen by Congolese leaders. 
Hurlburt refused. Kulala and his allies forced Hurlburt and his family from the church. Youth 
encircled them outside, gathering rocks to throw at the missionaries. The Hurlburt family entered 
their car for safety. Former “mission boys”173 heaved stones at the vehicle shouting, “The day of 
mercy is over.”174  The missionaries drove through the angry crowd to their compounds. They 
called on the state for protection. Authorities placed soldiers at mission enclaves and churches to 
prevent the ecclesiastical rebels from taking control of these spaces or harming the American 
missionaries.  
As conflict continued to stew, two leaders of the insurgent group would write a letter to 
John F. Kennedy, asking the American president to control the missionaries: “we ask you… to 
recommend to your compatriots to treat us like men.”175 For these infantilized congregants, a 
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time of reckoning was at hand; justice was coming to the church. Those who joined the church as 
small boys were finally to be treated “like men.” Others in the community were not convinced by 
these arguments. They did not celebrate the pressure placed on Hurlburt and his allies, nor would 
they join or support the insurgents. Instead, these individuals were loyal to missionary authority. 
For them, it was not just justice that was coming, but rather a great evil. One among them 
denounced his revolutionary peers: “Satan entered them, like he did Judas.”176 
During these last days of the colonial era, thirty years of different forms of youth reform 
unraveled in eastern Congo amidst rich metaphors of viral contagion, demonic possession, and 
spiritual emancipation.177 Powerful male figures in the state and in the church were struggling to 
contain the perverse wildness and evil of unruly juniors. They could not know this era was 
simply the beginning of a time of chaos. Nor could they imagine that in 1964, in the decade of 
Hulbert’s attack and the closure of Niangara, these intense moments of insurgency, accusation, 
and confusion would be eclipsed by a paroxysm of youth violence so total it would mark, for 
life, the memories of all who encountered it: the Simba Rebellion.  
This chapter analytically links the failures of Dominican “moral reeducation” at 
Niangara, the collapse of works by Hurlburt and other UAM evangelists, and the emergence of 
Simba warriors in 1964.  It traces colonial precedents for the motivations and actions of the 
thousands of children who made war in 1964. At core is a question of causation. Can we locate 
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antecedents to the Simba movement’s overwhelming young constituencies of warriors in the 
overlapping disciplinary relationships between young people and adults in the state and church in 
Belgian Congo?  
By tracing the ways colonial adults sought to imagine, constitute, and shepherd wayward 
youth through thresholds of redemption and maturation, precedents may be glimpsed.  We return 
to where the chapter begun, a place built precisely to enable such processes of transformation: 
the National Penitentiary for Delinquent Youth at Niangara. 
 
Niangara 
Colonial-era Niangara was a zone of incarceration.178  On the banks of Uele River, where the 
thick of the Congo Basin rain forest gives way to savannah, Niangara is otherwise best known 
for the discovery of bird species.179 Its remoteness made it an effective site for a particular form 
of colonial punishment: domestic penal exile. It was an ideal site for housing subjects of relégué. 
The administrators of the Belgian Congo established national prisons for men and women for 
such purposes there in the early 1910s. These prisons became sites of state concern a decade later 
when officials feared Lugabra-speaking inmates had an unspecified, perhaps psychosomatic, 
disease that caused them to perish under incarceration.180 They were released en masse—deemed 
intrinsically incapable of withstanding the strains of incarceration.  
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Niangara’s officials later experimented with the possibility of using prison populations to 
alleviate Congo’s chronic labor shortages. The wardens availed inmates for hire to private 
enterprises in the region. The effort was of limited economic success and was ultimately 
abandoned. Beyond these episodes, however, Niangara’s prisons appeared unexceptional, 
functioning much like other penal sites in the state. Difficult work, the passage of time, and the 
stresses of isolation characterized the carceral experience of most inmates.181 This changed when 
state officials selected Niangara as the site for the sole children’s prison ever built in the colony. 
The project commenced in October 1931 when Governor-General Auguste Tilkens 
signed Ordinance Number 76/J into law. It mandated that children be henceforth separated from 
adults in the colony’s prisons.182  Further, the decree stipulated that “when local authorities 
consider it appropriate, and material conditions allow” detention centers specifically designed for 
criminal children were to be constructed. The ordinance, intended for comprehensive application 
across the Congo, lacked detail.  Boundaries between categories of “child” and “adult” were not 
specifically delineated. What a children’s penal colony should be, contra a prison for adults, was 
not elaborated.   
These lapses, and the decree’s broad vagueness, evidence hasty preparation. Such 
oversights are surprising given the significant legal precedent around the standards and goals of 
children’s incarceration in the metropole, Belgium. The criminality of children was a subject of 
significant interest there due, in part, to surge in popularity of the work of the scholar Adolphe 
Quetelet. In the early 19th century, Quetelet became Belgium’s social quantifier par excellence, 
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an innovator of Comptean “social physics,” who undertook the work of measuring bodies and 
minds in pursuit of his human ideal: the “average man.” A surge of publically available 
demographic information in the 1820s provided the evidentiary grist for Quetelet’s 
explorations.183 To Quetelet, the average man was the “mean about which oscillate the social 
elements; he is, so to speak, a fictitious being for whom all things proceed conformably to the 
average results obtained for society.”184 The average man was, to Quetelet, at the apex of 
humanity’s Gaussian distribution—less Platonic form than distillation of the mean. Obsession 
with the average drove Quetelet’s attentions toward the outlying figures on the tailings of 
humanity’s imagined distribution curve. These abnormal individuals threatened the social entire 
order—affecting the mean itself. Their existence strained the very integrity of the nation.  Most 
dangerous of all were criminals. To Quetelet, these constituted the great enemy of society. 
Normative positivism drove him to create, inter alia, a proto criminologist.  
He first developed the concept of the “average man” in his “Study on the Penchant for 
Crime at Various Ages,” though this interest is evident throughout his work. 185  His most famous 
work, Treatise on Man and the Development of his Faculties contained a chapter on “the 
development of the propensity to crime.”186 His attempts to quantify “penchants” and 
“propensities” toward crime led Quetelet to produce the first recorded criminal profiling system 
used by Belgian law enforcement. He found it was the “young, male, poor, uneducated, or 
unemployed” who were “the most likely to be arrested and convicted of a crime.”187 These likely 
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future criminals were cast alongside an array of social undoers: the suicidal, those prone to 
divorce, the short, the weak, the overweight, and the slow-witted.188  
Quetelet’s quantifications sought to pinpoint those who most jeopardized the social 
order—those who threatened to unravel the average. Once identified, these figures who could 
weaken societies’ futures could be transformed or, if necessary, excised from the social body and 
set aside where they could do no harm. Quetelet’s foundational work was taken further in the 
mid 19th century by Italian criminal positivist Cesare Lambroso, who expounded on biological 
determinations toward criminality.189 Lambroso’s concerns was more to do with evolution than 
statistics—he feared a biological atavism among segments of the population would lead to a 
degenerative dynamic in the entire polity. He cast aberrant outliers as vectors of social disease. 
Part and parcel to Quetelet’s views, and those of followers like Lambroso, was the conviction 
that the social deleterious effects of the systemically abnormal could only be ameliorated through 
state action. 
In 1844, twelve years after Quetelet’s work on crime first appeared and eighty-three years 
before Governor Tilken’s decree, the first Belgian “prison for boys” opened cells for young men 
who ran afoul of the state.190 The category of child criminal emerged in Belgian jurisprudence. 
Initially, the sole tactic for transforming these individuals into socially productive agents was 
quarantine from adult offenders. Debates roiled for decades around the roles of other measures—
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isolation, education, and the most efficacious durations of child incarceration. Perhaps the most 
contentious issue concerned the role of the church in working with child criminals. The “prison 
for boys” opened against the backdrop of nested political battles known as the “school wars” 
over parochial education. The outcome was that the Catholic Church secured a monopoly over 
national primary and secondary education in 1884.191 Arguing for the pedagogical and 
“reeducational” value of imprisonment for delinquents, the church was able to extend its reach 
from classrooms into prison cells. Child incarceration became framed by the dual notions of 
moral and spiritual reformation and a national interest in protecting the social future.   
Decades of metropolitan debates and around the incarceration of youth and children went 
unreferenced in Tilken’s decree. Nonetheless, Ordinance Number 76/J is a clear product of this 
genealogy. It would take a decade for the act’s vision to come to fruit in the form of carceral 
infrastructure for children. On February 11, 1944, state officials commissioned the National 
Penitentiary for Delinquent Youth at Niangara. As described, Niangara was a remote and 
inaccessible location, particularly from the urban zones where most child criminals were arrested 
and tried. Officials acknowledged that Niangara’s rural situation effectively increased sentence 
duration due to the difficult journey to reach the site. It was thus mandated that “minors... be sent 
to the colony provided the duration of detention justified their displacement.”192  Many children 
came from Kinshasa. Their journeys upriver could take months—longer even than most 
maximum sentences.  
What crimes justified such displacements? Magistrates decided. Little can be gleaned in 
the archives about the logic and debates around sentencing for Niangara’s inmates until 1950, 
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when another decree “inspired by” 1912 penal reforms in Belgium called for clarifications and 
revisions to the extant law. The 1950 decree clearly defined a child as an individual under the 
age of eighteen. To this point the de facto punishment for all convicts, whatever the age, was 
penal labor. The new decree exempted children from hard labor, replacing work with “education 
and protection measures.”193 It created special jurisdictions for courts sentencing child offenders, 
and required officers from the Ministry of Public Affairs to assist judges in sentencing children 
to ensure concern for their welfare was balanced with the punitive requirements of justice.194 
Emerging developmentalist and pedagogical thinking framed child criminals as candidates for 
reform rather than discipline.  These new techniques necessitated new infrastructures for 
managing child imprisonment and generated a bureaucracy for specialized assessment, data 
gathering, and curricula for the carceral reform of minors.  
A particularly robust regime of data collection emerged. While Belgian judiciary officials 
bemoaned that it “was not possible to obtain statistics on juvenile delinquency,” the new law 
demanded that such information be collected regardless. Collecting such information was not 
simple. Even determining a criminal’s age, the sole criterion for juvenile status proved difficult. 
The Provincial Office of Administrative, Political and Judiciary Affairs informed the Governor-
General of challenges in implementing the new legislation concerning child criminality: “It is 
necessary to indicate the difficulty of determining an individual’s age in the absence of organized 
civil associations! [Only] recourse to medical experts enables the formulation of a presumed age 
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for each subject.”195 Doctors examined young bodies carefully to establish, in essence, 
culpability. The stakes of medical judgements were high. Clinical determinations of age 
determined if a person would be reformed or punished, redeemed by the workings of the state 
and church or subject to harsh penal labor. The convergence of medical and penal expertise in 
the post-1950 era is well captured in Nancy Rose Hunt’s arguments about the dual nervous 
natures of the Belgian colonial state—simultaneously deploying biomedical and security 
apparatus.196  For children in late colonial Congo, the gateway to the juvenile prison was through 
the clinic.  Their bodies were to give evidence for medical experts whose assessment sealed their 
prison itineraries.  
State agents operating within this converged medical and carceral sphere tasked with 
determining a subject’s age—and thus their disciplinary trajectory—often found delinquents to 
be very young. Annually, Niangara interned a number of seven-year-olds, the youngest legally 
imprisonable age. In 1953, twenty-three children who were said to be seven, and dozens more of 
unknown ages, were among the hundreds who arrived at the colony. On average, the Penitentiary 
took in between 600 and 1000 children each year. Some were given the heaviest legally 
permissible sentences: indefinite incarceration with a five years minimum term. Only the 
wardens of Niangara possessed the power to determine the release conditions of the most serious 
prisoners of Niangara. The policies and guidelines such reviews demanded are not to be found in 
the archive. It is possible these decisions were arbitrary and based on relationship, or perhaps, 
mood.  
                                               
195 Ibid.  
 
196 Nancy Rose Hunt, A Nervous State: Violence, Remedies, and Reverie in Colonial Congo (Duke University Press, 2016). 
 79 
Imprisoned children were largely uneducated. In a typical year, only four of 824 child 
prisoners had completed primary school. No child housed at Niangara was ever a secondary 
school graduate. The overwhelming majority each year were boys. The constituted a population 
resonant with Quetelet’s “young, male, poor, uneducated” aberrant outliers who threatened an 
average social ideal. Yet, not all were male. Each year between 3 and 7 percent of children sent 
to Niangara were girls. Hundreds of children each year, from across the Belgian Congo, found 
themselves arrested, medically examined, tried, convicted and relegated to Niangara to serve 
penance and be subject to reforming procedures.  
Belgian Congo’s state agents rationalized the existence of child criminals in Congo in 
several ways. The most compelling explanation, it seemed, was to see delinquents as the 
products unnatural social geographies. For colonial authority figures juvenile crime was an 
inherently urban problem—symptomatic of the many moral dangers of city living. To address 
the roots of child crime, the government needed to “take measures to curb the promiscuity that is 
rife in major centers.” The fruit of this immorality were “thousands of children resident [in urban 
communities] that have nothing to do.”197 Idleness engendered crime. To prevent child crime, 
officials reasoned that they needed to gather overproduced and underproductive children and 
“return them to their villages.” The idea of return implied that children, even those born in the 
city who had never left urban centers, were fundamentally rustic creatures.198 Their criminality 
emerged from being—through no fault of their own—out of place. Improper origins generated, 
as though by nature, inevitable aberrance and criminality.  
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Even while symptomatic of urban problems, officials argued, the children’s criminality 
was rooted in rural zones. “We find in tribal centers the disappearance of authority and the lack 
of paternal authority.  All efforts must be made to restore the latter” to truly address delinquency. 
In this logic, the source of delinquent youth were absent fathers, and the ultimate, if unnamed, 
villains of the story the femmes libres who found in the city an escape from state, religious, 
patriarchal, familial, and customary authorities.199 As in earlier eras, colonial figures draw a 
direct link between their power and “paternal authority.” Belgian state agents acknowledged 
common cause with the male heads of Congolese communities and homes in agrarian zones. At 
the same time state agents found fathers wanting in fulfilling their responsibility to discipline 
female sexuality and marshal productive junior labor.  
The colonial penal reforms of 1950 marked a philosophical shift towards the “education 
and protection” of child prisoners. These reforms in Congo’s children’s prison echoed those 
deployed in the metropole almost a century earlier. In Belgium, the incarceration of delinquent 
youth deployed secular and psychological tactics. Previous educational strategies of encouraging 
children to observe and respect authority figures—including a standard curriculum that required 
children to repeat phrases like “People everywhere shall submit to the will of Leopold III’’ as 
late as the mid 1940s—failed to curb juvenile delinquency and were abandoned. In this era of 
reform and reflection, questions were asked of those who were charged with the previous 
educational and penal responsibilities over Congo’s children.  
Where once biological fathers in the villages bore the blame for juvenile delinquency, 
now it was Catholic fathers who were expected to address questions concerning the strategies of 
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moral pedagogy the employed in the decades of their monopoly of children in both class and 
prison cell. In Niangara this critical gaze fell upon the work of the Dominican Order.  
 
 
Fig 1. 2 “Belgian Congo Ecclesiastical Map” [The Dominican domain is in the top right quadrant of the 
image. It extended from the Uele River to south to the border of Sudan to north; and from 270 to 300 west.] 
 
 
Moral Reeducation 
Dominican missionaries from Belgium arrived in Niangara in 1911 to establish the order’s first 
mission stations in Africa.200 Most were Flemish. The Dominicans, officially the Order of 
Preachers, are a “teaching order” within the Catholic Church: authorized to oversee educational 
institutions—similar to the Jesuit and Holy Cross orders. In the Belgian Congo education was 
less by academic achievement than a moralizing impulse. “The moral formation of pupils,” Marc 
                                               
200 Denis, Philippe. 1998. The Dominican Friars in Southern Africa: A Social History, 1577-1990. BRILL. Page 100.  
 
 82 
Depaepe argues, “was considered in the colonial context of the Congo as a much more important 
educational objective than the acquisition of knowledge.”201 In the Congo, as in Belgium, this 
moral formation was the exclusive domain of the Catholic Church.  Historian of African 
Christianity, Bengt Sundkler, wrote: 
 “The Catholic Church in Congo…had a theory, formed, as they felt, by hard 
experience: adults in Africa did not respond and could not be won for the faith. The only 
possible category to aim at was the children. To the Catholics at the time this was part of 
an international concern, from Mongolia to Congo, and their organization `Holy 
Childhood' was founded with this in view. The Jesuits insisted… a Church in Congo had 
to begin with a generation of children. `The Church could wait', until these children in 
their turn were to become adult members of the Holy Church. No prophecy proved more 
appropriate. The little boys [would] become soldiers in the army but soldiers with a 
difference: they were successful voluntary catechists winning thousands for the faith.”202 
 
The work of early Catholic evangelists and catechists was not wholesale conversion of all 
in the communities they encountered. Rather, church leaders leveraged infrastructures and 
human resources to create a beachhead within Congolese lineages for a future generation of 
believers. They imagined a new generation of Congolese, raised under Catholic guidance, who 
could build the true church over the objections or indifference of their intractable kith and kin. 
The work of Dominicans in Niangara with delinquents was thus crucial. Losing a generation of 
Congolese children to moral decrepitude meant the entire apparatus of the church would again 
need to “wait” for the next era of youth to emerge who could be shaped into the future Congolese 
Catholic community. This was not just about ecclesiastical futures. The state was also in wait for 
a new generation of citizens. An imagined army of young catechists were to join their parochial 
educators both on mission and, literally, on the imperial payroll.  
                                               
201 Marc Depaepe, “How Should the History of Education Be Written? Some Reflections about the Nature of the Discipline 
from the Perspective of the Reception of Our Work,” Studies in Philosophy and Education 23, no. 5–6 (September 1, 2004): p 
789. 
 
202 B. Sundkler and C. Steed, A History of the Church in Africa, vol. 74 (Cambridge Univ Pr, 2000),p 89. 
 
 83 
An ecclesiastical map devised by church and state authorities, established geographies of 
control to implemented this grand strategy for Congo’s Catholic future. Authorities assigned the 
region North of the Uele river in eastern Congo to the Dominicans. Among their first projects 
were to establish a primary school at Watsa, on the edge of their religious concession and 
established a small seminary for post primary education at Dungu.203  
 
Figure 3. “Young Christians on Day of Baptism” taken at a Dominican Mission in Niangara district around 1920204  
 
Uniquely, however, it fell to the Dominicans to care for wayward youth who slipped 
through the cracks of the grand moral/pedagogical strategy. Moral reeducation of delinquents 
became their urgent and particular responsibility. Discipline was manifest in quotidian reality for 
the young inmates of Niangara.  Life at Niangara fell into particular patterns, as follows: from 
5:30 to 8 children awoke, sang the national anthem in assembly, exercised and ate breakfast. 
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From 8 to noon was manual labor for older youth, and classes for younger children. From noon 
till 1:45 was lunch and “mandatory rest.”  From 2 to 4:30pm was education for older youth and 
vocational training for younger children. 4:30 to 5:15pm marked the sole 45-minute stretch in the 
day where young people could play “sports and games” or, if they were in violation of some 
protocol, more compulsory labor (corvée). The remains of the day consisted of dinner prepared 
and cleaned up by the inmates, bedtime at 6 and lights out by 8pm.  Dominicans enacted moral 
reeducation, nowhere defined or articulated in strategy, through management of the rhythms of 
the day, and applying corrective punishments. Monastic in routine, children endured moral 
reeducation as an ordering of their lives. The unruly conditions and broken homes from which 
they emerged—at least in the state’s imagination—were replaced with civic ritual, spiritual 
inculcation, productive labor, and study.  
This, at least, was how the infrastructure of moral reeducation was designed to function. 
Within the intense strictures of such structure the capacity to misbehave seemed remote. In 
practice, when assessed by the state, something quite different was found to be taking place. 
When J. L. Wauters, the District Commissioner of Paulis,205 forwarded his annual report for 
1957 on the Penitentiary to the Governor of the Eastern Province little in the document appeared 
remarkable. One comment, however, concerning the need for prison officials to “steer young 
offenders away from dangerous promiscuity,” veered from standard bureaucratic reportage.206 
Attached to the report were two sealed letters, both starkly marked “CONFIDENTIEL.” In these 
letters the reference to promiscuity, and the language of infection breathlessly invoked in the 
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opening lines of this chapter, were clarified: “A conspiracy of silence covers the actions of our 
residents. The facts of my report… are not new but have never been reported. I will not be 
quelled by false prudishness… An examination of the register reveals that, since 1948, 
homosexuality has reigned in the Prison Colony for Juvenile Delinquents.” The report revealed 
that prison guards, older inmates, and the children themselves were engaging in consensual and 
non-consensual sexual activities. The vision of purifying discipline producing a future army of 
catechists was, at Niangara, producing something quite different in practice. Far from becoming 
a zone of model moral reeducation, Niangara was, for at least a decade, a site of documented 
sustained “attacks on morals.” The Dominican director, is portrayed in the report as either naive 
and ineffectual, too “prude” to take a hard look at his prison, or, it was very subtly implied, 
potentially complicit. In any case he harshly disciplined children discovered in sexual contact. In 
one case a boy, Matalatala, who was caught engaged in “"obscene acts at night with another 
boy” was sentenced to two weeks solitary confinement in the darkness of Niangara’s cachot 
(dungeon).207  
The chaotic yet systemic victimization of Niangara’s prisoners by their minders, and the 
pursuits of pleasure engaged in by the inmates themselves, effaced the staid, metronomic 
temporalities of order imagined by penal experts and church leaders in Kinshasa. The irruptive 
experiences of abuse, and perhaps consensual sexual expression, overflowed the delineations of 
the day imagined to be the osmotic medium for moral reeducation. The quotidian processes 
themselves, even as ideally conceived, were not designed not to extrude productive adults from 
lost children. Rather, moral reeducation was a civic project: it could bring wayward youth closer 
to a Queteletian norm of the colonized child. It was only then, in turn, that children could be 
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pedagogically shaped for future productive social use: builders of the ideal future church and 
state. Wayward youth, products of urban moral decay, were sent to the remote rim of the rain 
forest—a place imagined to be somehow their true home— to be transformed.  But this did not 
happen.  Instead they were made into subjects of arbitrary detention, predation, and ultimately 
left to be architects of their own futures.  The church-state complex offered no paths to 
adulthood, only alternative childhoods.  
Whatever the particular failures of the leaders of Niangara to protect the safety and 
privacy of children under their charge, and enact even a problematic vision of moral elevation, 
the ideal educational itinerary for Congolese students not under incarceration was bleak. Nancy 
Rose Hunt writes that “a relentless, belittling paternalism hindered post-primary schooling and 
fed profound disquiet” in colonial Congo.208 The simmering discontent, humiliation, and 
foreclosed futures of moral education (and reeducation) clearly delineated the structural 
limitations built into colonial attempts to shape and reshape Congolese youth.  
The untenable visions and realities of this project eventually collapsed.  In 1957 the 
Niangara Colony was dissolved due to Wauter’s damning report, and a new center established in 
Kanga-Kanga, conceived in great haste. No longer a parochial institution, this was to a modern 
state-run project, focused on science and psychology.  Healing was to be applied to the fragile 
psyches of delinquents. Inmates were not foundationally perpetrators but rather victims of 
trauma. The project was no longer to redirect the wayward souls of lost children. There was not, 
however, sufficient time for the project to develop and independence ended such new dreams of 
secularized, psychologized Congolese futures.  
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Katwa and Hurlburt 
Elsewhere in eastern Congo the soul remained at the center of the frame when it came to 
imagining and addressing juvenile delinquency. Lost souls were the animating object of Paul 
Hulburt Sr.’s life. Paul, the first son of Charles Hurlburt, a founder of the Africa Inland Mission 
(AIM). AIM was among the earliest American Protestant missionary groups to send individuals 
to eastern Africa. In 1896 Charles moved his family, including his six-year-old son Paul, to 
Kijabe, Kenya to bolster the floundering mission there in the wake of the death its first leader, 
Peter Cameron Scott.  There he set roots and established a boarding school for missionary 
children, Rift Valley Academy. Charles Hurlburt’s authoritarian style stabilized the entire 
mission, and his forceful manner convinced Theodore Roosevelt to negotiate Protestant 
missionary access to eastern Congo with Prince Albert of Belgium.209 When permission was 
granted an exploratory trip to Congo took place in 1910. By 1917 Charles had relocated to 
Congo and Paul, recently graduated from Biola University in Southern California joined him 
there. Plans were laid for a permanent mission to a “savage area”210 north of Bukavu, their 
landing point, where the gospel could thrive. Paul Hurlburt was ready to spend the remainder of 
his life in Congo, compelled by a missional heritage obtained from his family and the 
conservative evangelical theology gleaned from his education in southern California.  
Education became a cornerstone of the Protestant missionaries’ earliest efforts in eastern 
Congo. They shared with the Catholic fathers an understanding of its power and potential to 
redirect future generations of Congolese. Paul Hurlburt’s experiences at Biola211 University were 
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formative. Established in 1908 in La Mirada, California. Biola was imagined as an alternative to 
other Christian universities—a place where global missions were to be the overwhelming focus. 
Hurlburt would be among their first graduates. This missiological single-mindedness owed much 
to the denominations heritage. The Baptist movement in the United States was an offshoot of a 
17th century schismatic offshoot from the church of England around essentially one theological 
issue: that only those whose personally and knowingly accept their sinful state and subsequent 
need for salvation could be baptized and, thus saved from eternal damnation.212 Baptist 
theology’s cornerstone doctrine was “believers baptism.” This theology profoundly affected how 
missionaries imagined the place and role of children in the church.  
Where Catholics in Congo were concerned over lost children in a battle for the soul of the 
future church, these Protestants focused on individual itineraries. It could be imagined that 
Baptists viewed each person as possessing a metaphorical sand timer ebbing away the seconds 
toward the end of his or her life. All souls who did not accept Christ and experience baptism 
before time ran out was destined for eternal torment. In Baptist theology, the sand timer began at 
birth. Every living human was, from birth, destined for hell based on the doctrine of original sin, 
supported by passages from the Bible such as Psalm 51:5 that stated “"Behold, I was brought 
forth in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." Unlike Catholics, however, dedicated 
Baptists could not simply immerse the child as an infant to bring them into the Kingdom of 
God. Each individual adherent had to be “old enough to understand” the Gospel and accept it 
personally.  Knowledge of culpability and accountability were central. Childhood, therefore, 
was a position of temporal double-bind: a precarious time period when a child was born in sin, 
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destined for hell, but could not be saved until intellectual capacity permitted volitional 
acceptance of the doctrines of salvation. Biblical translation, education, proselytizing, and 
youth work were all, thus, bound together in taking advantage of a child’s impressionability to 
shaped by the Gospel, but educated enough to understand the commitments there were making 
so they might “own” the ideas they heard preached.   
If children were crucial agents in a theological and temporal nexus for Protestant 
missionaries, they also served as power affective agents—stirring the longing and stoking the 
passion to serve for many missionaries. In 1925 A. Amory, a single female missionary serving in 
the Congo Balolo Mission, recounted a jarring encounter.213  “What a pitiful sight! Only today I 
saw a child so wasted away, one mass of sores and lying in a hut beside the ashes of a fire, it 
would difficult to say when the child was last washed, or the hut last swept.” Amory went to 
comfort the child and “the natives who saw me touch the child exclaimed…” causing her to “rue 
the callousness it revealed” in their hearts. She recounts that she “could not help recalling how 
Jesus never shrank, in his tender love and pity, from touching the most vile. But here, in this 
country, such a thing is unknown, and the weak are left alone to die. Indeed, what a pitiful sight! 
And this is by no means a solitary case. May the hearts of these people soon be touched by the 
infinite love of Jesus.”  
For Amory and her missionary fellows, it was the plight of children that animated the 
clarity of the mission most strongly. Vulnerable children were perceived as the most egregious 
exemplars of the lost condition of the Congolese people. For many missionaries the animating 
impulse was rescue. For others, like Hurlburt, they also could become agents of spiritual rescue 
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for all Congolese if trained properly.  Mirroring Catholic strategies at the time, in 1905, 
Protestant missionaries who baptized their first converts saw the three boys from among “the 
young in school” as “the best soil of all” for planting “the Good Seed” of the Gospel. The newly 
baptized were deemed the “nucleus of the Church of God in this place.” To some Protestant 
missionaries, state authorities, and Catholic fathers alike, Congolese parents had abandoned their 
children to literal and spiritual disease. Powerful adults in colonial Congo invested much hope in 
children, however, to transform the colony’s social, spiritual, economic, and political futures. 
Biological metaphors again took center stage, but unlike Quetelet’s criminal youth who played 
atavistic agents to the social body, baptized youth were productive nuclei—changing from within 
the cells of renewed polity. They represented healing power, the pluripotent cells of a vast and 
powerful Protestant religious movement founded on the Gospel.  
 How did the subjects of such fervent hope experience this investment in their futures? 
Despite the possibility of material gain from joining colonial labor regimes afforded by mission 
education, and avenues of spiritual and social edification possible on missionary stations, the 
infantilizing instincts of missionaries like Hulrburt were difficult for many stomach. One future 
convert described his first encounter with the mission in mixed terms: “I went home that evening 
with a handful of salt, but my spirit was left back there because of the khaki shorts.”  This stands 
in contrast to the contemporaneous experience of newly enlisted workers at Butembo’s Mines 
des Grand Lacs (MGL) who were given one “blanket, two cooking pots, one jacket, one small 
kerosene lamp, and one heavy sweater.” The objects were “displayed with pride by the new 
[mine] workers” and the items were “strongly envied” by those in their community. By contrast, 
the sartorial expectations of the Baharobe were repulsive.214  Infantilizing converts through 
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dress, regardless of biological age, appeared to be a non-sectarian impulse. Non-white adults 
depicted in the Dominican baptismal gathering cited earlier in this chapter were costumed in 
ways similar to the Baharobe. Long socks, short pants, and short-sleeved shirts functioned as a 
uniform for those apprenticed to white missionaries. The missionaries, of course, donned the 
garb of full-grown adults—including long pants and long-sleeved shirts. Conjecture suggests the 
desire to develop a “blank slate” of youth to change Congo’s future compelled such decisions, 
though no doubt deep seated paternalism, and colonial nervousness about social place, were at 
work as well.  
For Hurlburt’s cadre of young evangelists this diminishment stung. Though converted, 
baptized, and brought into leadership, these young men—always men, always boys—were 
frozen in place in social “development.” For mission youth, baptism marked full inclusion in the 
eternal kingdom of God, but only partial integration into the earthly order of social adulthood. 
Hulrburt and other missionaries controlled reproduction with the Baptists community; they had 
sole discretion in the marriage matches of their protégés. Hurlburt and others decided which 
among their Protestant evangelists were mature enough to marry and determined which young 
Protestant women they were to spend their lives with.215 Unconsciously within a lineage of many 
decades of such control of junior reproduction, Protestants imagined themselves managing the 
biological future of the church in Congo by ensuring Godly marriages were under their purview. 
Young evangelists in the church found this to be another infantilizing process, and one that 
removed them from deeply meaningful marriage rites and practices their biological families 
insisted upon.  
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Of greater concern, and of greater impact, was Hurlburt’s dogged refusal to provide 
Congolese church workers with a salary.  Hurlburt felt paying Congolese workers would foster 
avarice, and that their true “reward was in heaven.”216 This decision spurred intense debate 
within the UAM missionary community and between Congolese and American Protestant 
evangelists during the period—from the arrival of missionaries in 1929 through independence in 
1960. In the late 1930s an influential early convert, Daudi Makenzi, protested the lack of pay 
given that both Anglicans and Catholics paid Congolese evangelists a small stipend. Hurlburt 
refused to discuss a change and later expelled Makenzi from the mission when he began 
organizing his colleagues against the policy. Makenzi and his followers appealed to the state for 
redress—arguing they were being forced to labor without pay, a condition of slavery. The 
Territorial Administrator sided with Hurlburt under the pretext that Makenzi was never promised 
pay in writing. Further agitation and organization by Makenzi and his peers led to his arrest and 
conviction for “starting a religious movement without permission.” The punishment for the 
leaders was fifteen years of relegation to a zone south of Bukavu, many hundreds of kilometers 
distant. Makenzi’s views, however, persisted. A number of young Congolese evangelists 
continued to question Hurlburt’s decision making, albeit in more subdued fashions. Lacking a 
way to earn an income dramatically reduced the possibilities for evangelists to, among other 
things, establish a homestead and paying bridewealth. Church workers lived next to mission 
stations and thus did not have time or land to cultivate. Dependence on missionary largesse was 
total. In effect, this amounted to another path by which Hurlburt and his followers managed, and 
ultimately blocked, some forms of social maturity of their Congolese evangelists and church 
workers.  This was why church workers submitted to Hurlburt’s control over their determining 
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who their spouse would be. There was not another avenue to pursue.  
Tensions over reproduction and social adulthood were further exacerbated by collusion 
between missionaries and the state against initiatory practices. Both church and state perceived 
initiation as ripe ground for inspiring insurgency. Durable practices in the region of Hurlburt’s 
mission work called for young men of an age set to be gathered by a ritual expert “blindfolded, 
circumcised, and then as a group would spend up to a month in the forest, sleeping together and 
taking cold morning baths till their wounds healed.” This process was condemned by church and 
state. The ban was deeply unpopular. Protestant evangelists, not unlike young Meru women in 
Lynn Thomas’ work, feared that without circumcision, “they would be denied adulthood.”217  
Desire for social position afforded only by initiation—given the lack of other routes toward 
social position— led many to pursue circumcision despite the ban. In the 1940s “some who 
sought out Hurlburt's advice on the matter were sent up to the AIM mission hospital at Oicha to 
have the operation done.”218 Like the age evaluation in juvenile courts, and the pathological 
framings of immorality in Niangara, initiation was similarly medicalized. Elder Congolese 
church leaders wrestled with the issue and determined that both traditional and medical 
circumcision, which came to be known as “European circumcision” were unbiblical. They 
confronted Hurlburt for allowing youth to be circumcised in the hospital, and with his consent 
excommunicated all the youth, even those with Hurlburt’s permission, who received the 
procedure in the hospital.219  
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Dress, pay, and circumcision were debates that refused to resolve. All centered on youth 
attempting to pass through a threshold to social adulthood. These youths were attempting to 
engage in respectable petition and sought to invoke and obey authority in these matters. Yet they 
did not receive reciprocal respect. As the colonial period came to an end, Congolese evangelists 
came to view aspects of Hurlburt and his American colleagues control as untenable. In June 
1960, many Congolese young people, long frustrated by Hurlburt’s intransigence decided that 
“the day of mercy was over.” They sought, through violence, to take their futures into their own 
hands. Four years later these debates were spectacularly eclipsed as a massive multifaceted 
insurgency would begin.  
 
Conclusions  
In colonial Congo, state agents arrested children, placed them before doctors for clinical 
assessments of biological maturity, and relegated some to remote parts of Congo for moral 
renewal. Meanwhile young Congolese evangelists on Protestant missions sought recognition for 
their diligent striving towards respectability and responsibility. Recognition was not 
forthcoming. These young Protestant men insisted that they refused to remain children. Theirs 
was a rejection of the achingly slow process of spiritual and social maturity under rubrics of 
transformation managed by missionary elites.  
These two modes of religious authority leveraged disciplinary power against those who 
acted out against these regimes. Tactics of excommunication, arrest, solitary confinement, 
extended incarceration and detention were deployed against unruly young people. Often state 
and mission colluded to exclude common foes. Amid the strictures and blockages presented by 
such figures, talk of wild power was ever in the air. In eastern Congo, stories like Mwindo 
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circulated in song and dance alongside internment orders and evangelical tracts. Old epics made 
space for new music, fashion, and economic possibilities that generated a landscape of 
opportunity for young people in late colonial Congo. The avenues of achieving respectability— 
passing through carceral redemption or diligent Christian labor—excluded many from the 
possibilities of social mobility. Forces of the wild remained a powerful alternative to such 
restricted, elusive futures for the young. New political ideas provided alternative avenues to the 
pursuit of domestic authority.  Insurgent young people refused what was offered in lineage and 
missionary church futures, and thus posed significant threats to the enduring power of various 
forms of male eldership.  
 The carceral techniques of Belgian Congo’s juvenile prison sought to conform wayward 
youth to an “average” standard, using strategies of moral reeducation and punitive discipline to 
produce conformity. By moving them into remote situations and casting children into projects for 
reform, colonial figures fetishized the potential of carceral transformation. Toxic conditions of 
vulnerable children in isolation, cast-off by the state and alienated from families, bred predation 
and abuse. Children looked to one another to engage in fleeting forms of pleasure amid dark, 
difficult circumstances. Their moments of connection flicker in the margins of the security 
archive, locatable in the panicked correspondence between officials in the Ministry of Justice 
about a loss of control at the penitentiary.  
 Paul Hurlburt sought to bring lost children into salvation through the baptism. But he 
offered spiritual transformation at the cost of social mobility. Youth were frozen in sartorial, 
economic, and physical space.  Young evangelists became responsible for thousands of souls 
even as they were denied sovereignty over their own homes and churches, over their own 
marriages and fortunes. The racialized regimes of Protestant power bred deep resentment and 
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anger that found multiple outlets for expression. Stones, pleading letters to international political 
elites, and debates over theology were deployed by young men seeking respect and 
accountability.  
 In focusing on these two examples—moral reeducation and spiritual renewal via mission 
leadership—this chapter shows traces how a complex of state and church did not allow non-
conforming children pathways to adulthood, but rather simply alternative ways of being children, 
still permanently under the authority of a pater—the state, the pastor, the warden.  This inability 
to inherit authority led to a deep disillusionment among youth who found only frustrated paths 
into adulthood.  As the colony became self-governing, passing through its own transition to 
anarchic national adolescence, many youth in eastern Congo identified ways to transform society 
through new thresholds of their devising. The social fathers who blocked their paths into 
adulthood would be among those who they brought to account, made to endure their own 
threshold and transition. These passages—often out of the world of the living— would prove to 
be painful too.  
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Chapter Four: “Congo Crisis” in Bunande, 1960-1964 
 
Political scientist René Lemarchand writes that “one of the more baffling aspects of the 1964-
1965 eastern rebellion… is the complex intermingling of local issues with the regional 
insurgency.”220 Lemarchand draws attention to two important quandaries. First, how to link 
drivers of the rebellion tied to deep, localized dynamics and, at the same time, attend to endemic 
issues affecting most citizens of decolonizing Congo during a volatile period? Second, and more 
broadly, Lemarchand points us to a critical analytical question: what scale engenders the clearest 
insights on the movement? This chapter aims to address both challenges.  At the same time, it 
wrestles with a scalar dyad that threatens to mislead—what defines the bounds of the local and 
the regional? 
The focus is on a crosscutting dynamic: how elite economic and political class formation in 
the “Congo Crisis” period precipitated the rebellion. I argue that economic and political 
developments linked the particular climate of unrest in North Kivu province with similar events 
unfolding throughout decolonizing Congo. At the same time intimate resentments evoked by the 
exclusions of new forms of class were critical in catalyzing the rebellion within communities in 
eastern Congo. Rising male elders, especially in urban zones, leaned into the emerging 
opportunities afforded by fellow elites and state officials and away from power drawn from 
social followers. As elsewhere in decolonizing Africa, these men, once critical patrons, showed 
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“contempt for old norms of reciprocity with clients [and] shattered the latter's acceptance of 
gross social inequality” that new possibilities of wealth accumulation made possible.221 Kin, and 
fictive kin, suffered from the loss of these relations and, ultimately, fought back to remind elders 
of their obligations. This chapter draws on themes introduced in the previous two chapters—
vernacular debates around power and maturity and state and religious attempts to discipline 
unruly youth—to interpret these dynamics.  
To ground the analysis, processes of class transformation are explored in a single zone: 
northern North Kivu province’s primary urban trading center, the city of Butembo. In this town 
and its rural periphery, I trace trajectories of economic change and political engagement from the 
colonial era through 1964. From Butembo, during a critical period of instability between 
independence and the Simba Rebellion, a cadre of powerful Congolese business families arose 
that would dominate the regional economy from the Simba era to the present day. These same 
figures attempted, less successfully, to form a class of political operatives who sought advantage 
by deploying Cold War registers of inequality, and exclusionary forms of ethnic politics, to 
direct youthful resentments against political enemies.  
This chapter explores why social pressures from crystalizing class divisions in Butembo 
during the Congo Crisis were not alleviated by so-called “ethnic solidarity.”222 Even as novel 
techniques of Nande ethnic identification gained momentum in the early 1960s—inspired by 
Bakonzo “blood brothers” in Uganda declaring an independent ethnic kingdom of Rwenzururu 
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on August, 15, 1962—internal tensions beset ethnic patriots in eastern Congo.223  This chapter 
traces how the moral expectations of ethnic affiliation intensified, rather than reduced, the 
stresses generated by economic exclusions. Shared expectations of reciprocity, ignored by some 
elites and demanded by juniors, was exacerbated by widening economic inequality. We trace 
how elites who leveraged the limited economic opportunities afforded by colonial wage labor 
aggressively pursued the possibilities of decolonizing markets—especially in cash cropping. This 
narrow opportunity for significant wealth accumulation incentivized the freezing of youth into 
social place, in part to reduce the cost of their labor. As Africans once worked for Belgians in 
North Kivu’s racialized economy, rising business leaders imagined lineage youth were to work 
for Kinande-speaking elites and provide a platform for their wealth acquisition. Offered in return 
were limited forms of respectability, palatable to elites. This proved, to many young people, a 
hollow trade. Instead of participating in these elite-directed projects, the Simba rose up against a 
cadre of Shemwindo-like figures who were to face, in 1964, armies of avenging sons. 
 
Butembo 
The urban milieu of Butembo gives shape the middle scale of analysis adopted in this chapter. 
Butembo’s history provides context for the particular processes of class formation examined in 
this chapter. A cross-cutting view of conditions and trends in northern North Kivu from the late 
1950s to 1964 emerges. This chapter explores antecedents to the Congo Crisis and Simba 
Rebellion that go beyond previous analyses, stuck in scales too wide or too narrow. A regional 
frame, grounded by a single urban space, allows us to better explore the experiences and 
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memories that characterized this era of rebel rule and helps trace the emerging post-colonial 
order that Simba rebels were so intent on countering.  
It also reveals how and why social elders strove to both produce, protect, and preserve it. 
This chapter’s approach opens the study up to a broad range of practices, aspirations, and debates 
by situating its focus on Simba violence against an emerging class category and nascent ethnic 
polity. Rebels actively mocked, attacked, and attempted to undo predictable paths to class 
respectability that took slow shape during a thirty-year period leading up and through 
independence. Against these notions of adulthood, Simba leveraged illiberal, kin-based idioms of 
obligation. Simba sought to overturn the comforts and forms of authority upwardly mobile men 
worked busily to establish.  Elites and aspiring elites, in turn, charged the Simba with being 
agents of incoherent, even demonic evil. Cast as lost children, under dark influences of political 
leftism and the occult, those in power worked to protect the moral order Simba sought to invert.  
These dynamics emerged out of stewing tensions in late colonial Congo and came to a 
boil during the tumultuous years of chaos and opportunity between independence and the 
spectacular violence of mid-1964.  Moving beyond prison colonies, rural communities, and 
mission stations, this chapter explores a city to understand, as Crawford Young argues, why such 
zones were targeted with particular vigor by Simba Rebels in 1964.224 Why were urban spaces a 
primary locus for violence enacted by this insurgency? And, why this city, Butembo?  
The story begins in October 1964 as war and panic first reached the city.   
Butembo lies in the mountainous heart of Bunande—the homeland of Congo’s Kinande-
speaking communities—high on the escarpment of the Albertine Rift. Butembo’s weather is 
cold, despite it virtually straddling the equator, due to its 4,531-foot elevation. Simba insurgents 
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penetrated the lush green hills surrounding the city at the peak of the movement’s power. In late 
October 1964, approximately 3000 Simba rebels took the town. Butembo was strategic: a vital 
trading hub then and today, home to about 14,000 inhabitants at the time.225 It was the last major 
city to fall under rebel control—the eastern geographical ambit of the movement. Simba took 
Butembo without bloodshed. Rumors of rebels perpetrating anti-elite violence provoked “general 
panic” in advance of the invasion. All whites and most Congolese elites living in the city 
engaged in a hasty exodus ahead of invasion rumors. Key among the fleeing figures were the 
town’s emerging Kinande-speaking trading elite.226 They were wise to flee. Upon capturing the 
town, Simba identified and rounded up remaining persons of power and influence and placed 
them on trucks bound for Beni, fifty-four kilometers to the south to be “judged by the people.”227 
Conviction by a voice vote in public trials of “crimes against the population” resulted in 
summary executions.228  
The Simba regime took hold without serious opposition from the Butembo populace. 
Most townspeople, who called themselves Bubolais, were ambivalent about the presence of the 
rebels.229 While Simba terrified the emerging Nande elite, the poor feared violence but imagined 
Simba rule might mark potential for change and opportunity. No matter the opinions, few 
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possessed the power to challenge the rebels. Government armed forces, the National Army of 
Congo (ANC), fled prior to the Simbas’ arrival. Despite weeks of preparing for an assault and 
rooting out civilians allegedly sympathetic to the rebellion, whispers of an impending attack 
spurred the preemptive retreat.230 This capitulation came on the heels of other mass ANC 
defections to the Simba forces across rebel-held zones.231  
For less than two weeks, the Simba ruled Butembo. Then in early November, fierce 
fighting broke out when reconstituted ANC forces, led by mostly white “Rhodesian, South 
African and Belgian” mercenaries, besieged the city. This new force was tasked by the United 
States and Belgium to “hold the line against the rebel insurrection” which threatened to conquer 
all Congo.232 After brief but intense fighting, the ANC-aligned forces retook the city in early 
November, 1964, killing over 500 Simba and suffering a single casualty. 233 The surviving Simba 
fled. International journalists wrote that people “liberated” from Simba-held zones in Congo, like 
Butembo, struggled to shake off “the eerie unreality of life under rebel rule,” as if haltingly 
waking from a dream.234 For people like Gustave Pengeza, a nineteen-year-old schoolteacher at 
the time, memories of rebel rule were vivid fifty years later.  
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The Simba struck Pengeza as very young, “jeunesse,”235 drawn from a large disaffected 
generation in newly independent Congo. He recalled acutely their ferocity in the face of the 
professional mercenary soldiers. “Their clothes were full of bullet holes, yet they advanced. Even 
the ones whose intestines were outside of their body held them with one hand and continued 
fighting with the other hand.”236 Pengeza, a man seeking respectable employment in Butembo’s 
public schools, identified the source of Simba power as “unbelievable sorcery.”  
The dawa that animated the Simba’s insurgency struck all who witnessed it in Butembo. 
Rebels mobilized various forms of mai medicine at every level of operations. Medicine was 
deployed as a battle tactic through the end of the movement. One battlefield commander, Lt. 
Colonel Abeti Kabwe, requested that the Simba’s commanding general, Nicolas Olenga, “send 
us the necessary ingredients so that all bridges in this area may be washed with remedies to 
protect them from bombing” to aid retreat.237 Another rebel leader, Martin Kasongo, told an 
American journalist: “One pill and no one can touch us. [Bullets] dissolve into water. You 
Americans can bring all your bullets and bombs. They’ll be no use.”238   
In the end, bullets, bombs, and the technologies and tactics of the multinational 
mercenary force were highly useful in ending the reign of the Simba. The loss of Butembo 
proved a significant strategic and symbolic failure: a turning point.239 By the end of December, 
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1964, the Simba regime lost control of virtually all its former territory. The movement was 
decimated. A coup d’etat in 1965 began Joseph Mobutu’s 32-year tenure in power. Under his 
regime, the vestiges of the Simba were brutally suppressed by his army, a rejuvenated ANC. By 
the end of a series of purges, the Simba were no longer a threat to the state in Leopoldville. 
Straggling remnants of Simba forces persisted within Congo until 1975, operating largely as 
forest-bound bandits.240  
 
Cold Warriors? 
The Simba rebellion was both massively successful and short-lived—its impact vast but brief. 
This chapter focuses on how and why the movement targeted an emerging vernacular elite class. 
It interprets Simba violence, mirroring concurrent generational conflicts in other parts of east 
Africa, as an opportunity for young men to “express their masculinity, lay claim to maturity, and 
capture the mobility that had eluded them.”241 This approach runs against much scholarship on 
the rebellion.242 Most studies frame the movement as a globally-linked leftist insurgency in an 
emerging postcolonial African state. The reasons for this owe much to the unique conditions in 
which the scholarship was produced, namely the so-called Congo Crisis.243  
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The Congo Crisis began when Patrice Lumumba, the Prime Minister of Congo, was 
kidnapped from his home in Kinshasa, transported to Katanga province—the site of a well-
supported foreign-backed secessionist movement—to be tortured and assassinated. He had been 
in office for 207 days. Both Belgium and the United States later acknowledged involvement in 
his death. In all, five significant insurgent movements emerged during this period. Moise 
Tshombe’s Belgium-backed Katangan secession, the Mulele Uprising in Kwilu in January 1964, 
the South Kasai secession, the Gizenga-led secession in 1961 eastern Congo, and the Simba 
Rebellion in eastern Congo of 1964. International involvement helped catalyze each of these 
rebellions.  
Academics, concerned with such interference, commenced studies of the Simba conflict 
even before the movement was vanquished. Their work was written in the context of Mobutu’s 
rise to power. The CIA’s support for Mobutu was already clear.244 This scholarship was thus 
composed in a climate where neocolonial projects seemed imminent.245 The Africanist political 
scientists who first examined the Simba rebellion argued that the movement was a “second 
independence:” seeking to finish what political decolonization began.246 Interpreting the vast and 
                                               
to Congolese the “Congo Crisis.” The phrase became a useful shorthand for the series of catastrophes that were resolved, 
ultimately, in Mobutu’s seizure of power in 1965.   
 
244 Connor Cruise O’Brien, “The Congo, The United Nations, and Chapham House,” The New Left Review, June 1965. 
 
245 There is still much scholarship on eastern Congo that falls into the “rebel movements as proxy armies” for Cold War 
interests. See Rene Lamarchand‘s Eastern Congo Historiography piece in Journal of African History (2013) on p. 425.  He also 
used the phrase the “’so-called’ Simba rebellion.” It is unclear why this distancing term is used, given that was the identifier used 
by the rebels themselves to describe their movement in all internal communication.  
 
246 Freedom from external domination became the emancipatory framework within which this nascent scholarship, most within 
the discipline political science, sought to shape its interventions and perspectives. (See Chapter 7, “The Recurrent Crises of the 
Gatekeeper State” in Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present (Cambridge University Press, 2002) As Cold 
War alignments appeared to present a redoubled threat to the autonomy of Africa’s independent nations, albeit in insidious forms, 
some of postcolonial Africa’s first leaders, many once seen as heroes of anti-colonial movements, appeared to be less 
revolutionaries and more “gatekeepers” for Western economic and political interest. The case of Congo’s Moise Tshombe was 
held up as a prominent example of this type. 
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seemingly incoherent eastern wing that engulfed Butembo presented a greater challenge than the 
smaller Kwilu wing headed by the Maoist revolutionary Pierre Mulele. The first major study of 
the rebellion by Renée Fox, Wally de Cramer, and Jean Marie-Ribeaucourt, argued that the 
Mulele rebellion was a “revolutionary attempt to correct some of the abuses and injustices by 
which large segments of the population of the region felt oppressed.” They argued that Mulele 
sought to provide a subjugated population with a chance “to look forward to the fruit and 
promises of ‘second Independence.’”247 Mulele ensured his revolutionaries “did not neglect the 
ideological preparation” for combat. His recruits were required to imbibe and recite propaganda 
and Communist literature in order to ensure clarity in the political logic behind their violent 
actions.248  
The eastern wing of the rebellion did not fit well into this liberatory framework. Most 
awkward were the “so-called… magical practices” that the scholars tended to relegate to 
footnotes.249 These eastern revolutionaries seemed to neglect the “ideological preparation” of the 
Kwilu wing. The Fox, De Craemer, and Ribeaucourt study, like other early works on the 
rebellion, struggled to link the two wings of the movement together beyond the surface level. 
                                               
247 Renée Claire Fox, Willy De Craemer, and J. M. Ribeaucourt, “The Second Independence”: A Case Study of the Kwilu 
Rebellion in the Congo (Mouton & Co., 1965) p 109. 
248 Benoît. Verhaegen, Rebellions Au Congo., Études Du C.R.I.S.P. (Bruxelles: Centre de recherche et d’information socio-
politiques, 1966), p 345. Unpublished work by Emery Kalema offers a useful take on Mulele’s impact and legacies in the DR 
Congo.  
249 A similar pattern is carried through other prominent studies by Crawford Young, Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, and more 
recently by Ezimet Kisangani. Benoit Verhaegen’s 1966 Rebellions au Congo is a notable exception. Benoit Verhaegen’s seminal 
Rebellions au Congo, published in 1966, adopted a different scale than the pioneering work, treating the movement in a more 
granular fashion, within, largely, the bounds of Congo’s borders and political vicissitudes. His interpretation tracked closely the 
infighting among Congo’s emergent political elites and “ethnic” tensions throughout the country. Verhaegen’s approach was to 
connect ethnically-identified groups with a particular ideology. Language groups were either “progressive” versus 
“conservative,” “Lumumbaist” versus “pro-government,” “Muleleist” versus “traditionalist,” and so on. Verhaegen also dealt 
more directly with “the magic” elements of the rebellion, as he called them, but interpreted the dawa as a mechanism for 
maintaining authority. “The absolute necessity for the all Simba to receive a new immunization before each battle ensured their 
total dependence on the military organization that itself maintained a monopoly over the functions of magic.” From page 353.   
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The Cold War-dominated, internationalist framing that allowed analytical traction on the Kwilu 
rebellion made it all the more challenging to interpret the Simba movement. Early work on the 
rebellions over-determined root causes while failing to explain the recurrence of mai movements 
similar to the Simba Rebellion long after Cold War allegiances fell away.250  
 
Class and Kin 
For persons living in eastern Congo in 1964, enduring the rebellion, the Cold War seemed at a 
far remove. The rebels did little to foreground its relevance. None I spoke with in Butembo 
recalled rebel speeches extolling a particular political line. Anxieties instead concerned perceived 
sartorial, not political, affronts. Gustave Pengeza remembered that “if someone was wearing 
trousers he was arrested immediately and killed… We were all obliged to put on short pants… it 
was cruel.”  Simba economic tactics were also difficult to comprehend. “At the Central Bank of 
Congo branch in Butembo, the Simba looted and then perforated money. Before fleeing, they 
burned it all.”251 Pengeza’s memories of this Simba-controlled city reveal the rebels not as 
“communists and far-leftists,” like many international analysts imagined them to be.252  They 
were instead terrorists working against pillars of progress and adult respectability.  
Pengeza’s recollections are worth exploring alongside other evidence. His story emerges 
                                               
 
250 Even the nomenclature is overdetermined. Called by some scholars the Mulele Uprising, the movement was connected to the 
Kwilu-based rebellion of 1964 led by former Education Minister in Lumumba’s government, Pierre Mulele. However, despite 
invoking the powerful names of Lumumba and Mulele in their fighting, there is little evidence that the Maoist ideology animating 
Mulele’s rebellion applied to the Simba (the eastern wing of the rebellion.) Che Guevara who came to assist what he thought was 
a communist-influenced insurgency was deeply disappointed by the absence of revolutionary thinking among most of the 
combatants he encountered.  
 
251 Interview with Pengeza Mumbere Gustave, Mangina, DRC Congo. 27 March 2014, 
 
252 Confidential letter From Senator Tom Dodd to President Lyndon Baines Johnson, October 27, 1965. United States National 
Archives: C.F. CO 52 Congo, Republic of (Former Belgian Congo) (1965). 
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from within a milieu where tales like Mwindo were still being recited, and his life unfolded next 
to the Katwa mission station where he and others witnessed Paul Hurlburt and his followers 
sparred sharply in public with Congolese colleagues. He also aspired to a respectable 
profession—school teaching. His allegiances as a young man, but also an évolué, were complex.  
Like mission youth described in the previous chapter, wearing shorts hurt Pengeza 
deeply. For an upwardly mobile aspiring educator and évolué such as Pengeza, being forced to 
wear shorts smacked of colonial era forms of frozen immaturity. Colonial educational order was 
partly constructed through codes of dress, and a ban on wearing pants for certain categories of 
Africans was common. Elite educational institutions in East Africa such as King Budo School in 
Uganda and Alliance School in Kenya banned both African staff and students from wearing 
pants—a situation found to be “humiliating,” and akin to not “being treated like a man.”253 To 
Simba, the “cruelty” of forcing social adults to wear shorts can be interpreted as a kind of 
symbolic violence. The guardians of respectability and adulthood were being hoisted up on their 
own petards.  Wearing pants was seen as an attempt to integrate with European modes of dress—
connected to political reactionaries and “loyalists” associated with the pro-Belgian Parti 
National de Progrès (PNP) that was conservative and anti-independence; the party for “évolué 
African petty elites.”254 
 The demand to wear shorts was, in some people’s mind, linked in mysterious ways to 
                                               
253 Andrew Burton, Andrew Ross Burton, and Helene Charton-Bigot, Generations Past: Youth in East African History (Ohio 
University Press, 2010) p 91.  
254 Mukohya Vwakyanakazi, “African Traders In Butembo, Eastern Zaire (1960-1980): A Case Study of Informal 
Entrepreneurship in a Cultural Context of Central Africa” (The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1982) p 158. 
 109 
Simba imperviousness to “white people’s weapons.”255 The rebel capacity to neutralize 
technological disadvantage seemed bound up with a hostility toward emerging norms of class 
respectability in colonial and postcolonial urban Congo, indexed by many things including the 
masculine wearing of trousers.256 The Simba made war against more than the national army. 
They sought to tear down the pillars of social mobility around which members of a rising class, 
like Pengeza, steadily imagined the future. Simba targeted indices of prestige and authority, 
class-based forms all with colonial roots—professionalism, fashion, money, and technology—for 
erasure and mockery. Such humiliations were deeply destabilizing for a schoolteacher with what 
Derek Peterson has called “a fervent regard for social discipline” like Pengeza.257 For Pengeza, 
rising out of subjugation meant mastery of language, high levels of professionalism, and 
achieving class respectability. These markers of cosmopolitan difference separated him from 
those who failed to acquire these markers of upward mobility. The rebellion proved a 
devastating, if temporary, disruption to his trajectory. Against Pengeza’s decorum came a 
profane, occult, movement that railed against French, Christian, sartorial airs, and other 
foundational postures of the “cosmopolitan urban world.”258  
Pengeza, however, had little to fear beyond damage to his pride. It was only established 
elites—who dominated economic, religious and political life in Butembo—for whom actual 
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256 Johannes Fabian, Language and Colonial Power: The Appropriation of Swahili in the Former Belgian Congo 1880-1938 
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257 Derek R. Peterson, Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival: A History of Dissent, C.1935-1972 (Cambridge 
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bodily harm was intended by the rebels. What did shock him was that the tormentors of elite 
culture were not politically radicalized ethnic outsiders. Most came from within eastern 
Congolese societies, albeit from its lowest rungs; these were often poor, rag-tag, rural youth. As 
one woman remembers, “most of our young people were implicated in the rebellion.” She saw 
the Simba as fellow Nande. To her, the rebels were “us: everybody who died was our brothers 
and sisters” on both sides.259 The killers and killed imagined one another as kin, fictive or 
consanguinal. The authors of the subjugation and humiliation of Pengeza and thousands like him 
were interpreted as wayward sons, not as Cold War guerillas. The conflict between wild jeunesse 
and established évolué was not for a just future for the nation, but for the soul of Bunande. 
Bunande is an invented ethnotope.260 It was christened as a supposed Nande “fatherland” 
by “ethnic patriots” to describe terrain that straddles the vast, agriculturally rich lands of the 
Semiliki Valley and climbs the northern reaches of Mitumba Mountains as well as the 
escarpments of the Western Rift Valley, called locally the Albertine. Butembo is the largest 
population center in this zone.261 Both the ethnotope, Bunande, and the ethnonym, Nande, are 
relatively recent inventions, likely coterminous with early incursions by European explorers in 
the mid to late 19th century.262 In the precolonial era, Kinande-speaking groups were not under a 
                                               
259 Aniesi Kahindo, interview in Beni. 27 March, 2014. Second quote is from Kinyata Kasereka from interview in Butembo, 14 
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260 I find this term, from Pieter van Wesemael, Architecture of Instruction and Delight: A Socio-Historical Analysis of World 
Exhibitions as a Didactic Phenomenon (1798-1851-1970) (010 Publishers, 2001), p 422 to a useful way to describe an ethnically 
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261 Derek R. Peterson, Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival: A History of Dissent, C.1935-1972 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), p. 16. It likely follows the early colonial Belgian description of the area as “Territoire des Wanande.” 
 
262 See page 42 of this dissertation for a possible explanation of how this term emerged.  
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single political authority or organized under a centralized hierarchy.263 The proximity of 
Kinande-speaking persons to commodity-rich zones, both agricultural and mineral, combined 
with the relative vulnerability of these largely autonomous and acephalous clan-based social 
structures, made these groups an attractive target for raiders, including Zanzibari slave traders in 
the nineteenth century.264 Into the mix of war groups, ruga-ruga forces, including Belgian-
aligned militia, eclipsed all others in establishing control of the region.   
This instability invited the implantation of Belgian military outposts, first established at 
Beni and Kasindi in 1897, marking the birth of nascent urban zones in Bunande. Belgian 
officials reported that “full exploitation” of the primarily Kinande-speaking region was “almost 
null” until after WWI.265 Even after the pacification of Beni in 1928 and the settlement of Greeks 
and later Belgians in the region, ongoing insurrections, often interpreted as Anioto, troubled 
colonial control until 1945. The lateness of pacification and the vociferous nature of Kinande-
speaking resistance to colonization brought the linguistic community into disfavor. Very few 
Kinande-speakers went into the state apparatus despite Belgian adoption of strategies of indirect 
rule.  
 
Making a Colonial Economy  
As in much of colonial Congo, but in ways particular to North Kivu, the colonial economy 
halting emerged an was unevenly established. Settler farmers and mining agents relied on forced 
                                               
263 Packard, Chiefship, chapter one.  
 
264 These included the British brigand John Stokes, described in chapter 2, as well as forces allied with the Kinyarwanda-
speaking warlord Rwabugiri (see Vwakyanaki and Packard).  
 
265 Mukohya Vwakyanakazi, “African Traders In Butembo, Eastern Zaire (1960-1980): A Case Study of Informal 
Entrepreneurship in a Cultural Context of Central Africa” (The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1982), p 124. 
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labor, using mandatory inclusion tactics such as taxation to compel the participation of African 
labor. At the same time, much effort went toward preventing Congolese workers from accessing 
lucrative possibilities the colonial economy offered. Such exclusions were essential to colonial 
order. Workers, including Hurlburt’s evangelists, became interstitial figures proximate to, but not 
inside, worlds of economic authority and opportunity.   
In January of 1928, immediately after Bunande’s “pacification” was complete, the 
Comité National du Kivu (CNKi) was formed. CNKi was an economic development monopoly 
designed to turn the Kivus into agricultural powerhouses for the colony.266  The system was, 
from its inception, highly racialized. Although the Kivu region was home to only four white 
agriculturalists in 1920, by 1930 there were over 1100 Europeans engaged in farming.267  To 
encourage in-migration, CNKi allocated 10,000 hectares of land to each new European migrant 
for agriculture. The government also offered significant loan funds to provide seed capital for 
establishing plantations.268 These aggressive recruitment and support schemes, combined with 
relatively low population densities of Congolese meant the Kivu region soon had, by far, the 
highest ratio of whites to black in non-urban Congo. The density of white agriculturalists was by 
design; the colonial government sought to create what David Northrup called “a second Kenya” 
in the Kivu region.269 The state generated conditions where Europeans could flourish without any 
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African competition: cash crops were illegal for Africans to grow until the mid 1950s. To further 
protect the economic advantages of white settlers in the Kivu provinces, Africans traders were 
not allocated to purchase and resell quotas of foreign goods, unlike their peers in other 
provinces.270  Greeks, brought in to serve as laborers and economic middle figures for Belgians, 
used their ambiguous status within the Belgian colonial racial structure to travel within and 
between racial spheres, and engage in profitable trade with Belgians and emerging Nande elites 
alike. Class distinctions emerged along and across racial lines.  
Despite legal barriers, Kinande-speakers found possibilities for profit in smuggling and 
informal cross-border trade activities.271 The epicenters of such activity were the emerging urban 
zones of Beni and Butembo. As the colony approached independence, CNKi’s tenure as a state-
like entity in the Kivu economy grew vulnerable. The recruitment strategies to lure Belgians to 
Kivu were all to successful. By 1955, colonial policies restricted the immigration of Belgians to 
Congo to prevent over mobilization of African labor. The focus was on reducing the need for 
Congolese workers. This decision was prompted primarily by anxiety about African population 
decline and birthrates.272 But there were also fears about efficiency: African laborers, it was 
claimed, possessed “ one-fifth of the productivity of a white worker.”273 Labor reforms in 1955 
sought to increase wages in the hopes it would enhance productivity and generate a middle class 
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for whom the temptations of “African nationalists” would be minimal given their privileged 
positions.274  A parallel period of labor reform in French Africa is called by Frederick Cooper an 
era of “imperial equality.” Class formation, in short, was a deliberate colonial strategy designed 
to segment African society and produce a class of influential elites who found the colonial 
situation not just tolerable, but even preferable to the uncertainties of independence. These 
dynamics were playing out in the Kinande-speaking heartlands on the eve of independence. 
CNKi’s racialized economics stratified opportunity in the Kivus. For Africans, CNKi was 
committed to exclusionary, extractive practices and policies. For over two decades, Africans 
were barred from nearly all economic activities other than the lowest forms of wage labor. As 
salaries increased with the demand for African labor, and political strategies in Leopoldville 
changed, dynamics shifted. In Kivu, however, skilled labor was never in high demand, quite 
unlike in the mining communities of Katanga. Kivu’s economy was founded on cash crop 
exports. Colonial strategy thus did not incentivize higher levels of education for Kivu’s black 
population. Opportunities for such training were few and hard-won. Those who fought for an 
opportunity for uplift were not keen to jeopardize their positions by agitating for broader and 
more equitable inclusion practices. Quite the opposite.  
 
Ambivalent Engagement with the Colonial Economy 
Throughout the colonial era, Butembo’s path toward strategic economic significance came 
through trading and mining in addition to agriculture. The two major commodities traded in 
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precolonial Bunande were ivory and salt.275  Early Nande traders built wealth from salt, which 
came from a lake at Katwe in what is now Uganda. This lake was a robust source of salt, and 
Kinande-speaking groups, especially the Baswaga and Bashu, took advantages of cross border 
lineage alliances to monopolize the salt trade in the region.276 The five-day, one hundred fifty-
mile journey from Butembo to Katwa was dangerous. Salt gathering groups were vulnerable to 
raiders on the return journey as the hauled their prized goods. Dangerous work was required to 
extract the prized white salts from foam deep in the lake. Brown salt could be more easily 
acquired at the lake rim but was not as flavorful, costly, or desirable.277  
Ivory came from elephants that took shelter in the massive rainforests around the Semliki 
River. Ivory was long a strategic commodity in the region, but elephants were still plentiful 
enough that missionaries shot them and sold their ivory to finance ministry activities through the 
1930s. Salt and ivory were only the most important among an array of trade goods, including 
iron, raffia, livestock, clay, and necklaces, which Nande bought and sold. In the mid 19th century, 
the Kinande-speaking zones were brought into the Indian Ocean slave trade and, soon after, 
formal colonial economies.278  Both scavenging for salt and hunting were associated with forces 
of the bush—an interface point with wild power.279  
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But the wilds were not the source of most households’ sustenance. For the vast majority 
the primary means of livelihood before, during, and after the colonial era was agriculture. 
Randall Packard argues that Kinande-speaking communities were innovators of land tenure 
systems in the northern Mitumba Mountain regions—migrating in with notions that “clearing the 
land” established tenure.280 Agriculture, like lineage-based land tenure systems, became 
hallmarks of Nande society in the region. In the colonial era, new regimes of land tenure, like 
those established by CNKi, competed with older systems. With this came significant social 
change.281 Land competition, rarely a precolonial problem in a region with low population 
densities, emerged powerfully in the face of massive terrain holdings by an emerging cadre of 
Belgian farmers.282  
Coffee soon proved the most lucrative crop for white settlers. Though coffee would, 
nearly three decades later, be the commodity that launched Kinande-speaking traders into 
significant wealth, it was not legally planted by Africans until 1954, and even then against 
European coffee farmers’ vociferous objections.283 Loan capital was unavailable to Africans 
through most of the colonial era. They thus had no subsidies for start-up costs for coffee farms 
until 1956 when credit for Africans was first made available.284 This meant that those requiring 
credit to start commercially viable farms—a group that included all Africans, long excluded from 
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profitable agriculture— would not see their first yields from coffee trees until 1959. All profits 
from coffee production for African farmers came only after independence. In this milieu, 
prestige in the wage economy was difficult to earn. Pressure on elder males to accumulate wealth 
for the acquisition of followers motivated venal, exploitative practices toward juniors. Resource 
scarcity, real or imagined, compelled Kinande-speaking elites to push down juniors who might 
become potential competitors and so as not to lose a crucial source of cheap labor.  
Mining was also an important driver of economic activity in the colonial era. The 
company Compagnie Minière du Grand Lacs (MGL), established in Butembo in 1928, became 
the administrative entity behind all mining in North Kivu. By 1945, approximately one third of 
all male labor in the territory was mobilized for the mining sector.285  The MGL earned 
concessionary privileges, including exclusive mining rights over a territory double the size of 
Belgium, by investing in rail infrastructure in eastern Congo. Even with a mining monopoly, 
labor proved difficult to mobilize, so incentives were offered to entice men to move to mining 
zones. One miner in the 1930s recounted: “When I arrived at the [mines] in 1938, everything was 
there in abundance:  manioc, meat, beans and clothes...in the mining camps you easily forgot 
village life and detested it.”286 The promises of mining prosperity stirred class formation. Access 
to goods and foods linked mine labor with forms of abundance unattainable in village life. Urban 
life and its opportunities for self-mastery appealed to many. A kind of urban aspirational lifestyle 
quickly took hold, and the obligations of kin in the village became perceived, even by non-elites, 
as a nuisance.  
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Soon, the investments in infrastructure and labor paid off for the MGL. By 1939 it was 
annually exporting nearly three tons of gold from the Kivus.287 MGL was responsible for 
building virtually all of the connective road networks in the region in order to facilitate the 
exportation of raw materials.288 For a generation of Congolese men, the only meaningful 
possibilities for engaging in wage labor—necessary to meet colonial tax burdens—were on 
Belgian farms or the five MGL mines in the region. The arrival of independence dramatically 
affected the fortunes of these wage laborers. Between 1958 and 1962 all formal sectors 
employing wage laborers—agriculture, industrial manufacturing, construction, transportation, 
commerce, and finance—saw massive employment retraction. Some sectors, like construction, 
lost as much as sixty percent of the work force.289 Nationally, more than half of all mine work 
ended between 1958 and 1964. In Butembo, the 1963 closures of all MGL mines led to economic 
deprivation in the Congo Crisis years.290 Wage laborers looked to kith and kin for sustenance. 
Intense pressure on a small cadre of emerging elites was exacerbated by the collapse of ancillary 
markets of trade goods that came with the decline of large mining projects like MGL. Further 
difficulties came with the closure of politically powerful business associations such as the 
Professional Association of the Middle Classes of Kivu (UNAKI), an exclusively white 
organization. With the end of the associations, so too went infrastructure development services to 
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the region, once generously supported by state financing.  
The point here is that the racialized colonial economy profoundly shaped postcolonial 
prosperity. It established economic structures of exclusion and stratification as normative—even 
intrinsic to the functioning of the economic system. Very few Africans crossed the threshold of 
independence with existing wealth. In 1961 just five individual Congolese businessmen had 
established significant commercial holdings within all of Bunande.291 By 1970, however, dozens 
of Butembo traders would fill the ranks of Congo’s most powerful and wealthy emerging African 
elite.292 The economic transformation happened remarkably quickly. In a single generation—the 
generation of decolonization—ninety percent of Butembo’s core trading families moved from 
subsistence agriculture and into commercial trading.293 Former farmers, not wage-earning 
miners, first grasped the possibilities for wealth accumulation in the post-colonial economy. 
These emerging African big men worked to shape a respectable elite class. They used their new 
wealth and opportunities to consolidate authority and power. The first signs of the impending 
violence against Bubolais elites came amidst a storm of interethnic violence.  
 
Kanyarwanda 
In the twilight months of Belgian Congo, anti-Tutsi rioting and violence in Rwanda led to 
massive displacement of Kinyarwanda-speakers into North Kivu province. Between 1959 and 
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293 Vwakyanakazi, “African Traders,” p 235.  
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1962, thousands of Tutsi resettled in Congo. Though significant, this migration of refugees was 
only the most recent among a long history of population transfers from Rwanda into eastern 
Congo. From 1937 to 1955 the Belgian government coordinated the Mission d’Immigration des 
Banyarwanda with two primary goals. Population transfer was meant to alleviate resource 
pressures caused by famine in Rwanda while supplying much needed labor in Kivu’s tea and 
coffee plantations.  Most migrants in these first waves were identified by Kivutiens as “Hutu.” In 
1959, a “social revolution” transformed Rwanda’s internal politics. A flood of Tutsi-identified 
persons fled to the Kivus to escape this purge. They found themselves in a highly competitive 
and exclusionary economic world where tensions among Kinande-speakers over limited 
resources was already fevered. 
By 1963, claims to autochthony and pressures on increasingly densely populated lands 
came to a head.294 Just a year before the Simba Rebellion, from within Kinande-speaking 
communities youth were mobilized in large numbers to seize and control lands in unofficial 
borderlands between Bunande and regions of eastern dominated by the so-called 
Banyarwanda.295  This violence was meant to push back ethnic competitors and secure tenure 
opportunities for Kinande-identified peoples. An escalating series of attacks and reprisals took 
ensued.  Known as Kanyarwanda, this era was characterized by an “orgy of violence,” according 
to Rene Lemarchand.296 
                                               
294 For an in-depth treatment of this, see Stephen Jackson, “Sons of Which Soil? The Language and Politics of Autochthony in 
Eastern D.R. Congo,” African Studies Review 49, no. 2 (2006): 95–123. 
295 Mulenge is the name of the chefferie that first provided succor to Rwandan migrants and became a zone from which they 
built their key population centers.   
 
296 Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, 2011. 
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Most relevant to this chapter was the dramatic shift in the targets of violence during the 
conflict. In the early stages male Nande elites sent juniors to purge Kinyarwanda speakers from 
contested lands. Within months, however, elites found themselves under attack—not by ethnic 
competitors— but by juniors from their own communities. According to Koen Vlassenroot, 
Kanyarwanda ended up as a “rebellion against chiefly abuse and the first step of a spiral of 
unending violence.”297  Despite population pressure, economic restrictions, and tensions within 
neighboring groups, it was local chiefs, the architects and preservers of Bunande, who ended up 
subject to violence from their own kin. Elites’ attempts at fostering a double exclusion—lineage 
juniors as economic competitors, and elites from other language-speaking groups from land 
claims—backfired. They found themselves under attack from within and without.  
Understanding this shift is key in resolving the interplay between events occurring at 
multiple scales and by numerous actors in motivating the Simba rebellion. The clearest, most 
direct antecedent movement to the Simba movement in North Kivu was neither the Mulele 
Rebellion nor localized versions of the Cold War’s struggle between left and right. Rather the 
most important antecedent was young people rising up against their elders in the late days of 
Kanyarwanda, resisting co-option and exclusion from an emerging class of economic and 
political elites.298 Dynamics here are well framed by John Lonsdale, who argues that “Class 
formation anywhere, we can now see, is a process that can be intellectually grasped (and morally 
judged) only by reference to some former moral economy that (we must imagine) once governed 
                                               
297 Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers, Conflict and Social Transformation in Eastern DR Congo (Academia Press, 
2004), p 76. 
 
298 Koen Vlassenroot also describes the rise of Banyamulenge Tutsi anti-Simba emerging in 1964 called Abagiriye that was 
meant to defend these communities against the Simba. P 26. (Rift Valley Institute Usalama Project 10 report on South Kivu, 
2013) 
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the politics of known reputation”299  The tensions of class formation at the confluence of 
decolonizing economies and new political risk and opportunity were felt deeply by juniors who 
longed to reinstate the bounds of a moral economy they saw fading in the face of elite 
accumulation. A violent reminder of obligation seemed to be required.   
The economic situation was not, however, the whole story. Prior to the outbreak of 
rebellion, the most intense competition against emerging economic elites came from another 
group of rising social leaders. This group discerned potential political opportunities in the 
obvious stirrings of youth resentment. Here the register of global leftist thought did provide a 
powerful lexicon for emerging political figures to draw on.   
 
Party Politics & Ethnic Patriotism 
The formal political sphere offered another context for rising elites to stake claims to authority 
and jockey for position in the postcolony. Political transformations played out against the 
backdrop of economic tensions. Ultimately, political divides further alienated constituencies 
from elites in the Kivu.  
Nationally, the jarring arrival of independence generated complex operational conditions 
at every level of the public sector. Seventeen of the first cohort of national legislators, for 
instance, were illiterate.300 The political transition and secession of key technocrats in Katanga 
who ensured the smooth functions of the state created both chaos and opportunities. The party 
                                               
299 John Lonsdale, “Moral Ethnicity and Political Tribalism,” in Inventions and Boundaries: Historical and Anthropological 
Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism, ed. Preben Kaarlsholm and Jan Hultin (Institute for Development Studies, 
Roskilde University, 1994) p 119. 
300 René Lemarchand, Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo (University of California Press, 1964), pg. 228.  
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that most successfully capitalized on the complex milieu of decolonization in the Kivus was the 
Centre de Regroupment Africain (CEREA), founded in July 1958.301 
CEREA, like all major political movements at independence was highly regionalized and 
leaned heavily on the rhetoric of ethnic identification to build a constituency. The party was so 
regionalized it had no political base or officials serving in office outside of the Kivu province.302 
Within Kivu, however, it was dominant. CEREA symbolized, as much as any ideology, 
representation for Kivutiens in the central government—a domain from which they were 
historically excluded, for reasons described in the previous chapter of this dissertation. CEREA 
itself was subdivided into regional bases. The individual representing what is now North Kivu 
was described as a “militant bank employee” named Jean Miruho.303 All the political officers 
elected from his electoral zone were Kinande-speakers.304 The success of CEREA in Congo’s 
first elections, winning ten seats, was called by contemporary observers a “spectacular 
breakthrough” for a party once seen as a marginal force on the national scene.305 
Given the overt and intrinsic Nande-ness of the movement, the rise of CEREA as a force 
in eastern Congo was the first major deployment of Nande “ethnic identity in political 
competition with other groups,”  following John Lonsdale definition of “political tribalism.”306 
                                               
301 Koen Vlassenroot’s translation is “African Rallying Center” (from Rift Valley Institute Usalama Project 10 report on South 
Kivu, 2013, p 24). It could also be translated Center for African Regrouping. 
 
302 Nelson, Missionizing, p 131.  
 
303 Ibid. 
 
304 Outside of CEREA, however, individuals from Nande communities specifically, and North Kivu more broadly, were largely 
absent from the government. This was true in both the national government and among the various secessionist groups. Moise 
Tshombe’s breakaway Government of the State of Katanga, established on July 11, 1960, included only one Kivutien in the 
cabinet: Leon Mamboleo who was included because he received a Doctor of Law from the University of Lovanium in 1963. 
305 J. Gerard-Libois, “Comment Le Congo a Accédé À L’indépendance,” Civilisations 10, no. 3 (1960): p. 342. 
306 Lonsdale, “Moral Ethnicity and Political Tribalism,” p 132.  
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The racial tensions of Kivu, which René Lermarchand argued were the highest of anywhere in 
Congo, and the ethnic consolidation of parties across Congo gave CEREA an ethnonational 
flavor that appealed to many Nande.307 CEREA attempted to link this politicization of ethnicity 
with a pledge to redistribute white-owned lands and wealth to the people of the province. Theirs 
was a project of inverting the strategies of economic exclusion that established North Kivu’s 
stratified class structures. At the same time, CEREA leaders sought to leverage bonds of ethnic 
affiliation—a move that worked against class frameworks of economic disparity. Elites within 
CEREA and in economic circles sought to instrumentalize filial sentiments while seeking to 
avoid becoming subject to the responsibilities borne of kinship. 
The leaders of CEREA promised a role-reversal for its voters—where finally Africans 
would hold the advantages and whites would be subject to their own humiliations. Popular 
artwork at the time depicted whites in shorts bending over to receive blows from the chicotte 
whip held by Congolese police officers.308  The radical, inversionary imaginary of CEREA found 
its antithesis in the conservative Parti National de Progrès (PNP) that was supported heavily by 
Belgians and was seen as reactionary, pro-colonial party. Much of the tension leading up the 
rebellion split the population into CEREA and PNP supporters.  The architect of CERA’s 
political strategy was the founder of the party, Anicet Kashamura. Kashamura advocated 
immediate independence and became an early ally of Patrice Lumumba, consolidating his 
support in eastern Congo. He was made the first Minister of Information in Lumumba’s cabinet. 
                                               
 
307 Lemarchand, Political Awakening, p 78.  
 
308 Interview with Kahi Kambale, Oicha, June 11 2014.  
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After Lumumba’s death, Kashamura launched a rebel movement. His political fortunes declined 
after he declared an autonomous Government of Kivu that was quickly crushed by the ANC.309  
CEREA’s radical platform proved a fertile developing ground for future rebel leaders. 
Gaston Soumialot, who became the military chief of the Simba movement, was originally a 
CEREA partisan and gained his political footing in the party apparatus. For him and others, the 
party’s weakness was its unwillingness to be truly radical. While still formally part of CEREA 
Soumialot and Christophe Gbenye helped form a secessionist government, the Congolese 
Popular Republic, headed by the National Council for Liberation based in Albertville, what is 
now Bukavu.310 For the most radical members of CEREA and its offshoots, the rhetoric of 
economic redistribution was insufficient. The problem went deeper than racialized land holdings. 
For young people, even Soumialot and Gbenye’s views failed to penetrate the everyday rhetoric 
and practices of the rebellion, where the logic of the mai medicine totally displaced formal 
political discourse. In the end, elites of all classes failed to grasp that Simba warriors sought 
change that could not be undone. Simba sought a restoration of order not along the lines of 
political left but recalling deep registers of reciprocity and accountability.311   
                                               
309 Crawford Young, “The Congo Rebellion,” Africa Report 10, no. 4 (1965): 6–11; and Crawford Young, “Rebellion and the 
Congo,” Protest and Power in Black Africa, 1970, 968–1011. 
 
 
310 ”Lettre confidentielle de M. Soumialot (26 Juillet 1964” from CRISP (1964) p 215.  
 
311 As early as January 1964 Soumialot began utilizing his CEREA-established networks in the region to begin recruiting youth 
into his new Simba movement. Many Kinande-speaking youths joined the movement. The Simba movement, CEREA, and 
MNC-L became inextricably linked in the state’s imagination. After the ANC conquered the movement former members of 
CEREA and MNC-L were rounded up and killed by government forces—some reports indicate three thousand were killed in 
North Kivu (From 1986 dissertation from Kisnagani). CEREA’s regional leader, Jean Muriho, was a “radical bank employee.” 
This is a relevant fact. His background demonstrates how local elites used CEREA’s purported radicalism to their own ends. 
Muriho and his fellows blamed racial inequality for economic disparity. At the same time, they sought to shift kin expectations 
away from themselves after taking the reigns over emerging economic regimes. CEREA elites shifted from registers of restitution 
to othering practices of political tribalism to offset the weight of expectation, obligation, and anger that came with newfound 
economic power. It is worth noting, if not overstating, that Simba specifically targeted banks in Butembo and destroyed currency. 
These institutions were run by local elites of a kind with, and indeed included, Jean Muriho. Ultimately the alliances between 
CEREA’s operatives and nascent rebels was too tenuous to maintain. Elite infighting at regional and national levels broke out, 
sabotaging the political movement. Jean Muriho, described by Célestin Nguya-Ndila Malengana as emblematic of Kivu’s “new 
 126 
 
Conclusion 
Anthropologist Kristien Geenen writes about the appearance of a new variety of water hyacinth 
in Butembo in 1958. Quite a fuss was made of it by elite Bubolais. They dubbed the plant “the 
New Congo.” Prints of the fauna proliferated across town. The flower served, Geenen argues, as 
a mythic representation of the efflorescent potential of an imminently postcolonial city. Long 
after independence such representations persist and continue to be celebrated. Geenen writes: 
“The outward glorification is backed by Bubolais’ profound belief that they are a chosen people, 
chosen to exemplify how things should work…. [the myth of the flower] smothers discordant 
voices, veils, social stratification, and consequently suits Butembo’s powerful elite, who have a 
keen interest in keeping the myth alive.”312 Geenen cites an event in 2009, during her fieldwork, 
where members of Butembo’s upper class gathered. The participants were “the big traders and 
their wives, the clergy, the city authorities and the security forces.”313 There is a powerful 
symmetry here with dynamics from over fifty years prior. The constituent groups of the Bubolais 
elite are essentially unchanged from 1964. Authority resides in the hands of economic, religious, 
and local political elites.314 The Simba were present at the genesis of this clustered, entangled 
                                               
political class” composed of “elite évolué” ended up in a serious political conflict and lost his position. CEREA dissolved as the 
first Simba deployments were taking place. As elites battled one another for control, young people dropped out of the movement, 
seeking a more authentic challenge to elite power. Ultimately, they found forms of dissent by drawing on old tales of moral 
responsibility. The greatest threat to emerging powers-that-be would come from within their own ranks, and not via placing elites 
one against the other.  
 
 
312 Kristien Geenen, “How the People of Butembo (RDC) Were Chosen to Embody ‘the New Congo’: Or What the Appearance 
of a Poster in a City’s Public Places Can Teach about Its Social Tissue: The Chosen People of Butembo and ‘the New Congo,’” 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 36, no. 3 (May 2012): p. 457. 
 
313 Ibid. 
 
314 This chapter does not discuss, in detail, the rise of African Christian elites within Protestant circles. That said, if customary 
and economic privilege were under assault during the decolonization period, early post-colonial Congo saw upheaval and 
transformation in religious communities as well. Economic dynamics were changing in ways that destabilized and recalibrated 
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aggregation of interdependent elites. They sought to disrupt the formation of what has proven to 
be a durable power structure—a constellation that dominates public life in Butembo today. The 
failure of rebel violence to disrupt this cadre was, it seems, total.   
This chapter lays out the methods, discourses, and practices of exclusion that led to both 
rebellion and consolidations of power.  The core theme was the process, passing through the 
independence period, of class formation: manifest in economic and political life in decolonizing 
Congo. The lead up to rebellion was marked by attempts from Congolese youth in diverse 
domains to pursue few, carefully guarded spots at the tables of power and position. Gatekeeping 
                                               
class order. The “ecclesiastical quarrel” that emerged among Protestants in 1959, (described in the previous chapter), came to a 
full boil in 1962 and 1963 with a schism within the largest Protestant group: the Baptists. Two factions emerged. One was a 
minority of adherents who supported the ongoing leadership of Hurlburt and his cadre of American missionaries, called 
“loyalists.” The majority supported African leadership of the protestant denominations, and called themselves Synodists 
(Vwakyanakazi, p 161). For the Synodists, their claims for greater power within the church hierarchy necessitated the formation 
of an association, or synod, to counter missionaries’ organizations. Decades of exclusion—characterized by unequal salaries, 
control of dress, removal from processes of decision making, and the foreclosure of avenues to adulthood through practices like 
circumcision—were to be replaced by their full participation in the leadership of the church. For all the contention, emerging 
Congolese religious elites were drawing on the same registers of respectability as their missionary adversaries. They were 
invested in creating small, stable families, dressing and speaking in an urbane fashion, and generating community within the 
church, not primarily from kin networks. Even so, to many missionaries, and some lay people, this expansion of the boundaries 
of authority was not acceptable, and the concept of a synod was contrary to the foundational precepts of the Baptist movement. 
They argued it reeked of a “heretical, Catholic type” form of church organization (Nelson, Missionizing, p 138) Missionaries 
humiliated dissenting congregants. One wrote, “We try to treat them as disobedient children who won’t get their supper until they 
do what we say.” (Letter from Don Nelson to Milton Baker, 2 May 1961, in the Billy Graham Center Archives, quoted in Nelson, 
Missionizing,  p 142.) Lay people within the church were split. Most Kinande-speaking people, in Bunande and beyond, 
supported the Synodist movement, but Kinyarwanda speakers in North Kivu tended to support missionary-led or loyalist 
churches. These tensions exacerbated the land conflicts described earlier. Upwardly mobile youth supported the Synodist camp 
and were actively recruited as a potential base for emerging radical political parties such as CEREA, discussed above. (Nelson, 
Missionizing, p 140) Tensions continued to rise. Missionaries were attacked at multiple protestant mission sites in 1960 and an 
exodus began. Within a year of independence all Baptist missionaries had been evacuated to Uganda—most of whom returned 
permanently to the United States. They bemoaned a “communist takeover” of Congo that had orchestrated a church schism by 
manipulating “young radicals.” (Nelson, Missionizing, p 156) The dispute continued and was so serious that determining legal 
control over the church required a presidential letter from Joseph Kasa-Vubu, who determined that the loyalist faction were the 
legal owners of the church and its properties and projects. (Nelson, Missionizing, p 173). The ecclesiastical conflict continued 
until the Simba rebellion swept into Bunande and overwhelmed all other quarrels. When Butembo was brought back under the 
control of the national army, a number of young Synodists were accused of aiding the Simba. They were imprisoned and tortured. 
(Nelson, Missionizing, p 192-193) Despite these deep divisions, and the complexity and chaos of the era, the theological tenants 
and organizing structures of the Protestant movements remained broadly similar. What is essential here is the fact that the rising 
Congolese religious professionals who sought to claim their manhood and force missionaries to cede control were themselves 
constituting an emerging vernacular elite category. Their investment in the norms and discourses of respectability animated their 
opposition to white domination in the church, but when in control they maintained the deeply conservative approach to 
empowering social juniors their American missionary forbearers instituted. Even though perceived, by some, to lean toward 
“radical-nationalist” tendencies, the pews of Baptists churches did not become freewheeling, democratic spaces of opportunity 
for all in the postcolony. (Nelson, Missionizing, p 192) Elites passed power to other elites. A small cadre of Congolese religious 
elites—the leaders of the Synodists simply replaced a small cadre of American authorities. The structures of power and hierarchy 
were preserved. Though economically impoverished, the social capital afforded by respectability gave religious elites a place at 
the table of power in independent Congo.  
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adults experienced their own vulnerabilities in seeking to stabilize fortunes and protect their 
interests in times of uncertainty and possibility. Economic opportunity focused elite attention 
beyond kin relations toward other networks of emergent power and access to wealth. CEREA 
leaders adopted a strategy of demagoguery: elites mobilizing lower class violence—much as 
lineage elders had done during Kanyarwanda against ethnically identified enemies.  
Young people found doors to social maturity and respectability closed. All paths went 
through gatekeeping elites. Opportunities for accessing authority and influence were 
tantalizingly close but ultimately unrealizable. Intense resentment, frustration, and a mood of 
dissent took hold. Many young Nande who yearned for responsibility in domestic spheres of 
business, church, and politics initially sought non-violent means to such ends. Some maintained 
allegiance to elites, waiting and hoping, like Gustave Pengeza, for their turn. These figures 
dutifully passed through the slow process of advancement through loyalty to authority and 
fidelity to norms of class respectability. Those who became Simba, by contrast, sought radical 
alternatives to these forms of power. They leveraged leveling medicines against those who held 
the doors shut.  
In tracing tensions across a middle scale between the global and the individual, this chapter 
focused on a narrower swath of time and a more intimate geography than earlier chapters. By 
maintaining a middle scale and examining manifold trajectories across a political economy that 
influenced Simba antecedents, this chapter placed the Butembo rebellion within a complex 
lattice of time and space. It sets up the experience in the next chapter of a personal history of 
violence and rebellion.  
A global Cold War lens, as found in existing scholarship on the Simba Rebellion, provides 
vital perspective. Without the global tensions and the interventions of the United States, Belgian- 
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and Soviet-aligned powers and maneuvers, the era would be incomprehensible. But to 
understand the dynamics and causal forces for an insurgency that ran across generations and 
classes it is also essential to trace more intimate afflictions and affects that motivated individuals, 
their participation, experiences, and memories. Remember Pengeza: the affective matters of 
prestige and humiliation illuminate key dimensions that stirred an entire movement with many 
actors on all sides.315 The Simba’s inversions of norms of respectability threatened the core of 
people like Pengeza’s life’s work. The rebels tested the very foundations of authority, and sought 
to produce, through violence, an entirely new order.   
When deep legacies of exclusion from the colonial era, as we saw in chapters two and three, 
met postcolonial frustrations around the walled garden of elite class formation in cities like 
Butembo, the conditions were ripe for insurgency.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                               
315 Veena Das, Affliction: Health, Disease, Poverty (Fordham University Press, 2015). 
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Chapter Five: Henri’s Rebellion: A Microhistory of the Simba Movement, 1964-1967 
 
“Enter the Simba to give us strength, to get rid of our enemies,” went the speech, brevity belying 
its vast implications for some in the audience. Commandant316 Augustin Bendela, a slight young 
man in generic battle fatigues, was the orator. For some time in midday heat the audience, 
citizens of a small village on the northeastern edge of Congo’s rainforest, awaited Bendela’s 
words. A fresh corpse sweltered between them and the commandant. This village was called 
Makeke, a clutch of mud homes on the northeastern rim of the Congo Basin rainforest. It was 
late July, 1964.317 Bendela’s speech was well practiced. It was not, however, in strict alignment 
with the scripted elements of a recruitment process set up by his superiors in the Armée 
Populaire de la Libération (APL) for “newly liberated regions.”318 The APL was an emerging 
movement, constituted by decree of the National Revolutionary Council (CNL), a rebel 
government, on April 15, 1964.319 Three months later, APL forces arrived in Makeke. To the 
                                               
316 This was the term the Simba used for the leader of a peloton, the basic military unit. This claim is triangulated from the story 
of Henri, though he calls him only commandant, and the information in the CRISP 1964 archival volume.  
317 Makeke is named for a stand of Keke trees that stood where the village is now before living memory. Though it not clear 
what species, precisely, the term Keke refers to it is probably the Dialium guineense. This is a tree, also called the velvet 
tamarind tree, that is not commonly found in North Kivu, as it is native to  thick forests of the sub-Sahelian belt farther north. In 
those regions it is also called, popularly, “keke.” I derive this conclusion from the claim in Takayoshi Kan, The Last Ape: Pygmy 
Chimpanzee Behavior and Ecology (Stanford University Press, 1992) that people in the Wamba forest region also called this 
species “keke.”  
318 GM Ekolo, “le Recrutemetn des Simbas” written on October 17, 1964. Document reprinted in Benoît. Verhaegen, “Congo 
1964,” Princeton University Press, 1966, p. 304 This archive will be called CRISP 1964 from hereon.  
319 From “Le programme d’action du CNL,” written by the CNL, and issued on April 15, 1964. CRISP 1964: p 41-43 
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people of the village, and others in eastern Congo, soldiers of the APL were known by another 
name: Simba.  
From a military standpoint, Makeke’s strategic importance to the Simba derived from its 
position astride a vital sinew of road connecting east Africa to Kisangani, a river city linking 
Congo’s northeast to the capital, Kinshasa. The chief du poste (CP) of Makeke was named 
Zakaria Kaiteni. As rumors circulated concerning the Simba’s arrival he denounced the 
movement, insisting he would refuse them access to the community. Commandant Bendela’s 
arrival was preceded by many weeks of talk on radio trottoir320 that made clear the Simba were 
en route to the village, out from their strongholds in Kisangani zone. Two weeks prior to their 
arrival in Makeke the Simba took the large town of Mambasa, one hundred ten kilometers to the 
west. Then days later they reached Bela village, six kilometers to the west of Makeke. Unlike 
Kaiteni, CP Ambrose of Bela fled the city before the Simba’s arrival. In response to rumors some 
in Makeke openly celebrated the impending arrival of the rebels despite, or perhaps even 
inspired by, the violence they reportedly committed. These were people ready for what they 
hoped would be a liberation movement.321 Henri Makoba, fourteen-years-old at the time, 
remembers that those who welcomed the Simba “did not know what war was. But those who 
knew war were afraid. And once the war came, the results for everyone were terrible.”322 
                                               
320 Literally “sidewalk radio.” This phenomenon is observed and, perhaps, most fully analyzed in Cornelis Nlandu-Tsasa’s La 
Rumeur Au Zaïre de Mobutu. Radio-Trottoir À Kinshasa (Paris, L’Harmattan, 1997). 
321 An early study by Renée Claire Fox, Willy De Craemer, and J. M. Ribeaucourt in their “The Second Independence”: A Case 
Study of the Kwilu Rebellion in the Congo, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 8, No. 1 (October, 1965) describe 
this era as characterized by a “chain” of “social revolutions” that came to be known as the Congo Crisis period in later 
scholarship.  
322 This and many other quotes in this piece are primarily drawn from three interviews conducted with Henri Makoba in the 
village of Makeke, North Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo. The first occurred in April, 2014, a second on June 9, 2015, and 
the final conversation in September 2016.  
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When Bendela and his troops arrived in Makeke, they denounced Kaiteni as a reactionary 
threat to the Simba movement. Kaiteni attempted to flee but was captured. Henri describes the 
scene that followed. “They called everyone in the village to come, even children. Then they 
murdered Kaiteni there. If someone did not participate or recoiled, they killed them too… No 
one could act sad, everyone had to celebrate.” As Kaiteni fell under the blows and cheers of his 
townspeople, the direct consequences of war were first felt in Makeke. With Kaiteni dead, a key 
representative of the prevailing system of authority in the area, Commandant Bendela was ready 
to deliver his short address. His appeal was to the young men and boys323 of the village: “Enter 
the Simba to give us strength, to get rid of our enemies.” In Henri’s memory, that was all he said. 
Then the Simba began singing. “It was like a game, like a party,” Henri remembers. “They 
danced beautiful dances. They sang very beautiful songs.” 
Bendela’s rhetoric was direct and simple. He was not providing an argument for his 
audience to weigh on its merits. He did not offer a fresh point of view to consider. The divergent 
elements and moods of the recruitment ceremony, lurching between speech, murder and dance, 
evoked what Bhaktin called “carnivalesque travesty.”324  Henri’s memories of the event are run 
through with a deep feeling of strangeness, imbuing his voice with a sense of wonder and 
confusion—perhaps even fear—fifty-one years later as he describes the event to me. The 
moment of community murder was, for Henri and his kin, when the barrier between the Simba as 
actors and villagers as audience broke down.325 As Henri shares his memories I realize we are 
sitting a stone’s throw from where they killed Kaiteni, Bendela spoke, and the songs were sung.  
                                               
323 In a group interview in Makeke on June 9, 2015 one informant specifically noted that the address was to “enfants et 
garçonss” in Makeke.  
 
324 Mikhail Mikhaĭlovich Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World (Indiana University Press, 1984) p 13, 98. 
 
325 Bakhtin, Rabelais, p 348.  
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As we speak the skies begins to shade gray. Vast rain clouds gather, shrouding Makeke in 
midday twilight. The humidity spikes, and sheets of rain douse the impossible expanse of the 
Congo Basin forest to our west. As we sit in the heat and shadow Henri’s memories unfold. He is 
a slender man, sixty-five-years-old. His back is ramrod straight as he perches on a low stool. 
Henri’s hair is cut short, salted with white, his eyes keen and piercing. I begin to ask him about 
the songs the Simba sang, what he could remember of them, but before I finish the query Henri’s 
voice rises: 
Alo, alo, ee 
Mama Maria 
Yakonoki biso  
Tokufeli mukili326 
 
Mother Mary 
Come quickly 
Our country is dying. 
 
He repeats the song three times. “They had very beautiful songs,” he says again. I nod. It 
is a beautiful song. Henri’s voice is clear and strong. When he finishes, we are quiet for a time. 
Henri described few details about the spectacle of Kaiteni’s death, perhaps he did not remember 
them, or perhaps they were too terrible to recall and speak out loud. The words and melody of 
the song, by contrast, were available to him as though lurking just beneath the surface of his 
memory. The performance was so immediate it almost seemed involuntary. The “acoustic 
debris” of this short song lingered in Henri’s memory for decades, and something about it 
seemed to somehow anchor Henri’s memories of the period in a way different from other forms 
                                               
326 This original song was sung in Lingala, and the English version is the authors translation of Henri’s translation into Swahili 
of the song.  
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of memory.327 He shifts at this point from describing the community’s reaction to the Simba into 
the details of his own story.  “There were five who went that day. Constant, Katuba, Bebe 
Viyaka, and Katsongo. And me.” Five boys from Makeke became Simba that day in July, 1964. 
 The sky above Makeke is now full of shadow. We sweat in the stifling heat. The 
thunderheads are ripe to burst. Henri is not looking at the sky. He is looking at our feet. Then he 
says, “Remembering this wartime brings me great discomfort. It is really bothering me. We are 
talking now and its bringing some things to me. Some painful things. Looking back at this time 
feels like I am looking at a snake.”328 
•• 
The instigators of these painful memories—those who came to Makeke with speech, 
songs, and medicine—were strangers. The Simba peloton329 arrived the very day of the 
recruitment event, a band of Lingala-speaking young men using a dialect that revealed their 
origins to be from zones west of Makeke. Commandant Bendela’s peloton, and myriad like it, 
were proliferating throughout eastern Congo in the summer of 1964. Each gathered young 
villagers in a similar fashion. The movement grew in this manner—quickly and powerfully. At 
its height the Simba forces were estimated to be in the tens of thousands, described as “hordes of 
many children” by contemporaneous journalists.330 The young men and boys were 
                                               
327 Nancy Rose Hunt, “An Acoustic Register, Tenacious Images, and Congolese Scenes of Rape and Repetition,” Cultural 
Anthropology 23, no. 2 (May 1, 2008): p 229.  
328 Henri is not the only person who struggles to deal with these memories. Other informants expressed similar issues and in 
Randall M. Packard’s Chiefship and Cosmology: An Historical Study of Political Competition (Indiana University Press, 1981) 
he describes how “the intensity of feelings that still surrounds these events [of the Simba Rebellion] not only prevents my 
detailing them here but also hampered my attempts to solicit specific information…” p 122.  He conducted fieldwork in the 
region in 1974.  
329 This was the unit description Simba warriors used. It is the French word for “squad” or “platoon.” 
 
330 From the Manchester Guardian. “Congo rebel leaders sue for peace” 26 Apr 1965: pg 9. This language almost certainly 
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predominantly from rural agricultural families. It was “in the countryside where the armies were 
first recruited,” Crawford Young writes: a “conquest of the city by countryside.” 331  
Even in the countryside, however, support for Simba could not be assumed. Henri’s 
parents, for instance, did not attend the recruitment gathering. Henri’s father was a rising figure 
in local political circles and fled with his wife into the bush days earlier, anticipating he might be 
a target for violence by the Simba. They hoped their son, the lastborn of six children, would be 
spared due to his age. Henri was told to stay and represent the Makoba clan. They feared that if 
none among his family were present the Simba might engage in reprisal on their extended kin in 
the village. When Henri first heard the song of the Simba, his parents were thus not at his side, 
and instead were some fifteen kilometers from Makeke.  In the emerging postcolony Henri’s 
father, and many rising male elites, similar to mission youth outlined in the previous chapter, 
invested themselves in building futures from within the bureaucracies of church, state, and 
business, both inherited and of their own making. The Simba song, calling for Mary to “come 
quickly,” evoked a sense of irruptive emergency—the Simba did not have time to waste. They 
sought to disrupt such plans and strategies and, in their place, cast alternative futures that were 
based on notions of power from the deep past.  Their authority came not from respectability and 
education, but from a powerful medicine: mai.  
Most people in Makeke, in Henri’s memory, acknowledged the power of the Simba’s mai 
medicine. Many villagers felt the cause of Bendela’s group was validated by the efficacy of the 
                                               
unintentionally evokes language about “hordes” of “adolescent males…gradually became the main source of manpower” for 
slavers like Tippu Tip in another age of eastern Congo’s history. See Melvin Page, “The Manyema Hordes of Tippu Tip: A Case 
Study in Social Stratification and the Slave Trade in Eastern Africa.” The International Journal of African History 7 n.1 (1974): 
72. 
  
331 The Simba held about 2/3 of Congo’s territory by mid 1964, nearly 2.5 million square kilometers of territory.  
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mai. whatever the formal political agenda.332 “Many were happy with the mai. They saw how 
powerful it was and felt they could follow it.” Others found the goals of the movement 
compelling: “Many joined because they believed that if they could rid the country of colonialism 
it would be good.” Despite the end of Belgian colonialism four years earlier, the assassination of 
Lumumba cast doubt on the notion of national sovereignty. Congo was seen to be enduring an 
imperial hangover. Leaders of the rebellion wrote in their guiding manifesto that “the essential 
task is actually to overturn the most retrograde structure in our nation: a submissiveness to 
imperialism.”333  
Others, like Henri and his family, found the mai simultaneously powerful and 
frightening, and the CNL leadership’s anti-colonial rhetoric abstract and far removed from the 
concerns of day-to-day life in Makeke. For Henri and his kin, as well as many other villagers, the 
arrival of the movement was unsettling. More than any other concern, rumors of the ferocity of 
Simba violence was repugnant to Henri’s family and they felt that “it would be foolishness to 
enter.” Henri’s father saw that the arrival of the Simba would likely place their family in an 
impossible situation where they would experience reprisal from the Simba if Henri refused to 
enlist or, eventually, violence at the hands of government-aligned forces if he joined. Many 
families found themselves facing a similar dilemma.  
                                               
332 Medicine, in this paper, is not being used interchangeably with a physical medical object—i.e. a pill or inoculation—but 
rather as a system of thought and practice around healing, public and personal. I use this term following its use in Steven 
Feierman and John M. Janzen’s edited volume with the Joint Committee on African Studies, The Social Basis of Health and 
Healing in Africa (University of California Press, 1992). Here a medicine is connected to particular enculturated itineraries and 
genealogies of thought and practice.  
333 Le programme d’action, pg 42. From CRISP 1964..  
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As much as the violence, one particular fact about the Simba concerned many in Makeke.  
The Simba were primarily children—the oldest officers in their early twenties.334 Some of the 
warriors looked to be seven or eight years old.335 On that day in July 1964 it was largely a group 
of boys who stood before the people of Makeke. They stood naked to their waists, clad only in 
shorts, armed with sticks and bows, limbs and head wrapped in leaves and grasses. Imagining 
their own young among these bands frightened many parents. Some hid their children, or fled 
with them, when the Simba held recruitment events like the one in Makeke, fearing their boys 
would be lost. Those that attended the events and protested openly in attempt to reason with the 
Simba, however, were summarily executed. “You hate our country,” Henri recalls the accusation 
towards those who hid or refused to volunteer their children, “So you will die.”   
** 
This chapter is a microhistory of four years in the life of Henri Makoba: his time as a 
Simba. Inevitably any single source of memory provides only a fragmented and partial 
evidentiary base for historical narratives. Henri’s recollections are thus triangulated by, and 
woven together with, other forms of evidence, including archival materials, contemporaneous 
journalism, and other combatant’s memories of the rebellion. Gaps still remain. These are treated 
in this chapter as evidence as well. Henri’s focus in conversation was not always on subjects I 
                                               
334 It is worth attempting a brief history of the term “child,” which seemed to emerge, in English, around the 12 century, It 
comes from the old English word cild. In essence, cild denoted an age of puberty. Other associations were with womb. Semantic 
debates emerged around whether the term carried, etymologically, a necessarily negative appellation—i.e. a description of lack or 
absence or “not yet.” A core debate was whether child referred to a human that couldn’t speak. This debate is traced well in 
Archer Taylor’s  “The Semantics of 'Child' Archer Taylor Modern Language Notes Vol. 44, No. 5 (May, 1929), pp. 309-314. 
Another framework traced by Taylor are grouping of the term in other languages focused on pre-pubescence, suggest that child is 
actually pluripotent—that there are many itineraries possible for a child as opposed to an adult. Its about hope about becoming, 
about possibility.  An early study on the semantics of the word child in English found two basic categories among a large array of 
etymological sources: one cluster revolved around connections to the womb and kin. The other were descriptive, with a focus on 
appearance: “A much more numerous and varied class, which is receiving constant additions, is composed of nouns derived from 
descriptive words, either adjectives or nouns with meanings lending themselves to metaphorical use,” writes Taylor.  That there 
is a difference between a child and adult is a universal in all cultures. What the difference is, precisely, is highly contingent. 
 
335 Henri, July 9, 2015 interview, Makeke. 
  
 138 
chose to discuss or describe. Some memories were too faded, or painful, to delve into. 
Undoubtedly shame and guilt shadowed his recollections as well. Acknowledging these 
challenges, this chapter still attempts to give weight to the subjects that anchored Henri’s 
memories. Given the challenges of writing such a history and the presence of other source bases, 
why write this as a microhistory? 
Though using the method differently than I do here, Nancy Rose Hunt argues for the 
value of such an approach. “Microhistory must bear meaning and even consequences for 
macrohistory. It should make us question — and unmake — the metanarratives that have been 
binding together our histories. A microhistory can destabilize: it should no longer be possible to 
tell the ‘big story’ in the same way again.” 336 Henri’s narrative, like all microhistories, will be 
necessarily “discontinuous and fragmentary,” limited by memory, forgetting, affect, and self-
perception, generating a story that becomes impossible to fully synthesize.337 The edges and gaps 
in his memory resist subsumption into any ‘big story’ of the rebellion and the presumed 
omniscience such narratives require. In the case of this chapter, some of the grand narratives I 
seek to unseat were provided in other chapters of this dissertation. The microhistory of this 
chapter aims to both enrich and also “unmake” the broad threads and sweeps of history at 
                                               
336 I am using Lyotard’s understanding of metanarrative here: “a narrative legitimated by a particular philosophy of history” 
(1977). 
 
337 Nancy Rose Hunt, “Rewriting the Soul in a Flemish Congo,” Past & Present 198, no. 1 (February 1, 2008): p 192. 
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multiple scales outlined in previous chapters.338 In sum, the productive, generative tension of 
microhistory is to capture the particular but not the “exceptional.”339  
More than “what happened” to Henri, the concern is also with what did not happen—the 
ways Henri’s story and memory evades the causal arguments previously foregrounded in this 
dissertation and in existing literature on the rebellion. In this way a more complex, less 
conceptually constricted, portrait of the rebellion, and its constituents, might emerge. It is not to 
suggest that adding strands to multivocal histories is somehow introducing greater accuracy—or 
authority, or authenticity—but that existing studies of the Simba rebellion are diminished by the 
absence of this kind of evidence.340 
Methodologically, this chapter attempts to bring pieces of evidence across time, space, 
and genre to tell one story. The pieces at hand are plentiful but complex. Henri’s account is 
among a dozen other interviews with former child combatants in the Simba Rebellion I 
conducted during field work periods between 2009 and 2016 in eastern Congo.341 While there 
were thousands of boys who became Simba like Henri in eastern Congo in 1964, this chapter is 
not concerned with using Henri’s story as a comparative case, nor is his account presented as 
“typical,” if such a thing could even theoretically exist. Henri’s microhistory is not a synthesis or 
exemplar of other combatants’ experiences to stand as a kind of universalized experience of the 
                                               
338 Micro-history does not imply, here, the Carlo Ginzberg “Italian school microhistory.” Rather the in the legacy of Nancy Rose 
Hunt, also Joan Scott, in an attempt to perturb categories—even, or perhaps especially, ones I myself have produced in this 
dissertation.  
339 Matti Peltonen, “Clues, Margins, and Monads: The Micro-Macro Link in Historical Research,” History and Theory 40, no. 3 
(2001): 347–59. 
340 Johannes Fabian, Remembering the Present: Painting and Popular History in Zaire (University of California Press, 1996), p 
192. 
 
341 This does not include dozens of interviews with non-combatants as well that are featured here.   
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Simba. Instead, telling Henri’s story as microhistory speaks to the irreducible contingency of a 
given historical actor, in a given moment, that stands against the teleologies latent in every 
narrative. This particular microhistory even works against my own conscious and unconscious 
attempts to shape the story of Henri’s experience given that it ultimately a joint work, forged by 
Henri and myself through excavating memory, engaging in dialog, and sharing time.  
Following Giovanni Levi, I understand that “microhistory as a practice is essentially 
based on a reduction of the scale of observation.”342 This chapter aims to demonstrate how 
reducing the scale of observation of the Simba rebellion to a single microhistory can open up 
analytical possibilities.343 What is attempted here is what Max Weber once called complex 
“human situations, in pianissimo.”344 Microhistory offers, according to Levi, the chance to place 
against “social action” an “individual’s constant negotiation, manipulation, choices and decisions 
in the face of normative reality which, although pervasive, nevertheless offers many possibilities 
for personal interpretations and freedoms.”345 Thus far this dissertation attempted to describe 
something of the “normative reality” of youth in Congo through an extended decolonization 
period. This chapter now explores the possibilities for evading and negotiating those normative 
                                               
342 Carlo Ginzburg, John Tedeschi, and Anne C. Tedeschi, “Microhistory: Two or Three Things That I Know about It,” Critical 
Inquiry 20, no. 1 (1993): 10–35. 
 
343 This produces the possibility of making legible institutions, global trends, individual lives that are either obscured or revealed 
depending on the scale of observation and analysis. I do not argue that microhistory is uniquely revelatory, but that is a valuable, 
even essential scale to include in studies of these kinds of conflict. Microhistory does not speak to capturing “voices” or 
providing anecdotes, but rather a proving ground for analytical approaches and arguments that emerge from engagement at other 
scales of observation and analysis. The scale of this chapter is not the single appropriate scale, but rather one relevant point of 
perspective—adding layers of insight to the broader work. 
 
344 Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Psychology Press, 1991), p 155. I am indebted to John Brewer’s essay 
“Microhistory and the Histories of Everyday Life,” from Cultural and Social History, Volume 7, Issue 1, p. 87 for introducing me 
to this quote.  
 
345 Giovanni Levi “On Microhistory” 1991, p. 94.  
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conditions at the level of a single story.  
Much care is required in attempting this approach. In relying heavily on a single story, 
even with other evidence sutured in from multiple sources, from memories recounted fifty years 
after the events under discussion, I acknowledge the methodological pitfalls, well charted in 
African history in particular, of turning biography into history. There are real risks in playing 
with the fraught “hermeneutics of transfiguring” a single life into many lives, and of treating oral 
history as an “authentic” story. I also heed Pamela Reynolds’ admonition that the emotional 
dangers of such histories are plethora include “the traps of sentiment, romance, and 
exaggeration; in writing in ignorance of faults, errors, harm done” especially for those whose 
lives are touched by violence—as both perpetrators and survivors.346 Nonetheless the risk is 
worth the reward, of knowing the Simba movement at a new scale with fresh insights into the 
most successful rebel movement in Congo from colonization until 1996, as we shall now see.  
 
Leaving/Joining 
“Enter the Simba to give us strength, to get rid of our enemies,” was the invitation from 
Commandant Bendela to the young men and boys of Makeke. This moment marked the 
                                               
346 Pamela Reynolds, War in Worcester: Youth and the Apartheid State (Fordham University Press, 2013) p 128.  This approach 
is also inspired by Pamela Reynolds work on young anti-apartheid activists in South Africa. Reynolds does not use the term 
“microhistory” in her work, but her focus on a small group of individual young men’s involvement in the anti-Apartheid 
movement does the kind of scaling work that Levi envisioned microhistory, at its best, could accomplish.  That Henri Maboka 
was, by any definition, a child soldier makes this kind of analysis all the more vital. As Reynolds warns: “A conception of the 
child that has been current at certain periods among middle-class Westerners is of the child as an individual shorn of most 
obligations, economically dependent, politically uninvolved, emotionally and morally immature, and secure within and 
represented by a family. It is one that fits very few children's experiences in the world. It may be an ideal that is worth enshrining 
in international legislation. It should not, in the process, undermine children's strategies for survival, especially their economic 
strategies, nor obscure their actual contributions to society, nor prune their potential by constraining their options.” The texture of 
Henri’s experience is not, again anecdotal, it is analytically essential to understand and undue competing conceptual frames for 
someone like Henri. 
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culmination of what was essentially a public initiation ritual.347 Whatever the dogma of the 
rebellion, Bendela’s speech was not an evocation of the revolutionary spirit of Lumumba, nor 
was the text derived from the “guerilla manuals” authored by Mao Tse-Tung that government 
forces claimed they found in the pockets of dead Simba,348 nor were these remarks drawn from 
the canon of Communist slogans uttered Pierre Mulele and his followers in Kwilu, some two 
thousand kilometers from Makeke. Whatever critiques of American imperialism in “Latin 
America, Cuba, Laos, Vietnam and Korea, etc.” that the CNL leadership decried, Bendela 
understood that his audience were not primarily invested in Cold War politics. He knew, given 
experience, that they would respond best to an appeal to the “deep politics” of what John 
Lonsdale calls a shared “moral ethnicity.”349 Lonsdale argues that ethnicity is, foundationally, 
about unifying people around “internal discourses of social responsibility” against the kinds of 
othering that he calls “political tribalism.” The goal of disputation and debate around social 
responsibility is “good governance,” not by the state but through acts of reciprocity from 
authority figures in relationship with their constituencies. Though strangers, Bendela sought to 
forge community with the people of Makeke around a shared moral logic. To suggest that 
Bendela’s appeal was in this spirit it must be clear what he meant by “our enemies.”  
                                               
347 That this initiation was public, and involved asking for sons, not taking children or, as is the case in some contemporary 
movements, forcing them to kill their own family members, indicates that this movement was intended to be socially constitutive. 
The impetus was on protecting the “us.” For a comparative look at other initiatory practices for child soldiers in Africa since 
Alcinda Honwana’s chapter in Alcinda Honwana and Filip De Boeck, eds., Makers and Breakers: Children & Youth in 
Postcolonial Africa. (Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA, 2005), particularly pages 42 – 43.  
 
348 From Kikwit meeting in January 1964 in CRISP 1964, p 134.  
 
349 “Letter inedited de C. Gbenye sur la mission et l’action du CNL,” 16 April 1964, from the CRISP 1964, and also Lonsdale, 
Unhappy Valley, p 74.  
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I asked over a dozen former Simba to define the enemies of the movement. There was no 
consensus. Henri, and many others, suggested that the core battle was against “colonialism” and 
the goal was “liberation.” Another common response was that the enemies were elites and 
Belgian-sympathizers in the Parti National du Progrès (PNP), led by Moise Tshombe. These 
figures were deeply hated. One informant said the goal of the Simba was “to slaughter everyone 
of PNP.”350 At root, all enemies of the movement shared a common social sin: venality. 
Accusations of greed, imperialism, and foreign sympathy all spoke to concerns about elites who 
were egregiously extractive and selfish in how they management and shared power. Given the 
history of anti-elite war medicine-based movements in eastern Congo, described in chapter three 
of this dissertation, purging antisocial “enemies” can be seen as the core logic of the movement.  
These purges were most often internally directed, focused on the “us” and not the other. 
To protect and renew the deep bonds of elite-common relations of reciprocity, the essential 
dynamic necessary to maintain the good governance, the enemies of the social “us” were those 
insiders who failed in their duty to “social responsibility” and abandoned their obligations to 
their people. Anioto, I argue in this dissertation, is a movement in which elites targeted dissident 
followers for terror and murder.351 Simba, I now suggest, inverts the logic of Anioto: its chief 
targets were not disorderly women and children but corrupt elders. Elites in colonial and post-
colonial Congo recognized the danger such movements posed and, to an often irrational degree, 
                                               
350 Interview with Deogracias, June 9, 2015 in Mangina, North Kivu province, Democratic Republic of Congo.  
351 Even after the brutal suppression, even erasure, of Anioto as described in chapter 3, it is worth noting that another male adult 
secret society, called mukomo, persisted through the present day. It is associated with Kapipi a spirit being described in the 
following way in the Kinande – English dictionary: “this is an evil spirit that terrorizes women and children. It is believed that he 
is a fierce young man who usually walks with a club. When he meets a woman, he tears off her clothes. He also takes with him 
children who are alone and that he meets in the street. Kapipi is one of the spirits associated to the “mukumo” a male secret 
society of which only initiated people know its internal functioning.” From Ngessimo Mutaka and Kambale Kavutirwaki, 
Kinande-English/English-Kinande Dictionary (Rutgers University: African Anaphora Project, 2008) p 464 - 465.  
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sought to eliminate them. Even as decolonization presented both opportunity and risk for a 
“nervous customary authority” class, including people just like Zakaria Kaiteni in Makeke, these 
figures deeply feared being purged by movements like the Simba Rebellion— should they be 
seen as venal, selfish, and greedy.352 Simba rebels were out to “spill fratricidal blood,” even 
patricidal blood, over “rights to inclusion” and a place at the table in the emerging post-colonial 
order. Though in aggregate their goals overlap with globally-minded critiques of imperialism, 
when examined in specific cases it is clear that the movement was not a state-level elite versus 
elite coup d’etat type movement, but rather was being contested in the micro politics—the deep 
politics—of every hamlet and village in eastern Congo, places much like Makeke.353   
Bendela was not attempting to change minds by orienting youths to a new politics 
informed by competing global political perspectives, but rather sought to call boys and young 
men into a novel form of belonging: to become part of the Simba “us.” Bendela’s words, again 
following Lonsdale, drew upon a common understanding that “youthful energy can revive a 
political culture corrupted by its elders.”354 So with brief words and an act of “evidentiary” 
violence against Kaiteni, Bendela called Makeke’s young men to leverage their power to reform 
a broken moral order, and bring justice to unbalanced societies.355 Bendela’s language of 
                                               
352 This language is used in the sense that it was deployed by Neil Kodesh in Beyond the Royal Gaze: Clanship and Public 
Healing in Buganda (University of Virginia Press, 2010). He argues that “public healing” is a crucial concept in the deep political 
history of Africa’s Great Lakes region and that it took many forms, including armed violence. He describes the core of the 
concept on page 20, and then on page 119 describes the links between “public healing” and what he calls “collective violence.”  
353 Lonsdale and Odhiambo, Mau Mau and Nationhood, pp 1 and 4.  
 
354 Ibid. 
 
355 Peterson in his unpublished work on Lost Counties disputes in Uganda. He writes “Evidentiary violence is reported, 
publicized, and discussed. It is fodder for petitions and demands for recompense. Evidentiary violence is the violence of 
victimhood: when chronicled and dramatized in reports and pleas, it helps cast political authorities as brutes. Its audience is an 
external organization—the state, the international community, the church, the empire—that can, by direct or indirect means, be 
moved to action to alleviate injustice” page 1.  The claims of order and renewal that are connected to Henri’s perspective are 
linked but also distinct from Kanyarwanda’s animating logic of ethnic competition, drawing on registers of ethnic difference and 
resource scarcity to justify conflict.  
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inclusion and invitation were powerful. The recruitment ceremony, whatever its animating logic, 
succeeded. Within hours of the speech Henri and four age mates were imbricated into the 
paloton.  
He does not recall a specific moment of committing to join the movement, nor making a 
particular oath. He was simply in. One moment Henri was a boy in Makeke, fresh from 
completing his primary school exams, and the next he was Simba. The rebels he joined, Henri 
recalled, “were all kinds of people.” He divided the group into two primary categories. One 
subgroup he called “jeunesse.” These were the youngest, least educated of the group. The others 
he called “students.” These had some education and political experience, who understood and 
could speak in the register of CNL propaganda. Most of the band were jeunesse. Like other 
Simba, neither Henri nor his peers knew, or were told, anything of the strategy of the movement, 
nor even where the band was headed after Makeke and for what purpose. There was no formal 
combat instruction of any kind. They were not armed with conventional weapons. The one 
weapon they were given however, according to Henri, “was so powerful.” This was a medicine 
with a deep genealogy in eastern Congo called mai.356  
 
Obeying the Mai 
The peloton that Henri joined consisted of forty-five boys, subdivided into three section of 
fifteen young men each. These section were not stable fighting units. There were few defined 
roles and, at the ground level, no clear chain of command. Boys were constantly, and without 
                                               
356 The standard Kiswahili words is “maji,” but in eastern Congolese’s dialect the “j” is not pronounced, leading to two 
spellings” mayi, or mai. I use the mai spelling in this dissertation. There are many worthwhile histories of other mai or maji based 
movements, one such is James Leonard Giblin and Jamie Monson, Maji Maji: Lifting the Fog of War, vol. 20 (Brill, 2010). 
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forewarning, moved between sections and into other peloton for no discernable reason. As a 
result, it was both impossible to establish specializations or internal chains of command within a 
section and, from Henri’s perspective of Henri, very difficult for individual warriors to forge 
close friendships with comrades-at-arms—what military scholars call the social bonds of “unit 
cohesion.”357 Whether a fellow Simba was killed or simply moved to another section after the 
chaos of battle was never clear to Henri. He only knew for certain a fellow Simba was dead if 
they were killed by his side. For obvious reasons, then, he did not attempt to get close to the boys 
in his peloton but sought out those from his home region who he knew before the war—
regardless of which combat unit they were fighting within.  
During the four years Henri was in the band “there was no training. The dawa was our 
training.358 Politics were not taught—they taught us nothing but war.” The force that produced 
cohesion and esprit du corps among the Simba was only the mai. The leaders of Henri’s section, 
as all others, focused not on developing chains of command, tactical training, nor ideological 
indoctrination, but rather instilled an overweening commitment to observe the strictures of the 
règlements of the dawa—the rules the governed the deployment and efficacy of the mai 
medicine.359 Induction, such as it was, into the section was achieved by articulating these rules 
                                               
357 Perhaps most famously, in recent scholarship in Leonard Wong and Army War College Institute, Why They Fight : Combat 
Motivation in the Iraq War, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003. 
358 The use of dawa here is similar to how Christopher Davis-Roberts described the “dawa ya kinchi” or “medicine of the land” 
in the Tabwa speaking regions of eastern Congo. Daw ya kinchi is, explicitly, a tool for public healing connected directly to 
notions of “healing the land” Steven Feierman put forth. This particular case is discussed in Davis-Roberts’chapter in Steven 
Feierman, John M. Janzen, and Joint Committee on African Studies, The Social Basis of Health and Healing in Africa 
(University of California Press, 1992), on pages 376 – 392.  
359 In Renée Claire Fox, Willy De Craemer, and J. M. Ribeaucourt, “The Second Independence”: A Case Study of the Kwilu 
Rebellion in the Congo (Mouton & Co., 1965) these reglements, as found in Kwilu, are called “norms and rules of behavior.”  
They also call them “magic-accompanied norms.” They note that they found it difficult to find, among the rules those that were 
“explicitly communistic in nature” and rather were “magico-religious”: in nature (p 100).   
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and ensuring the new Simba understood and could recite them. The moment of becoming Simba 
was the moment when first one took the mai.  
The dawa and both its associated responsibilities and empowering possibilities was, for 
Henri and other interlocutors, at the center of the entire Simba movement. In Henri’s view it was 
not the commanders who ran the units: the mai itself governed everything, and the mai 
demanded obedience from all. Seniority, Henri remembers, “was not by age. Leadership was 
decided by power. Those who demonstrated the strongest mai power were the leaders. It didn’t 
matter if they were the youngest person in the section, they would lead. We would follow them, 
respond to their power.” Indeed, often the very youngest in the unit—Henri believed them to be 
seven or eight years old—were on the front lines, with nothing on their skin but the mai, leaves, 
and fronds to face down the guns of the army. They held no weapons. Henri insisted he did not 
see a gun in use by anyone in his band during his entire time with the Simba. That leadership was 
determined by mai power, and that this power was often linked to the youngest of the band, 
demonstrates the inversion of domestic authority the Simba movement embodied. All, however 
were subject to the authority of the mai. No individual, no matter how powerful, could violate 
the règlements and survive battle. Their dependence on the efficacy of the mai was total.  
The règlements were clustered into four broad categories: rules around dress, ethics, 
foodways, and sexual contact. Combat gear for most Simba was a state of undress. “You would 
wear pants, but you could not wear a shirt,” remembers Henri. Some of the youngest wore no 
clothing at all other than the wreath of a palm fronds on their heads, and leaf bracelet wrapped 
upon their wrists, that all Simba warriors wore into battle. The commanding officers 
differentiated themselves by donning generic military fatigues. The most senior among them 
wore leopard skin hats and a band of leopard skin as a bracelet on their left hand.  
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Dress differentiated and established authority but complex ways. As argued in earlier 
chapters, a primary continuum of power operating in this region stretches between 
domestic/political authority and wild power. These dress practices indexed the continuum. At 
one end was the domestic power of the leopard embodied in hat and bracelet. The leopard, an 
apex predator whose power also formed the core of Anioto symbolism, was long associated with 
the power of cleared bush—domesticated space. The leopard was master over space and, 
according to Vicky Van Bockhaven, the animal symbolized “local notions of leadership” in 
eastern Congo.360 But the bareness of the youngest Simba, adorned only in mai and objects from 
the wild, demonstrated their own kind of authority—over a power bestowed by the mai. Their 
power was not bestowed by domestic elites, quite the opposite. The very absence of any 
technologies and objects formed by the hands of domestic experts—the focus being on the raw 
deployment of the dawa on skin—was as potent, or perhaps even more potent, than the material 
forms of other kinds of political hierarchy. The absence of such domestic authority figures within 
a section demonstrates that it was the mai itself that provided order and validated wild authority.  
Simba dress practices stood in sharp contrast to the norms of respectable fashion at the 
time. Évolué sartorial regimes indexed maturity and education with suits, ties, formal dresses, 
spectacles and straightened, parted hair. Hygiene was to be displayed on the body’s clean 
surfaces and covered with crisp, laundered fabrics. The filth, nakedness, stench, and unruly hair 
of the Simba marked a stark, almost antithetical presentation of the powerful self. The Simba 
were, in their disposition and appearance, inverting symbols of postcolonial respectability, 
power, and prestige. These contrarian dress codes emerged through practice and observation by 
Simba warriors—it was not proscribed formally.  
                                               
360 Vicky Van Bockhaven, “Anioto: Leopard-Men Killings and Institutional Dynamism in Northeast Congo, c. 1890–1940,” 
Journal of African History 59, no. 1 (March 2018), p 35. 
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Most règlements, however, were put into the form of declarative statements. In Henri’s 
memory, they were as follows:  
Do not steal, or you will die.  
Do not break the bone of an animal.  
Do not eat the head or intestines of an animal.   
Do not eat vegetables, only meat.  
Do not sleep with a woman.  
Do not wash after you take the mai.  
Do not physically touch another person.  
While avoiding an overly instrumental, functionalist interpretation of these rules it is 
worth attempting to parse out some of the logic behind them, and how this might reflect 
something of the nature of the movement that sought to adhere to these strictures. These 
règlements were widespread—most contemporaneous sources from the 1960s as well as all of 
the other former combatants I spoke with recognized these rules as being clearly delineated, not 
the product of assumption or observation.361 They can, therefore, be read as a kind of text, 
describing the bounds and moral positions the dawa was meant to enforce.  
One rule concerned, broadly, the ethical foundations of Simba’s relationships with non-
combatants. Simba could never steal possessions while under the influence of the medicine. 
                                               
361 The list, for instance, contained in Renée Claire Fox, Willy De Craemer, and J. M. Ribeaucourt, “The Second 
Independence”: A Case Study of the Kwilu Rebellion in the Congo (Mouton & Co., 1965) on pg 100 includes the ones Henri 
mentioned as well as several others. These were “Partisans must live a communal life.; They must obey the orders of their chief.; 
They must not fight among themselves.; They must be brave, have discipline, and exhibit endurance and perseverance.; They 
must do whatever manual work is required, voluntarily, and look upon such work as honourable and dignifying.; They must not 
speak French. (Lingala is the accepted language.); They must not pray…. They must abstain from all things European.” It is 
again important to note that these were from the Kwilu wing of the rebellion which, by all accounts, shared some aspects of the 
logic of the mai medicine while adopting a much more obvious ideological dimension to their training. Benoît Verhaegen does 
not mention the specific rules in his “Les Rebellions Populaires Au Congo En 1964,” Cahiers D’etudes Africaines 7, no. 26 
(1967): 345–59.  
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Though Henri and his band would later build and man informal roadblocks near the forest to 
demand “tolls” from passers-by, he claims neither he nor any in his section ever stole from a 
civilian.362 The mai medicine would not enable personal accumulation; it was not to be abused 
for individual gain by those who took it. If the mai undergirded a purging movement against the 
excessive consumption of venal elites, this proscription shapes the interface point, and protects 
the relations of reciprocity, between a Simba band and the public it sought to protect. The Simba 
were only to take that which was offered to them—ensuring relations of reciprocity were 
observed and the young warriors could not, at least in concept, operate outside of a mandate, 
replete with material support, from the population.  
The bulk of the règlements concern governance of personal consumption and bodily 
habits. Three addressed foodways: no breaking bones, only eating meat and no vegetables, no 
eating the head or intestines of an animal. In practice all three of these rules concern the 
relationship between a Simba and the body of animal. Simba’s normative diet was meant to be 
meat and not flora. Eating only meat, an expensive proposition for agriculturalists, meant either 
possessing wealth or living in proximity to the bush in order to access wild animals. This 
proscription also, then tied the Simba to the source of mai power: wild spaces. The proscription 
against breaking bones precluded butchering. Animals were meant to torn apart to be consumed, 
not cut, and bones not broken through chewing. The head and intestines of the animal not 
consumed. The knife and kitchen of the domestic world was meant to be left behind and the 
                                               
362 For an interesting look at contemporary roadblock activities in eastern Congo see Johan Pottier, “Roadblock Ethnography: 
Negotiating Humanitarian Access in Ituri, Eastern DR Congo, 1999-2004,” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 
76, no. 2 (2006): 151–79. 
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Simba were to engage directly with the powers and provision offered by the wild spaces they 
inhabited. 363  
The proscriptions against washing and touching another person are best examined within 
a framework of concerns about pollution. Randall Packard, in his ethnographic account of 
Nande-speaking groups chiefship rituals, describes the fear of bodily pollution transferring 
between individuals as being at the core of tensions between the domestic (eka) and wild 
(ekisoki) spaces. In Packard’s account much care was required to ensure that the two domains 
remained separate, especially during politically volatile times, such as the investiture of a new 
chief.364 One can further see prohibitions against washing and touching being related to notions 
of protecting a mai-imbued body from contaminants that might reduce its power or inflect it with 
forces associated with the domestic space, potentially negating its efficacy. 
The prohibition against sexual contact likely drew its logic from similar concerns about 
pollution and contamination between eka and ekisoki spaces and powers. As the interface 
between these two zones was necessary for society to thrive, Packard argues that women were 
the key “liminal figures” in managing the boundary—both with their social positions and their 
physical bodies.365  It can be inferred that the prohibition against sexual contact was an attempt 
to avoid approaching the point of liminality in order to protect the wild powers that constituted 
the mai. If, in fact, mai’s efficacy can be linked to forms of social immaturity, something Henri 
                                               
363 Perhaps one could link this to arguments made by Nicolas Argenti, The Intestines of the State: Youth, Violence, and Belated 
Histories in the Cameroon Grassfields (University of Chicago Press, 2007). In this text he suggests Oka call the palace the 
“intestines of the state,” and he addresses this connection on page 4 related to Oka-speaking groups.  
364 Randall M. Packard, Chiefship and Cosmology: An Historical Study of Political Competition (Indiana University Press, 
1981). 
365 Ibid., 43. I have written more about this in an unpublished piece called “Cosmologies of Sexual Violence” that I presented at 
the University of Chicago, the Hertog Global Strategy Initiative and Columbia University, and the United States Institute for 
Peace.  
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and other repeatedly articulated, then crossing the threshold of sexual experience can be, itself, 
connected to adulthood. This boundary-crossing potentially negated the tenets of wild power. 
Foreclosing access to the zones where mai drew its force at the expense of moving forward in the 
world of domestic responsibility and authority yielded dangerous—even fatal—consequences in 
combat.  
These rules were wide reaching and very difficult to follow in all circumstances. A few 
were explicitly enforced by commandants within the Simba—theft was punishable by execution 
by a section leader, for instance.366 Most of the rules were regulated by the mai itself.367 If a 
warrior violated any rule, even if no one in the band was aware of his infraction, then mai would 
betray him in battle.368 The bullets that struck his body would not turn to water, they would 
pierce his skin and his body would come apart— the consequences of violating the règlements 
and of failing to obey the mai obvious for all to see.   
 
The Sense of Mai 
Before each battle, a ceremony took place where the mai was “taken.”369 It began, like many 
Simba events, with song. Some songs associated taking the mai with notions of birth and 
                                               
366 The line between theft and appropriation was not always clear. A key source of income after the fighting was the production 
and manning of illegal roadblocks. Travelers were stopped and asked for a donation. 
 
367 I here use mai as a noun, as set of practices and concepts, but it is worth noting that others, most importantly Benoit 
Verhaegen, prefer to describe it in terms of “magic codes” and the medicine itself as the product of “magico-religious beliefs.”  
 
368 What, exactly, would happen in these battles? Henri never touched a firearm during his entire tenure in the Simba. How were 
nearly naked, unarmed children meant to defeat armed, trained, soldiers? Here Henri, and his peers I spoke with, are imprecise. 
We can conjecture that the encounter with Simba was both deeply frightening for opposing forces. Until faced with the 
mercenaries, perhaps the ANC forces could not stomach massacring unarmed children and fled rather than engage in murder. My 
interlocutors insist that the most powerful among them could divert—even redirect—missile and grenades fired at them so they 
would return to those who fired at them.  
 
369 The word “take,” kuchukua in Swahili, was used by all informants. They did not use the term eat, kula, or apply, kuweka.  
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rebirth—one popular refrain went “Even though we die, others will be born after us.”370 Other 
songs threatened the enemies of the movement: 
Jambele, ooo, mateka yetu. 
Mapombo ya Tshombe, se cachent 
Ya kubeba masasi. 
 
  “Hello” to our prey, 
 Those babies of Tshombe, who are hiding themselves 
 But should instead grab their guns371 
 
After singing and encouraging one another’s’ appetite for battle, the Simba prepared to 
fight by lining up side by side before the muganga that was responsible for administering the 
dawa. Each band’s ritual specialist, or muganga, dipped a whisk of a special plant in the dawa 
and flicked the drops on the bodies of the soldiers, shouting “mai” with each application.372 On 
certain occasions another type of mai medicine, this one a thick dark paste, was applied inside 
cuts made on the bodies of the warriors, usually their arms or chest. These cuts would form, at 
times, cicatrized markings that identified someone as a former Simba for the rest of their lives. 
The specific ingredients of the mai itself were unknown to all of my informants. Whatever it was 
composed of, once the mai was applied adherence to the règlements was to be absolute. For all 
those who took the mai, even those who were observant of the règlements its effects lasted for a 
limited time, and if the soldiers went too long before a battle the mai had to be re-applied in a 
similar fashion.  
                                               
370 Interview with a man who asked to be identified as Yuma in Bunia on July 10, 2014.  
 
371 This is a highly idiomatic version of Lingala combined with Swahili and French. “Mateka” means “captives” in Swahili but 
this term was used pejoratively to imply their enemies were already under their control. ”Mapombo” literally means “greens” in 
Swahili but is an insulting way to talk about a young person. Moise Tshombe was the secessionist leader of Katanga blamed for 
Lumumba’s death.  
 
372 This process or a close variation of this was described by all informants who experienced the mai ceremonies. The fiction 
film “Nindi” about the contemporary mai-mai in and around Butembo depicts a very similar process.   
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The mai had a profound effect on how Henri and his peers experienced battle. “Using the 
mai medicine we were invulnerable.  Even the sound of the guns was quiet. They were like the 
sound of breaking sticks. As the medicine was wearing off, the sound of gunfire became louder 
and louder until it was like normal. Then we knew they needed to flee.” Not only did the mai 
protect the body from being punctured and penetrated—it also affected the sensorium, reducing 
the magnitude and intensity of frightening sounds. Other states of intoxication no doubt affected 
perception as well. Regardless, warriors experienced the mai’s effects somatically, both on the 
body surface and within. Its influence was capable of overwhelming and sometimes inverting the 
natural rhythms and reactions of the body. One of Henri’s peers recalled that the mai provoked in 
him in insatiable desire to run toward the noise of guns without fear.373 Henri has complex 
feelings about his involvement in the movement, but he is not ambivalent or skeptical 
whatsoever about the power of the mai. For Henri, even as he interprets contemporary mai-mai 
movements in eastern Congo, he focuses on the existence of “true mai-mai,” against the 
proliferating fake mai-mai movements that are more like bandits than healers. True mai-mai 
embody both socially protective values of the movement he was part of and are authenticated 
accordingly by the power of the dawa.374 
  
States of Intoxication 
                                               
373 Gustave Pengeza, Mangina, June 9, 2015.  
374 This notion of authentication can also be tied to a Weberian sense of legitimacy. Carol MacCormack in her chapter in Steven 
Feierman, John M. Janzen, and the Joint Committee on African Studies, The Social Basis of Health and Healing in Africa 
(University of California Press, 1992) argues that Weberian “traditional” legitimacy is comprised of “merit, valor, and holiness” 
associated with a  particular group. This can be linked to the notion of “charismatic” legitimacy connected to “extraordinary 
qualities” of power linked to particular figures (pp 429-430). MacComarck’s work linking these two notions of legitimacy is 
something relevant to many African healing movements is something I take up in this chapter.   
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The mai was only one among a number of substances that the Simba regularly used.  Henri 
insisted that every Simba regularly used intoxicants. “Yes, even the children. Even us. We grew 
bangi [marijuana] there. And they made corn-alcohol. And palm wine. We drank it all the time, 
almost every day. It was just a part of our life there. Not just before fighting.” Henri recalls that 
he and all in his section were more or less permanently intoxicated. Purchasing alcohol was the 
virtually the only reason Simba sought to possess currency. The array of substances consumed 
by the Simba were intended to affect a warrior’s relationship with battle. The dulling effects of 
the mai were exacerbated by those of other intoxicants. It is worth noting that one substance 
Simba did not consume, omuzenze, was the traditional banana alcohol of the Kinande-speaking 
communities in eastern Congo. It was meant to be consumed by elders only.375 The refusal to 
intoxicate themselves on the cheaply produced omuzenze can be read, perhaps, as a refusal of 
symbols of domestic authority and trappings of gerontocratic power.  
All Simba took the mai, but its effects were not universal, nor of uniform potency. 
Particular individuals found the mai more efficacious than others. Some of these figures gained 
renown and became folk heroes among the Simba and people sympathetic to the movement in 
the region. I heard their names many times, spoken by nearly every former Simba I encountered. 
These were the ones who “demonstrated the strongest mai power.” Yuma Deo was the most 
fearsome Simba warrior in Beni territory, whose raw power established his unquestioned 
leadership of the band. He never wore a shirt in battle, his only weapon a wooden scepter that 
could be used, it was said, to strike a man dead at distance or redirect a rocket with a gesture.376 
                                               
375 Interview with Kinyata Kasereka, Lwanzo, Kahindo Pierre, Vikatsira Kalalahire, Paluku Katsavu, and Kambale Kihundwa 
Erasto who comprised the Kighanda (elders court) of the Butembo Kinande-speaking community. In Butembo, North Kivu, DRC 
on April, 2014.  
 
376 One is, again, reminded of the Mwindo Epic and the role of Mwindo’s scepter in the tale.   
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One wonders if this can be connected to the wooden scepter Mwindo was born wielding in the 
epic. Yuma Deo led the entire Simba band into the city of Beni a few days after Henri’s 
recruitment and was a key figure in the taking of Butembo, described in the previous chapter. 
After the Simba were repulsed from Butembo by mercenaries Yuma Deo was killed in a battle in 
Beni he was struck and killed by a bullet from the gun of mercenary. Even the mightiest, his 
former compatriots argued, failed to always observe the rules of the mai.  
  
Discovering the Medicine 
Most warriors in a typical band, however, were not of the stature of Yuma Deo. “Most of us 
were just children,” Henry states flatly, confirming what many other sources suggest. At this 
point in our conversation, he stops speaking, and stares at the broom-shaped swirls of sand 
between us, and then looks up. He wants to make sure I understood what he meant. “Even 
primary school kids were in there. Even children of eight years were in there.” This memory 
upsets Henri. He does not, however, perceive the use of children in the Simba conflict as a result 
of their impressionability or ability to be coerced. A key reason for their involvement, Henri 
recalls, was, in part, due to the fact they were particularly suited to the forms of expertise needed 
to wield and produce the medicine.  
The production of mai required the engagement of at least two key figures: daktari 
[doctors] and muganga [healers].377 Muganga could be any sympathetic healer, known to the 
Simba, who possessed the secret knowledge of how to mix the medicine. The muganga were 
often women, though in Henri’s band the healer was a man. The Simba’s most important 
                                               
377 It is worth noting that the children were referred to in a biomedical register—as medicin or daktari—and the elder who 
transformed the raw power was referred to in terms associated with traditional healers. The power had two origins—the 
production, and the utilization—both required purity of spirit and ability to connect with the wild. 
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muganga was named Mama Onema, a woman “with only one breast,” who was said to be the 
progenitor of the original mai that ignited the movement. Onema was said to be the bearer of the 
secret knowledge all muganga of the Simba needed to produce the dawa.378 Daktari were 
selected quite differently. Age was not relevant, but they almost always came from among the 
youngest in a band. Their primary task was to harvest the raw material needed to produce the mai 
from the jungle. The wild materials, forest plants, needed were only detectable by certain people. 
It seemed that those with “talent” for finding them were always among the youngest in each 
band.379 Key herbs and plants were indistinguishable from all others to most, but to the daktari 
the latent power in certain plants would be obvious. These materials may be linked to plants that 
Randall Packard described as ritually “cool,” used as either tools for “cleansing and purification” 
or “pollution and danger.”380 Henri and others said that it was not the species of plant in 
particular that mattered, but the force latent in the plant that only a daktari could identify. These 
potent materials were then brought to the muganga who would then prepare the ointment and 
paste in a process that Henri and his peers were not allowed to witness.  
 
Losing the war  
If the mai was overwhelmingly powerful, and Henri and his peers could testify to its efficacy 
personally, how does he explain why the Simba lost the war? Specifically, what happened when 
the Simba lost Butembo, which proved a turning point in the rebellion for Henri’s peloton?  I 
                                               
378 This information comes from a man named Mabe Sabiti, interviewed on June 10, 2014 in the city of Bunia, Ituri province, 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Sabiti was a commandant in another Simba band during the rebellion.  
 
379 The word used in an interview with another former child soldier was the Swahili “akili” which can also be translated as skill.  
 
380 Packard, Chiefship, p 36.  
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asked several individuals to explain the events of the battle that brought the eastern wing of the 
movement into months of disarray and, ultimately, annihilation. 
The explanation provided by former combatants is markedly different than the one 
offered in the previous chapter. Rather than focusing on the superior organizational and tactical 
prowess of mercenary forces aligned with Dragon Rouge, Henri and his peers interpret the battle 
as a moment of gerontocratic authority winning a war of medicines against the mai across the 
main street of Butembo. According to members of the kighanda elders group who conducted the 
ceremony at the time, they were able to stop the Simba using a substance produced with a 
powder derived from a ram’s testicles, combined with an alcohol called mustibwe, and other 
materials. The medicine derived from these ingredients emerged during a ceremony called 
miereko. The final concoction was placed on the main road bisecting the city. Such were the 
medicines of the elders—drawn not from the wilds but from the domesticated goat, and the 
banana stands that became cultural talismans in Bunande, sites to mark burial and birth.381 They 
knew the power of the mai was formidable and used this negating force to block the Simba’s 
attempt to advance through the city. A war of medicines took place in the heart of Butembo, and 
the elder’s medicines held off the mai long enough for the mercenaries to deploy and drive the 
Simba back.382  
 In this framework, the critical defeat is explained by the failure of the mai but the triumph 
of another power—a different medicine. The collapse of the Simba precipitated by the 
emergence of medicine that validated the patriarchal elites of Butembo who protected their 
domestic space from an insurgency from the wild.  
                                               
381 Francesco Remotti, “Catégories Sémantiques de l’éros Chez Les Wanande Du Zaïre,” L’Homme 27, no. 103 (1987): 73–92. 
 
382 The key interview that provided this information was conducted with Mbale Kihundwa Erasto, Kinyata kasereka, Lwanzo, 
Kahindo Pierre, Vikatsira Kalalahire and Paluku Katsavu in the city of Butembo in July 2014.  
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Staying Alive  
For Henri, less than six months of the nearly three years he spent with the Simba were on the 
battlefield. While the mai was core to his memories of the movement, the bulk of his time among 
the Simba was spent hiding in the forest after the Butembo defeat. He characterizes that time by 
feelings of disillusionment, particularly after the powerful experiences of the mai: “Life was very 
difficult in forest. Because the conditions were very dangerous.  We were just little kids. Those 
people gave us these great hopes—we would die for good reason. So we just went to war. But 
many died instead in the forest.” The forest that was their refuge and tormenter was in the 
territory of Wamba, northwest of Makeke. 
 This zone is deep rainforest, now well known as the native territory of rare okapi and 
pygmy chimpanzee populations. The Wamba forests lie within Equator province, northeast of the 
heart of the Congo basin. The immense size of the forest and the extreme difficulty of moving 
armed forces into the interior provided the Simba nearly limitless possibilities for evading the 
authorities. Their zones of moment were near enough to a principal roadway so they might 
access small towns where they could trade for needed goods. The time in Wamba was, in Henri’s 
memory, a period of deprivation with a focus on survival and escape.  
 Survival in the forest was not easy. The band lived by trapping animals, farming easily 
cultivable foods like cassava, and instituting illegal roadblocks on the road that passed near the 
forest and extorting travelers north and south on what is now National Route 25.  The only 
connection to the outside world was the radio, and access to the radio was restricted to 
commandant level only. “They wanted us to keep going in the darkness,” remembers Henri. 
“They got the news and told us what they wanted us to know of it. They wanted to keep us in the 
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dark, so that the only things we knew were the trainings and ideas they wanted us to have. Not a 
knowledge of what was really happening in the outside world.” In the deep forest of Wamba a 
literal and metaphorical darkness surrounded the Simba. The crackle of the radio from the huts of 
leadership evoked a tenuous connection to the outside world, but nothing clear came through. 
Henri and his friends grew increasingly desperate to flee. 
   
Escape   
It took over one year to turn a strong desire to escape into workable plan. To Henri, he faced two 
untenable options in the forest: “It was so dangerous. If you stayed you would die in the war. But 
if you fled you would be killed by Simba. Many people fled, and when found they were killed. If 
you made it home, though, you could be killed by the government for being in Simba.” He also 
recalls that he was concerned that he was too physically weak to escape. “When you were in the 
bush, you just found food—fruits and grasses.” Food was always scarce and insufficient. He was 
malnourished and constantly enervated. Given the existential dangers of both staying and 
escaping, Henri committed to planning his escape, but knew that “if you wanted to leave you had 
to have a good plan.” He and his friend from Makeke developed a strategy.  
“There was one woman with us there. Everyone had to take care of themselves and keep 
themselves alive.  It was so difficult. But we who came from Mangina [the town nearest to 
Makeke] began to gather together. And we would talk quietly: ‘When will we get out of here? 
When will we get home? What will we do?’ The plan was that when one of us was on guard, we 
would get the others in our plan and escape together. So one night the three of us, a friend of 
mine and this women, we decided to escape.” The woman he referred to was named Kavira. She 
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was the “bush wife” of Henri’s section leader.383 “She was married to this man before the war, 
and so when we fled to the bush near Wamba she was brought along. But this man was not good, 
and he began to trouble her so much during that time in the bush.” His abuse of her was well 
known to all in the section. Despite her own circumstances she was kind to Henri and his friends. 
“It was like we were her children in the bush. We were like a family. We were her children and 
she was like our mother.” Initially, however, she was not included in their escape plans. “But as 
me and my friend began planning to run away, she found out and began to plan to leave with us.” 
He remembers being concerned that involving Kavira would increase their risk, given how they 
imagined their section leader would respond: “[Having her with us] increased the danger of our 
plan. The anger of that guy was so strong.”  
After months of planning, the team felt both ready and sufficiently desperate to attempt 
their escape. “We left the camp and reached the Aruwimi River, a large river that was not easy to 
cross. The reason we waited until March to escape is that was when the rains came with great 
ferocity. So the river was a low point right before the rains and we could cross it. We found a 
large tree that had fallen and used it to cross the river. By this point it was about 5 o’clock in the 
morning. Then we burned the tree we used to cross, so that if they came after us they wouldn’t 
have a way to cross the river.” The walk from where they were to the nearest village was a 
distance of about nine kilometers through dense forest. “When we arrived in the nearest town, 
people were so shocked to receive us. We had been starving. We were so hungry but even when 
we first ate some food we couldn’t eat any more. Even though we were hungry we could not 
eat.”  
                                               
383 This term is fraught but is used in contemporary conflict analysis in Congo to describe women kidnapped and coerced into 
sexual relationships with battlefield commanders in militia. See a discussion of the term in Shelly Whitman, “Sexual Violence, 
Coltan and the Democratic Republic of Congo,” in Natural Resources and Social Conflict, International Political Economy Series 
(Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2012), 128–51. 
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 The people who received them in the village expressed sympathy for them treated them 
like members of their family. They provided the bedraggled group with food, promised to 
mislead the Simba who pursued them about where they were headed, and encouraged them along 
their way. “As we passed through these villages, we were hearing that our Simba were behind us, 
following behind.  But we were far away and it would take a long time to reach us. It was 
something like twenty-five kilometers from where we were to Makeke again. But it happened, by 
luck, that one town we ended up in was where my father was doing government work. And when 
he saw me he wept. He really really cried completely. At that point I said, alright, I found my 
parents again. If the rebels find me here and I die, at least I’ve seen my parents again.” It was 
May, 1967, almost exactly three years after he entered the movement.  
 Henri does not describe in detail what it was like to be with his father again—what 
emotions, beyond joy, he experienced. He simply reiterated that his father accepted him back 
with no hesitation. They then made their way home together. Henri remembers that he was not 
afraid he would be rejected by the people of Makeke. “No, I wasn’t afraid at all. That was a time 
of joy. I wasn’t afraid to share anything with them. I felt totally open to share. They already 
knew what happened.  It was May 28, 1967 when I finally arrived home.”  
“The law was that being in the movement made you guilty of treason. And my father was 
a member of the government. So it was dangerous for me, and for him.  We needed to go and see 
the chef du poste [CP] and inform him that I had returned.” This chef du poste replaced Kaiteni, 
who the Simba murdered. “So I had to go to the CP and do a deposition about my experience. 
After the deposition my parents had to ready a payment. A fine. It was 3000 Franc at the time, 
and then I received a government registration form. Then I was without any [legal] problems. I 
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was held by the government for two days. As soon as I saw my family we immediately went to 
the post. I was held there just for one night. Then I was released.”  
 
Afterlives 
Henri’s time in with the Simba affected the rest of his life. Habits that he formed during his three 
years in the band were immediately challenged. Henri’s family were devout Jehovah Witnesses 
and insisted he relinquish a dependence on alcohol he acquired during his time as a Simba. After 
some months he was able to do so, but this decision limited his contact with other former Simba. 
Their gatherings, according to Henri, revolved around alcohol consumption and he wanted to 
avoid such temptations. These gatherings, thought informal, were sometimes called salama 
[peace] groups. They provided an enduring space for former Simba to reflect on their shared 
experiences and discuss the challenges of reintegrating into society again. It was also a place 
where they could share and manage their fear. For decades, and for many even today, there is 
fear of government reprisal for fighting with the Simba. This fear is also inflected with pride: 
they recognize Laurent Kabila, an official in the CNL during the rebellion, as an heir to “true 
mai-mai.” Many hope they will receive recognition, and even financial remuneration, for 
keeping the mai for the 1996 generation of warriors who took the country from Mobutu—the 
man who eliminated the vestiges of the Simba during his rise to power. 
Henry’s post-Simba life was rich and full. In 1968 he was able to return to his studies and 
eventual become a schoolteacher, was married and fathered children. His devotion to his faith 
and work, as well as his family reputation, enabled him to rise to a position of prominence in the 
community of Makeke. Not all his former peers experienced such a positive itinerary. Some days 
after my conversation with Henri in Makeke I spent time with another former Simba in a town 
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called Ngadi just north of Beni. Though we met before noon, the omuzenze was already 
prepared. The foamy banana alcohol brimmed an old ceramic bathtub. Long grass straws were 
expectantly dipped into the liquid. The tub’s insides were tinted dark brown from years of 
service as a brew vessel.  
 My interlocutor was the brewer. As our conversation began it was clear he was already 
intoxicated from sampling his batch. Years of omuzenze manufacturing, his primary income 
source, left him, more or less, permanently drunk, or so claimed his sister, who shared his home 
and vocation. His name is Obed. Unlike Henri he is frail and stooped and looks much older than 
67-years-old. He was a houseboy in 1964 and joined the movement in ways that are not clearly 
remembered. His experiences are not articulated in straightforward or linear ways. Memories are 
prismatic, conflicted, and contradictory. Statements and ideas fold back on themselves and his 
own involvement shifts and changes in each recounting. At one point he denied any involvement 
with the Simba. In another memory he foregrounds his role in his band and describes his heroism 
in detail. We meet several times and each time the details shift and shimmer. Obed’s cloudy and 
refracted memories remind me that Henri’s microhistory is not the microhistory of the rebellion. 
Other stories and experiences are buried, in clouded minds or in the soil.  
 
Conclusion 
Henri’s life history generates several conceptual and analytical possibilities. First it clearly 
establishes the centrality of children to the Simba movement, not as instrumental, easily 
mobilized labor but as critical agents within the functioning of the mai both as producers of the 
material and as agents of its purposes. The evidence provided by Henri allows us to view 
childhood in eastern Congo at this time in terms of interconnected constituencies with complex 
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interactions. This lens follows John Lonsdale warning to avoid “any analysis that separates 
power from its 'underbelly', or the thoughts and practices of dominant from 'subaltern' classes. 
All power relationships are represented and enacted within a polemical arena. Power may control 
the public address system, but crowds also have a voice, generally a murmur, at times a roar."384 
This chapter centralizes the roar of children in mid 1960s eastern Congo, and shows how they 
became a constituency that powerfully engaged the dominant powers of the era in order to offer 
an alternative future itinerary for the communities of North Kivu. Theirs was a movement that 
excited and energized many thousands of people even as it terrorized others. Polemics can turn 
toward violence, and some debates exist both within and beyond the realms of discourse. But the 
constituency who became Simba were not “radical men of violence” who contested a certain 
rationalization of authority.385 These were remembered as children. Henri’s story emerges from a 
scale shift that provides a unique vantage on what was happening at the level of the “underbelly” 
of society and connects with those figures most closely aligned with it.  
 Second, this chapter analyzes the mai as a medicine, not as “magico-religious belief” or 
“magic code.” This approach is new to studies of the Simba rebellion. By following the arc of 
Henri’s own memories, the chapter explored how mai worked and affected the bodies and minds 
of its adherents. It pushes down the ideological elements of the rebellion—not as irrelevant—but 
as of second order importance to those who joined the movement. Henri’s persistence in placing 
the mai at the heart of the rebellion drives us also to consider the importance of embodied 
experience. This move recalls Allen Roberts claim that “a long-standing social science bias 
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against studying embodied experience cannot be denied, but it is also true that writing about 
movement practices presents its own challenges” and possibilities.386 Where Roberts refers to the 
challenge of studying movement in the sense of an individual body in dance, the statement is 
also applicable to practices of social bodies in movement like the Simba rebels of mid-1960s 
eastern Congo. Whereas embodied practices might imply a realm of action beyond discourse, the 
mai medicine, its rules and powers, was both embodied and discursively constituted. Morality 
and discipline legitimated the mai both in the bounds of polemics and practice. This microhistory 
allowed a view into this world beyond simply a list of rules but also the memories of one person 
for whom the mai was a lived experience. It explored the dialectic between the memory of how 
mai medicine functioned in practice as well as what it meant to the public against which it was 
deployed. 
 Third, this focus on mai allows for the Simba Rebellion to be characterized, at least in 
part, as a therapeutic insurgency. This move connects the 1964 rebellion to a deep genealogy of 
such movements in Great Lakes Africa. This does not preclude the fact that its architects drew 
upon other registers of legitimacy at different scales—including Cold War and anti-imperial 
rhetoric. The relevance, however, of medicinal tropes within the functions of the mai and the 
relationship to such materials to notions of harming and healing the land that were politically 
central in pre and post-colonial communities in east and central Africa is difficult to deny.387 
Examining the règlements of the movement demonstrates how the legitimating morality of the 
mai, predicated on forms of innocence and self-denial, by implication reproved the behaviors of 
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immoral customary elites. Embodying the values of the mai was a life and death matter, both 
personally and to the community being targeted, and demonstrated that elites who expected 
support and labor from their young had much to fear from their own kin if elders transgressed 
their responsibilities.  
Fourth, Henri’s microhistory provides insights that enrich existing scholarship on this 
period. Benoit Verhaegen’s landmark study of the rebellion, for example, reflects similar 
scholarship in acknowledging the key role of children in the movement without attempting to 
explain their disproportionate representation among the Simba. He simply acknowledges that the 
twelve to twenty age set was the crucial demography responsible for the bulk of violent labor for 
Simba movement.388 His argument is that this age set was ready for mobilization primarily as 
they had little to gain and thus “nothing to lose” in the emerging postcolonial context.389 Henri’s 
microhistory provides a sharply contrasting argument: that these boys and their families had 
everything to lose for their involvement in the movement. Engaging with the Simba was a very 
difficult choice and some died rather than involve themselves or their children in the war. Others 
who joined dealt with trauma by losing themselves in intoxicants during the war and beyond. It 
also suggests, however, that the vision of the movement, and the medicine that animated it, was 
one of social renewal and not simply something to occupy time or afford opportunity.  
Finally, Henri’s microhistory captures a moment in the Congo Crisis era and references 
scales of deep time that were relevant to the Simba warriors and the constituencies they engaged. 
The mass mobilization of any community’s children threatened the very future of the group. This 
particular movement promised upheaval: its architects sought to build a society where elites were 
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accountable to their constituents and forms of political exploitation and cooption were ended. At 
the same time, Simba also invoked registers of meaning pulled from deep pasts. Mai medicinal 
practices drew on what E. Evans-Pritchard called “ecological time,” where temporality is 
imagined in cycles and rhythms centered on balance and flux, not linearity or chronology.390 
Ecological time is linked to the patterns and seasons of the forest and field. The mai medicine’s 
deep genealogy, and its users’ disruptive imagination of the future, made the movement an 
attempt to bring the future in alignment with the past. The goal was to restore order and balance, 
not produce a millenarian break with history and time.  
 We close with a question. Why did this chapter cleave so closely to a single life history? 
What of the other former Simba I interviewed beyond Henri and Obed? I chose not to interweave 
other memories and personal tales of rebellion into Henri’s story for one reason: I wanted the 
gaps and spaces in Henri’s tale to be preserved—to resist the temptation to fill in his memories 
with those of others. This was not to essentialize his story, but rather to suggest that something is 
revealed in the absences in Henri’s memory. Memories of actual battle, for instance, were almost 
totally absent from what he shared with me. How did unarmed children attack and repulse 
trained soldiers? He did not explain. My prodding yielded no answers. Whether Henri left the 
absences to protect the credibility of his memories or because of the trauma those memories 
evoked, I do not know. I merely note that the gaps persist and allow them to remain.  
The last word in this chapter belongs to another former Simba child combatant, Paluku 
Mwasema. It is based on another fragment of memory. For Mwasema, like others I spoke to, the 
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Simba were the architects of a movement of revitalization, where the youngest brought 
accountability and responsibility to their elders. When the bullets struck his body it was, for 
Mwasema, his age and inexperience that allowed the mai to save him—that gave life to the 
power of the medicine. The worldly wisdom of his fathers was not only insufficient, it had been 
corrupted and in need of renewal. This was a renewal he and his young peers were prepared to 
institute by force. “Innocence,” he said, “made us powerful.”391   
                                               
391 Interview with Paluku Mwasema, Mutwanga. April 12, 2014. 
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Chapter Six: Death Talk and Martyrdom in Decolonizing Congo, 1963-1967 
 
Death presents opportunities, perhaps even expectations, for the living to make meaning of loss. 
When mass death looms over a single context during a compressed period of time, as Congo in 
1964, members of affected communities interpret these events in both private and public ways. 
“Death,” argues T. C. McCaskie, “is a social event conceived of and observed as something that 
happens to an individual, but only in the context of family… and community.”392 This chapter 
tracks how three kinds of publications—the official newspaper of the Simba movement called 
The Martyr, books within a genre of Protestant missionary “Congo martyrs” literature, and the 
Catholic magazine Africa Alive— used deaths connected with the Simba rebellion to constitute 
different types of community. It examines how people with disparate, even antithetical, political 
perspectives debated the social meaning and politics of same kinds of death during and after the 
movement. 
Stephanie Newell suggests that “printed representations of dead people help to highlight 
the ways in which bodies can be produced through genre, narrative perspective, language, and 
style.”393 The “bodies” found in this chapter, individual and social, living and dead, shared 
experiences of violence committed by and against Simba rebels in the mid 1960s. Impassioned 
authors used the end of life as the grist for creative pieces on the politics of dying. All sought to 
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shape communities around their imagination of loss. Creative writers contested one another’s 
interpretations of death. What emerged were polyvalent perspectives on the relationship between 
time, mortality, and morality. One threads links their intellectual production: the question of 
martyrdom. Who were the martyrs among the dead? What were the political, social, and 
religious implications of ultimate personal sacrifice for those that remained?  
Temporal imaginations about past and future saturated how Simba leaders, global 
Catholics, mourning mothers, and American protestants interpreted the human aftermath of the 
violence of 1964. This chapter tracks how core themes of these martyrdom debates persisted 
long after the rebellion within a larger field of preponderant “death talk” that continues to 
provide a rich lexicon for political disputation in Congo today. 
 
The Martyr 
On July 21, 1964, the Simba Rebellion’s political wing, le Comité National de la Libération - 
Section de l’Est (CNL-SE), launched a biweekly newspaper: The Martyr. 394 The publication was 
the official intellectual “combat organ” of the movement with the motto “Fatherland or death” on 
the masthead.395 In bold letters the editor was listed as Gaston Soumialot. Soumialot was the 
chief architect of the political wing of the Simba Rebellion. At the time he published The Martyr 
he also served as President of CNL-SE and was the Minister of Defense in his own 
government.396 Soumialot’s consolidation of power—personally overseeing the governance, 
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communications, and military functions of the rebellion—came after a rapid rise through the 
ranks of revolutionary movements in eastern Congo after the death of Lumumba. After proving 
his capacity under other leaders, on January 1, 1964, when he was forty-two-years-old, 
Soumialot took command of CNL affairs in eastern Congo.397 He described himself as the “new 
Lumumba” and his rhetoric tended to be more florid, vivid, and apocalyptic than his 
compatriots.398 During the ascendant months of the rebellion Soumialot used the The Martyr to 
influence public perception of the Simba Rebellion and outline the movement’s ambitions and 
aspirations. 
The audience for the paper is not clear. The editors of The Martyr claimed to serve 
13,000 subscribers in Congo, 7,000 in Belgium, and 10,000 in “other” regions. It is not certain if 
the actual audience was as large as the publication claimed, but there was certainly a significant 
potential reading public within newly independent Congo. The early adoption of development 
paradigms in post-WWII Belgian Congo yielded a surge in adult literacy rates in the late colonial 
era.399 By 1960 over half of the adult population of Congo were literate—the highest percentage 
in Africa.400 That said, given the demography of the rebels themselves, it seems clear the 
intended audience of The Martyr were neither foot soldiers nor members of the communities 
from which the Simba emerged. Given the ages of most soldiers, their rural origins, and the high 
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price of the paper, 10 francs, very few soldiers likely read or even could access the periodical. 
The Martyr was not written for the masses. Instead it functioned as a tool to engage emerging 
forces within the global Left, as well as to inspire sympathy for the rebellion among Congo’s 
urban évolué. Its primary posture was global: it reached, by its own reports, a wider audience 
outside Congo than within.  
Coming off the presses in tabloid sheets from an office on Lippens Avenue in what is 
now Kisangani, the paper maintained a post office box and phone line for facilitating 
engagement with its reading public. Even so, the editors rarely took the opportunity for dialog. 
Foundationally The Martyr was a platform for revolutionary monologue. The newsprint was 
crammed with dense text. There were few images. Much of the content could be described as 
propagandistic bombast, threatening enemies of the movement and celebrating real or perceived 
victories. From its pages the authors vehemently decried the existential threats of “atomic 
imperialism,” bemoaned that the Catholic church was “owned” by Belgian forces and threatened 
dire violence on the movements many enemies. One, likely unintended, audience of The Martyr 
were Belgian officials. After Belgium facilitated a massive assault against the Simba that turned 
the tide against the rebellion, Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak attempted “to legitimise the 
decision to intervene by referring to the rebel paper” and its vivid threats against Europeans in 
Congo.401 
 
Marxist Martyrdom 
The content of The Martyr’s revolutionary monologues did not reflect orthodox socialist 
discourse at the time. That the “combat organ” of a nominally leftist insurgency would be called 
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The Martyr was itself not an obvious choice. In crafting the CNL’s message, Soumialot mixed 
vivid religious rhetoric with Cold War nightmares of events like nuclear war annihilating all life 
in Congo.402 The tone was rarely ideologically doctrinaire, and instead was prone to conspiracies 
drenched in Christian allegory. In private correspondence among senior leadership the rebellion 
was described as “a holy war.”403 Language of unconditional faith and religious sacrifice 
permeated the movement.  
Communication targeted directly toward the Simba was even more overtly religiously 
inflected. Rather than supplying Simba with copies of The Martyr, the CNL leadership produced 
what they called the “Revolutionary’s Catechism” to be circulated among the rank and file. It 
featured, on the cover, a photo titled “Patrice Emery Lumumba: Martyr for National 
Independence.”404 In the text Lumumba was described as an “eternal martyr for our people and 
all colonized peoples.”405 The “Revolutionary’s Catechism” replicated the dialogic format of 
Roman Catholic catechisms. A sample question: “What is the purpose of Lumumbaism?” 
Answer: “An African fatherland or death.” The didactic idioms of religious devotion and 
ultimate self-sacrifice came to inhabit the ideological center of the Simba movement for its 
leaders, even as the logic of the mai medicine, with radically different practices and meanings 
came to impel the actions of soldiers in the field.  
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As the prospect of victory dimmed, and the tides of battle turned against the Simba, death 
in the rebellion—martyrdom for the “fatherland”—became the remaining guiding ambition for 
leaders of the movement. They were to serve as an inspiration for future revolutionaries. 
Soumialot did not call Simba to die for Lumumba, but rather as Lumumba did, as an ultimate act 
of service to the nation. This approach reflected broader trends in Congolese popular culture as 
Lumumba’s political beatification generated a rich and vivid iconography around his visage.406 
Bogumil Jewsiewicki traces how sacralized iconography of Lumumba sought to bridge the 
divide between “sacred history and political history” through depictions like Lumumba enduring 
a “secular crucifixion.”407  
Beyond Congo the trope of Lumumba as martyr was discussed in halls of power 
throughout the world. Halpli Bundle, the United Nations Undersecretary for Political Affairs, 
declared in a speech in the United States in 1961 that the manner of Lumumba’s death “makes 
him a martyr.”408 From UN officials to field commanders in the Simba Rebellion the notion of 
dying for the cause—martyrdom—was a core, if contested, concept. Though aware of Lumumba 
and proud of their association with him, on the ground warriors in the Simba Rebellion were 
immersed in a quite different kind of apocalyptic nationalism tied to notions of ecological time. 
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 The Martyr’s editorial team worked to communicate the ferocious commitment of the 
Simba to their cause. As the rebellion lost ground the intensity of this rhetoric escalated. One 
article warned of the costs of foreign intervention against the Simba. Ideology again lost ground 
to more visceral imagery: “We fabricate our fetishes with the hearts of Belgians and Americans, 
and we wear the skin of Belgians and Americans as our clothing” wrote The Martyrs editors.409 
Again and again, The Martyr linked both killing and dying to a single cause, the advancement of 
the movement’s increasingly diffuse and incoherent ideals. Death and dying itself, it seemed, 
became the final purpose of the rebellion.  
Fundamentally, Soumialot wrote into being a temporal loop in which the sacrifice of the 
prototypical martyr (Lumumba) summoned new martyrs (the Simba) into being. Increasingly the 
movement’s purpose was generating a cycle of warriors being born to kill and die. The shared 
blood of Lumumba and his followers was meant to renew and revive the political fortunes of the 
Congolese. The necropolitics of The Martyr revolved around a temporally and politically 
indeterminate total victory against imperialism, injustice, and humiliation.  
As the seeds of the Simba rebellion were being stirred in Congo’s Kwilu province in 
1963, Carl Schmitt wrote about the efflorescence of a particular kind of warrior in the Cold War 
period, a unique form of partisan. He argued that these partisans emerged in two kinds of 
conflict: civil war and anticolonial struggle: 
 
“…when war is conducted as in civil war as a class struggle or when its main goal is the 
elimination of the government of the enemy state, then the criminalizing of the enemy 
represents a revolutionary blast that works in such a way as to make the partisan the real 
hero of the war… Such is the logic of a war of justa causa [just cause] in the absence of 
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recognition of a justa hostis [just enemy]. The revolutionary partisan becomes the central 
figure of war in such cases.”410  
 
The Martyr positioned itself within this framework. To valorize the Simba as “central 
figures” and “real heroes” of the war, Soumialot rejected the presences of a “just enemy” in 
Congo. He sought to make the war about global ideology, not control over a legitimate state 
entity. Within logic propounded by The Martyr, the Simba Rebellion was cast simultaneously as 
civil and imperial war—a battle against the collusion of unjust foreign and domestic enemies. 
Soumialot‘s rhetoric called for a third element to be added to Schmitt’s analysis. Just cause in the 
absence of a just enemy called for justa mortis [just death]. Justa mortis grounded the conceptual 
architecture of Simba martyrdom propounded in the world of thought that The Martyr’s 
discourse helped fashion.  
Did those who actually did the dying in the conflict, the Simba warriors themselves, share 
the notions propounded by CNL leadership around their sacrifice? This is, again, difficult to 
establish, but it seems clear that these views did not find their way into the interpretive 
frameworks of average soldiers. None of my interlocutors who fought in the rebellion recall 
encountering a copy of The Martyr at any point during their enlistment period. Quite the 
opposite: national news, even coming from leadership within the movement was deliberately 
kept out of earshot for most Simba. None recalled studying or even hearing about the 
“Revolutionary’s Catechism.” Precluded by poor internal logistics or deliberate intention from 
formal conversation about core ideological concerns, might the Simba warriors have resonated 
with the martyrdom framework espoused by CNL leadership? It seems unlikely.  
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While the figure of Lumumba was massively influential and inspirational to the former 
Simba I interviewed, none suggested they fought for Lumumba, but rather against the corruption 
of elites. While Soumialot imagined Cold War enemies readying nuclear weaponry against the 
Simba, the warriors themselves rallied against more tangible targets of morally compromised 
headmen, priests, and business elites. The apocalyptic temporality propounded by Soumialot 
gave way on the battle field to a quite different cry: “Even as we die, more of us will be born.”411 
The temporality invoked in this war chant did not begin with Lumumba, it implied a deeper 
cycle. Death was not aspirational, it was inevitable. Individual purpose was irrelevant. As a 
group, a cadre of mai warriors, they were imbued with a power beyond linear time that could not 
be stopped by an individual death. Though they died they would live. The mai would endure. 
     
Refusing Martyrdom: Denying Good Death in “Africa Alive” 
For six months in 1964 The Martyr and the Catholic magazine Africa Alive were in circulation at 
the same time. Publications devoted to righteous death and celebrating new life competed for 
audiences in Congo and beyond. Despite its title Africa Alive spent two years addressing the loss 
of Catholic lives during the rebellion. It featured, among analysis and words of encouragement, a 
poem of intense lament from the Catholic laity affected by the violence.  The authors, like most 
Catholics in Congo, were profoundly affected by the violence of 1964. The church estimated the 
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deaths of Congolese church workers to be “in the thousands.”412 Untold numbers of congregants 
perished. More than 1.2 million Catholics were, at some point, under Simba occupation.413  
In the June 1965 issue the magazine’s first page was starkly black. Bold white lettering 
pierced the dark backdrop. The statement recorded was called the “Congolese Mothers 
Manifesto”: 
“Mamans du Congo, c’est une grosse palabre!  
Nous, le mamans, nous pleurons nos enfants qui sont morts pour rien;  
Nous, les mamans, nous pleurons nos maris que nous ont abandonnes avec la lourde 
charge d’éduquer toute seules les enfants qui nous restent…  
Nous voulons la paix, la paix, la paix!” 
 
Mothers of Congo, there is too much idle talk! 
We, mothers, weep for our children who died for nothing,  
We, mothers, weep for our husbands who abandoned us 
with the heavy burden to educate all the children who remain … 
We want, peace, peace, peace! 
 
The authors of this poem offered a radical rejoinder to the partisans of The Martyr, and 
the Simba themselves. They refused to finds signs of political possibility and renewal in the 
death wrought by the rebellion. The unnamed mothers in the poem condemned the progenitors of 
“idle talk”—the productive, generative discourses of martyrdom rife at the time. They refused to 
cast their lost children as political heroes, medicinal warriors, or religious victims. Instead, they 
argued that the profusions of death accomplished “nothing.”  
                                               
412 “Eglise Du Congo: Liste Des Victimes de Janvier 1964 a Fin Mars 1965,” Vivante Afrique: Revue Générale Des Missions 
d’Afrique, June 1965. 
 
413 “Malgré Les Ruines, l’Eglise Du Congo Garde Confiance...,” Vivante Afrique: Revue Générale Des Missions d’Afrique, June 
1965. Among church leadership, 116 were killed, 109 of whom were expatriates. Given the proportion of Catholics to Protestants 
in Congo the ratio of leaders killed was significantly higher among Protestants than Catholics. Only one American Catholic 
church worker was killed, compared with dozens of American Protestants dead at the hands of Simba.  
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These women argued that the violence of 1964 resulted in only empty, meaningless, loss. 
They ignored notions of martyrdom that required death to produce meaning. These women 
reminded the readers of Africa Alive that loss begets responsibility. Their words shifted the focus 
from those who died onto the living remnant who would bear the enduring, unceasing burdens of 
absence. Their “manifesto” was a redirection of the necropolitical. Their words sought to move 
debate towards the bounds of obligations of those who remained. Against the notion of ultimate 
victory through death implicit in the concept of the martyr, these mothers used the platform 
provided by Africa Alive to ensure the living remembered their obligations and relations of 
reciprocity in kin and church community.414 They were not interested in valorizing the dead but 
enlisting the support of the living.  
What is perhaps most radical about the manifesto is not what the public was asked to 
remember but rather what the reading audience was being allowed to forget. No names of the 
dead were referenced, no obituaries shared. No details were provided to mark the lives of the 
fallen. The dead were lost “for nothing,” the texture of their lives obliterated—effaced by the 
refusal to make meaning of their passing.  The mothers also rejected temporal loops of death and 
rebirth the Simba imagined. The movement meant nothing to these women, death marked a full 
stop, not a new beginning.  
The perspectives on death printed in Africa Alive were polyvalent. Many Catholic 
constituencies suffered. The editors of Africa Alive wrote that “the insurrection of 1964-1965 
brutally jolted and shook” the church corporately.415 Given that Catholics were responsible for 
                                               
414 The “Congo Mothers” spoke in ways similar to the dozens of people affected by the rebellion I talked with in eastern Congo 
between 2012 and 2016. Very rarely did the term “martyr” appear in conversations, and when mentioned it referred exclusively 
to Lumumba.  There are obvious links here as well to the kinds of social obligation demanded by figures in the Mwindo Epic 
discussed in chapter one.  
 
415 Ibid., p 16.  
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virtually all primary and secondary instruction in Congo, educating over 1.5 million of the 2 
million school-aged children in the country, a particular concern was the fact that “a considerable 
number of young people, between ages 8 and 15, were conscripted into the rebellion.”416 Church 
children became Simba in large numbers. Though noted, the writers of Africa Alive made no 
attempt to understand why this would be the case. Rather, they too engaged in their own form of 
lament. They described the Catholic church in Congo as being “in torment.” 
Lament, however, was not the only interpretive register of 1964’s violence featured in the 
pages of the magazine. Pope Paul IV published a statement in Africa Alive that sought to 
reframed the deaths of Catholic workers in Congo in the familiar register of martyrdom. He did 
not explicitly name any of the victims a martyr—this status could only be officially conferred 
after significant bureaucratic processes at the Vatican. Nonetheless he sought to inspire the 
Catholic laity with the recent canonization of the Uganda Martyrs, and honored those serving in 
Congo for being the “irreplaceable artisans of the arduous and sublime task for which you have 
consecrated your life.” Rather than attempt to explain the reasons for the brutality meted out 
against the Catholic community the Pope stated simply that “the violence was unbound, and alas, 
blood flowed.”  
The Pope and others in Africa Alive sought to locate stories of hope and inspiration 
amidst the violence.  “Despite ruin, the Congolese church keeps the faith” one article was 
entitled.417  The authors described tremendous sacrifice and commitment among Catholics and 
claimed that from the ashes “more authentic Christian life was blooming” in Congo. The Simba 
Rebellion, in this view, was a crucible for demonstrating commitment—it served as a test of 
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spiritual authenticity. In ways strikingly similar to Soumialot’s framings in The Martyr, some of 
the polyvocal perspectives in Africa Alive inferred that the power of the Catholic cause in Congo 
was validated by virtue of individuals’ willingness to die for it.  While acknowledging the 
killings, even describing the “massacre of Christians,” the editors also carefully avoided naming 
any individuals “martyrs.” Indeed, the register of martyrdom among Catholic officials was more 
carefully deployed than it was by Protestants in the martyrdom biographies or the Simba 
leadership. Nonetheless, the spirit of martyrdom discourse was rife throughout the pages of 
Africa Alive. Stories of comparative persecution and the resilience of the church filled the 
reflective post-Simba issues. Such framings were enduring. Two Catholics killed by Simba are 
now beatified: Father Francesco Spoto and Sister Marie-Clémentine Anuarite Nengapeta: who 
also became the “first Bantu” to be beatified by the Catholic church.418  
In the end Africa Alive’s editors could not embrace the radical rejection of martyrdom 
discourse that “Congolese mothers” called for. They did however follow them in a turn toward 
lament, acknowledging the incomprehensible costs of Simba violence. They looked, however, in 
two directions at once: toward the future and the past. 1964 itself was largely unaddressed—
almost ignored. The spectacle seemed too great to confront. The violence was instead placed 
within a deep temporal framework of the history of the advance of the gospel throughout time 
and into a teleological future of the coming Kingdom of God.  
In the immediate, terrestrial future, however, the authors focused on strategies of 
transformation for Congo’s coming generations. They sought to prevent another violent 
                                               
 
418 Nengepeta’s martyrdom narrative, according to catholicsaints.info and the University of Notre Dame’s faith.nd site, was due 
to her refusal to submit to rape by the Simba Commander Colonel Pierre Olembe . After she was shot and stabbed she reportedly 
uttered, according to Pierre Olembe: “I forgive you because you know not what you do”—a phrase common in martyr tales.  
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mobilization of Catholic youth. Where education seemed to have failed to prevent radicalization 
in the late colonial era, the authors cast about for ways of avoiding future instability. To evade 
the pitfalls of the past, a new vision was called for in Africa Alive. It was time, it argued, for the 
church to foster “socio-economic development in rural zones” of the Congo.419 The protagonists 
in Congo’s future, according to the Catholic Church, would be prosperous farming families. The 
avenue toward growth and stability was to come through the pocketbook and not just the 
textbook. The Simba rebellion was framed as the product of economic desperation. Thus, it was 
to be the gospel of development that could chart a way forward. From the ashes of death came a 
new imagined engine of progress.  
In the end the words of the “Congolese mothers” remained unanswered by the editors of 
Africa Alive. For all the lament, hope and possibility summoned up in the magazine, the 
emptiness, loss, and brokenness of the poem persists. Trusting in development, keeping the faith, 
and anticipating veneration were cold comfort for mothers whose husbands and sons were gone 
forever.  
 
Protestant missions and a priori martyrdom 
The ambivalent, technocratic, and forward-looking approaches to making meaning from death 
recorded in Catholic periodicals found a strident rejoinder in the intense memorialization 
activities of American protestants in the wake of the rebellion. Life Magazine, in its December 4, 
1964 issue, ran the words “Congo Martyr” over a cover image of an American medical doctor 
                                               
419 “Comment Sauver l’écolier Congolais?,” Vivant Afrique: Revue Générale Des Missions d’Afrique, October 1965. 
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and missionary named Paul Carlson. Carlson became a cause célèbre in the United States after 
he was killed by Simba in Kisangani in November, 1964. 420  
On the Life Magazine cover Carlson looks jovial, surrounded by Africans, holding hands 
with a child. He wears khaki shorts and polo shirt. He appears both of and outside of the group. 
The depiction of the missionary doctor evokes contemporaneously produced oil paintings of 
Christ among children. The cover image and narrative behind it was managed Henri Luce, the 
publisher of Life Magazine and the child of Protestant missionaries. Luce grew up in China. His 
family were present when partisans of the Yihetuan Movement killed about 200 American 
missionaries. Henry Luce, though committed to his faith, sought to present American 
missionaries like Carlson as martyrs in Congo for more than just the gospel.421 They were Cold 
Warriors as well as Christian soldiers. Luce saw figures like Carlson as “bulwarks of Christian 
democracy” and their death a sacrifice for both faith and polis.422 From different, even mirrored 
ideological perspectives, both Luce and Gaston Soumialot drew on a similarly mix of religious 
fervor and Cold War ideologies to shape their views. Both sides saw the conflict as 
foundationally a “holy war,” but imagined the sacred and the profane in radically different, 
profoundly antagonistic ways.   
  Life Magazine’s Carlson cover was only one item in a voluminous genre of Protestant 
“death talk” which emerged after the events of 1964. Missions to Congo was long linked, in the 
Protestant imaginary, to death. Missionaries were apocryphally said to have literally packed their 
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possessions bound for Congo in their future coffins.423 Yet in 1964 some did lose their lives. At 
least 159 expatriate missionaries were killed by Simba between June and December.424 The most 
heavily affected Protestant mission agency, the Unevangelized Fields Mission (UFM), lost 
nineteen of their missionaries, including six children.425 Among these was a man named J W 
Tucker.  
J W “Jay” Tucker,426 became subject of a posthumous biography, He is in Heaven, 
penned by his wife. The text is emblematic of a genre of literature around missionary death that 
emerged after 1964 and provides a view on the kind of death discourses that animated a 
confluence of Protestant theology and Cold War politics in the mid-1960s.427 Jay’s story well 
captures the themes of the genre.  
While a teenager in Alabama, J W felt he was called by God to go to Congo. He 
reportedly told his family that “Without ever having seen the land, I love it. I want to live there 
and I want to die there and be buried there.”428 Like the leaders of the Simba Rebellion, 
                                               
423 This claim was repeated in multiple interviews in Congo, and I found one source of this claim in a book on Christian 
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424 J. Anthony Lukas, “Death of 30 More in Congo Feared,” The New York Times, December 21, 1964. 
 
425 McMillan, “1964 Remembered: The Congo Simba Rebellion, Then and Now.” A history of UFM involvement in eastern 
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Carlons “last, lonely journey to the Ubangi.” Simba rebels, “supercharged by the taste of blood” were spreading destruction. 
 
428 Angeline Tucker, He Is in Heaven (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), p 22. 
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martyrdom was not just a possible consequence of Tucker’s commitments, it was ultimately the 
telos of the work. It signified total commitment.  
Years later, while fulfilling his dream to serve in Congo, Tucker met a single American 
missionary named Angeline in Watsa, northeastern Congo. United by their common fervor for 
missions in central Africa, they married.  Whatever Henry Luce and the CNL leadership may 
have believed, for Angeline Tucker missions was utterly apolitical. “Missionaries everywhere 
are prohibited from talking politics with the natives of the country in which they serve, and we 
were no exception.” She claims that for the nearly twenty years the Tuckers lived in Congo the 
subject of politics, and particularly independence, simply “never arose.”429 “We had heard no 
talk of independence up to the time we left for our 1958 furlough. As far as we could judge, the 
people of northeast Congo were perfectly satisfied with the status quo…The leaders [in the 
cities] may have thought about it, but the community was in the process of transformation from a 
town to a city, and politics was then, I’m sure, a secondary consideration. Everyone was too busy 
with his own affairs.”430 
 Lumumba’s rhetoric was thus startling to the Tuckers. If the authors of The Martyr 
beatified Lumumba, missionaries demonized him. Jay suggested to his wife that “Lumumba 
might well be the most dangerous man in Africa.”431 They reported that Lumumba’s MNC 
activists tricked naïve villagers into joining his party by promising they could “take [a party 
registration] card to any mission and you will be baptized. All you have to do is show it.”432 
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Angeline was convinced the rebels enjoyed no popular support outside of cities, and certainly not 
in Paulis (now Isiro) where they lived. Nonetheless, on August 19, 1964 the Simba came for the 
Tuckers.  
 The American family was bewildered by the Simba. Particularly perplexing were the 
règlements, described in the previous chapter: the dress and eating codes, the refusal of the 
Simba to steal or make any physical contact with anyone outside the movement. “The strictest 
vow was the one about not touching women,” Angeline wrote. Nor would they eat food prepared 
by a woman. It seemed to Angeline that all “vegetables were taboo.”433 She explained that the 
dawa was likely a narcotic substance: “When it took effect it could drive a man crazy, giving 
him an almost uncontrollable urge to kill and a conviction that if he followed instructions 
nothing could kill him.”434  According to the Tuckers, Simba units consisted of bands of “little 
boys.” Under house arrest, their jailors were “two dirty, ragged little simbas [sic] named Motuba 
and Ngonde… Motuba was eleven and Ngonde twelve.”435 When the Simba took Jay into 
detention, Angeline expressed shock that the commandant was “not much older than Johnny,” 
their fifteen-year-old son. At the time Jay was taken, there were no reports of whites being killed, 
but the Simba were decimating local elites, killing the governor of Uele province, among others, 
and Congolese Catholic priests.436  
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 Some weeks later, during the event in which Paul Carlson was killed, JW Tucker also 
died at the hands of Simba. Informing Angeline of his death, a colleague told her: “May God 
comfort your heart to know he was ready to die.”437 She found consolation in the Book of John, 
chapter 12. “Verily, verily, I say unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it 
abideth alone: but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit. He that loveth his life shall lose it, and he 
that hateth his life in this world shall keep in unto life eternal.”438 Angeline read the passage over 
and over with her children until they felt “so warmed by the presence of the Holy Spirit that He 
seemed to be in that very room us.”439 She wrote that she found herself consumed by an 
overwhelming desire for her own martyrdom, and that of her children, praying: “Oh, Lord, now 
that Jay’s gone it would be so much easier if you’d just let them come and kill us all.”440 The 
fervor of her commitment to the celestial power of martyrdom trumped all other of Angeline’s 
most intense filial, material and worldly convictions and responsibilities.  
 Angeline ultimately rejoiced in her husband’s death, writing “Many years before, he had 
told his sister that his dearest wish was to live and die in Africa. By the grace of God, that wish 
was granted, for which all of us who knew and loved Jay are deeply grateful.”441 The book 
closed with a quote, “He worked hard and served His Master well. He has fought a good fight, he 
has finished his course, he has kept the faith. Now there is laud up for him a crown—a martyr’s 
crown.”442 
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 Jay’s family shared Angeline’s pride in his sacrifice. His brother, C M told the New York 
Times that ultimate commitment “was just his life, that’s all.” C M, however, evoked Henry 
Luce’s framework to further interpret the sacrifice of his brother and the other “Congo Martyrs.” 
“We had all the reason in the world to be proud of him… He told us there was quite a bit of 
conflict in the Congo. He said it was infiltrated, influenced, conspired and financed by 
Communists.”443 Symbolically, C M sought to frame Jay’s death as an event where an American 
Christian defender of democracy was brutally murdered by communist, anti-Christian soldiers. 
Despite the Tucker’s insistence on their apoliticality, and their claim that their Congolese 
colleagues lacked any interest in politics, C M suggested that perhaps Jay died for more than the 
Gospel and may have also given his life to for the sake of American values in the Cold War.  
Like C M and Henry Luce, many heartland American Protestants found this “logic of 
martyrdom” highly compelling. The specter of nuclear war and impending existential conflict 
between democracy and communism begat its own form of millenarian nationalism in the United 
States. Church leaders like Billy Graham saw that linking anti-communism and evangelism, 
argues Jeremy Rich, could bridge cultural divides between fundamentalists and mainline 
Protestants in the United States. Congo thus became a target for anti-communist Protestant 
crusades. In this framework the “Congo Martyrs” became powerful frontline casualties who 
could inspire common cause and commitment of the faithful in the USA.  
Missionaries in post-Simba Congo were well aware of these dynamics. Alexander Reid, a 
Protestant missionary from Kentucky, struggled to understand why many young people from the 
mission he managed in the late 1950s in Tetela-speaking zones of eastern Congo became fervent 
                                               
443 “Family Proud of Missionary Who Gave His Life in Congo,” New York Times, 27 November, 1964 p 12.  
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Simba in 1964. His conclusion was that the core problem was “extreme liberal minded 
missionaries” who poured “cold water on the evangelistic fires” that could have stopped the 
Simba by changing their hearts.444 The ranks of the Simba, Reid argued, were “two-thirds 
occupied by Chinese Communism.” The solution was thus twofold: spread the gospels of 
democracy and Christianity at the same time.  
 
Death Talk in Postcolonial Congo 
These formulations of meaningful death propounded in The Martyr, Africa Alive and in 
Protestant missionary hagiography found little audience within Congo. Though sharing a 
common lexicon of martyrdom and the political power of ideology, these discourses were linked 
almost exclusively to transnational debates about the future of the world animated by the 
seemingly existential stakes of Cold War conflict. Yet these debates were influential in global 
engagement in the Congo. Protestant passions for saving the Congo spurred interest and 
engagement in the region by the US government—already inclined to intervene due Soviet 
engagement in central Africa. Catholic missionary efforts redoubled and helped frame the 
coming era of non-government directed development that still frames much of Congo’s economy 
and education system today. The strains of martyr valorization and the celebration of 
Lumumba’s death in particular are still part of the Congolese everyday.   
Despite the social distance between these domains of debate occurring at the 
transnational level and within daily life in Congo, “death talk” has become a critical part of 
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Congolese political discourse. Death has come to frame the marking of time itself and signifies 
the ultimate index of political commitment. 
The national calendar itself is grounded by martyrdom memories. January, in particular, 
marks an unusual density of politically important fatalities. On January 4, 1959 massive riots 
struck Leopoldville after a key pro-independence group, ABAKO,445 was prevented from 
gathering by the colonial government.446 Ensuing suppression caused, according to the state, 
forty-nine deaths—likely an underestimate.447 January 4 has since become a national holiday 
called “Martyrs of Independence Day,” first observed in 1965. On January 17, 1961 Patrice 
Lumumba was assassinated in the secessionist Katanga province. January 17 is also a nationally 
observed holiday, called colloquially “Martyrs Day.”448 Almost exactly forty years later, on 
January 16, 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated in his presidential residence, Marbre, by a 
sixteen-year-old member of his guard, Corporal Rachidi Kasereka.449 January 16 is also a 
national holiday commemorating his death. Each calendar year begins with this season of 
reflection on the political significance of the deceased. Martyrdom in Congolese public life is 
personified and temporalized. 
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Postcolonial Congo is rife with the necropolitical—not as a question of sovereignty, or 
the “living dead,” as in Achille Mbembe’s work—but rather by profusions of “death talk” in 
public life.450 For decades after the Simba rebellion the focus remained on debate over the 
relative political significance, and morality, of the dead. This talk takes place at bars and across 
dinner tables throughout Congo, but, as in 1964, death talk about Congo finds space in other 
scales and spaces in world.  
Recently, much of this is due to with the recurring and spectacular, almost surreal, body 
counts of Congo’s history. The raw numbers shadow and sometime threaten to overwhelm 
Congo’s historiography.451 Millions followed what Joseph Miller called the “way of death” from 
what is now Congo and Angola’s Atlantic coast zone during the slave trade,452 millions more 
died during the Red Rubber period,453 tens of thousands during the Congo Crisis (1960-1965),454 
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and perhaps three to five million during the Congo Wars (1996-2003).455 Voluminous, copious, 
egregious death is the most persistent leitmotif in histories and narratives of Congo.456  
In postcolonial Congo, however, it is not the raw statistics of “bare death”—the 
biological transition of dying itself—that is the subject of conversation. The concern is with the 
quality of the passing, over whether the death was meaningful. At core, again, is martyrdom.457 
Necropolitical debates in Congo persist in the lines established in the post-Simba era. Much talk 
circulates around the “logic of martyrdom,” or what meanings can be made of all this death.458 If 
scholarship on Congo often focuses on the magnitude and causes of killing, public debate in 
Congo is more concerned with the manner and morality of kinds of dying. Where Mbembe 
writes that his study of the necropolitical concerns a “semiosis of killing,” this chapter closes 
with more on the semiotics of ways of dying.459 
 
Martyrs, Rebels, and Time 
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Martyrs are most often produced by the creative writing of their followers. Their martyrdom 
serves to help constitute a community—to inspire and unite the faithful. Figures like Sister 
Marie-Clémentine Anuarite Nengapeta, for example, was beatified by Catholic church so that 
others might bear witness to a woman who gave her life for her commitments to the gospel. She 
was remembered because she “gave final proof of the seriousness of [her] confessional 
witness.”460 Sister Nengapeta’s reward was to be placed into deep genealogy of ultimate 
commitment to eternal values and ideals by bureaucracies of veneration in the church. 
Other martyrs fashion their own martyrdom, hoping their logic of sacrifice will be taken 
up by followers in the future. The object, manner, and framework of their death is shaped in 
advance of their passing. The actual act of dying serves as the ultimate attempt to define the 
meaning and purpose of their lives. Theirs is an aspirational martyrdom, invoking the semiotics 
of self-negation for a common good. These martyrs use public record to insert themselves into 
future interpretations of their existential choices. JW Tucker stated his martyrdom aspirations to 
family and friends as a young man. Gaston Soumialot published an entire periodical to make the 
political case for the power of rebel death. To make oneself a martyr requires great commitment 
but also strong planning and intention, most obviously in the form of making temporal and moral 
claims about one’s future death. Martyrs are not simply, as Mbembe argues, possessed with an 
overwhelming “desire for eternity.”461 The presumptive martyr is most interested in the problems 
of reality, the urgencies of the present, or the world of the very near future. They are concerned 
about immediate impact.462   
                                               
460 Bärbel Beinhauer-Köhler et al., “Martyr,” April 1, 2011, in Brill's Dictionary of Christianity, p 30. 
 
461 Mbembé and Meintjes, “Necropolitics.” 
 
462 Martyr” comes from the Greek word µαρτυς [martus], meaning “witness.” It is about death as an act of witnessing, and about 
death being witnessed and proclaimed. In addition to personal intention, a key part of “being witnessed” as a martyr requires 
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 Though the focus of this chapter is on three martyrdom strategies by actors operating in a 
Cold War framework, it is essential to try and locate the boundaries of these valorizations of 
death. To what audiences would attempts to politicize death founder and lose meaning? Certainly 
Simba warriors were largely unaware of such debates. Most of the many thousands who died in 
Congo during the First Republic (1960-1965) neither framed their future deaths within a register 
of martyrdom, nor did kith and kin attempt to retroactively assert that claim. The vicissitudes of 
the mai medicine made other totalizing frameworks of power, such as martyrdom, difficult to 
integrate. While death was a constant preoccupation for Simba soldiers, the goal was to negate 
the power of death through the force of the medicine, not to hope for retrospective political 
approval of ones passing. Mai did not give meaning to the act of dying, it denied the power of 
death over the body. The medicine was not about the liberation of the individual, but the 
transformation of the social. Though intended to affect groups of people bound together and kin, 
mai fundamentally operated within the narrowest of temporal horizons, enabling the wielder to 
exist in the precarity of a violent moment. Mai did not persist. It needed to applied continually. It 
would validate an individual’s commitment and discipline every time it was needed. Mai’s innate 
ephemerality resisted attempts to project its power into the future or the past—to politicize its 
capabilities. Those who died under the mai were found wanting by the medicine. They were not 
heroes, they were failures. They transgressed the règlements and bore the consequences. Glory 
was only for the survivors. The logics of mai and discourses of martyrdom operated with 
fundamentally incompatible modes of meaning-making around death.  
The poem penned by the Congolese Catholic women’s offers a more direct critique of 
martyrdom narratives. It engages the core values of the martyrdom frameworks head-on. In 
                                               
making compelling claims about the motives of one’s killers. Martyr narratives make clear that the act of killing a martyr 
automatically negates the legitimacy of the killers claims to morality. The martyr must be construed as essentially innocent. 
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choosing to “cry for our children who died for nothing” in 1964 these women actively refused 
attempts to apply political or religious significance to death. If, in their respective domains, 
Gaston Soumialot and his colleagues painted rebel death as heroic, and Christians sought 
redemption for death in an inspired church and in the kingdom of heaven, the Congolese Mothers 
refused the very premise of the debate. Making meaning out of the death of children was not 
possible. The quashing out of countless possible futures, of responsibility and reciprocity, made 
any attempt at the politicization of their progeny’s death an unacceptable attempt to mediate the 
futility of loss. In choosing to mourn, in committing only to lament, these women offered the 
most radical critique to the political and religious work others busily pursued.  These women 
refused, in their grief, to resolve the fundamentally “enigmatic” nature of “losing what we cannot 
fully fathom,” as Judith Butler suggests. 463 In so doing they evaded the constraints of 
proliferating martyrdom discourse and found possibility in an embrace of brokenness.  
A focus on martyrdom discourses allows this chapter to examine one facet of the memory 
of the Simba rebellion—one with an enduring presence in Congolese public life. It traces the 
afterlives of the rebellion in attempts to make meaning of death in political and religious 
domains. It also marks a return to multiple, shifting scales of discourse and practice. It examines 
a moment where, at the global scale, Congo’s Simba rebels and their causalities were important 
international subjects, dominating conversation in the press, at the Vatican, in Washington, and 
among Protestant missions organizations. The language of martyrdom became one of the few 
registers of meaning-making shared by actors on all sides, and at many scales, around the 
rebellion. It allowed for a common conversation about the costs and possibilities of the war. 
 
                                               
463 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (Verso, 2006), 22. 
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Conclusion: A Nation of Martyrs 
“Death talk” did not find its apotheosis during post-1964 period. If anything, death talk in Congo 
is more vociferous today than ever before. Didier Gondola, in his History of Congo, argues that 
by 1990 Cold War backers of Mobutu’s regime “could no longer ignore the martyrdom of 
millions of Zairian people” and began to abandon the aging dictator.464 Gondola infers that every 
death, for any reason, in Mobutu’s Zaire was an act of martyrdom. This argument suggests that 
the martyrdom discourses this chapter sought to trace continue to hold power in political debate. 
That an entire people could be martyrs by virtue of their citizenship pushes the possibilities of 
the “logic of martyrdom” to its limit.465  
Gondola’s claim joins a roaring babble of “death talk,” brimming with competing “logics 
of martyrdom,” that circulate throughout Congo today. The once vibrant specters of neo-
colonialism and totalitarianism lost definition when Congo’s primary belligerents became its 
neighbors and those in power appear perpetually on the brink of losing control. Returning to 
Schmitt, such conditions often prove fecund ground for partisans ready to engage yet another 
martyrdom narrative. The question remains: who bears the weight of framing death as sacrifice 
and constructing both the identity and culpability of persecutors? Given the morass of 
contemporary Congo’s political landscape, it becomes difficult to distil clear belligerents and 
provide meaning and purpose behind all violent death.  
                                               
464 Ch Didier Gondola, The History of Congo (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), pg 152.  
465 One can muse about what such population scale martyrdom might be called perhaps “genomartyrdom” or 
“necronationalism?” 
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Filip de Boeck argues that “death has become so omnipresent… in Congo as a whole, 
that the labor of loss and mourning has ceased to be meaningful.”466 This chapter argues the 
opposite. Tremendous creative work, much breath and oceans of ink, are committed to the 
political and ideological work needed to insert meaning into death. De Boeck is not entirely 
wrong, however. A fatigued refusal to find meaning in loss and mourning also finds roots in the 
response of many Congolese to the scale and pace of death in the 1964 rebellion. Yet, much of 
the “omnipresent” death talk that de Boeck finds in Congo is linked to martyr registers. These 
are continually deployed by and for figures seeking to cast meaning in the shadow of death. Acts 
of radical self-negation and ultimate commitment to new, imaginary social worlds continues as 
well. Martyr narratives emerge again and again as militia groups make commitments to die for 
their country, cause, or patron. Pentecostal martyrdom stories surge in Congo’s urban spaces, 
inspiring youth to imagine forms of social renewal that demand ultimate personal sacrifice.467  
Lament, and the possibilities afforded by refusing to find meaning in death, stubbornly persist as 
well.    
                                               
466 Filip De Boeck, “The Apocalyptic Interlude: Revealing Death in Kinshasa,” African Studies Review 48, no. 2 (September 30, 
2005): p 13. 
 
467 Ibid, p 26-27. 
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Chapter Seven: “A Cannibalistic Entity:”468 Consumption, Morality, and the UN 
Stabilization Industry 
 
Children play. They thread the gaps between tight clusters of houses in dusty 
neighborhoods, absorbed until dark in endless games of their own devising. This play demands 
relentless negotiations over ever-changing rules. Voices rise to shout and tease. For those that 
cannot keep up one insult predominates: “MONUC! MONUC!” For the residents of Beni, a town 
in the North Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the acronym is obsolete but 
the meaning is clear. Being “MONUC,” a catchall for United Nations peacekeeping personnel, 
means being the odd one out, the child not playing the game in the right way. Beyond these dusty 
makeshift playgrounds—in the markets, bars, and churches of Beni—the insult resonates. While 
massively, even overwhelmingly, present in the community, personnel of the United Nations 
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, known by its French 
acronym MONUSCO, are often accused of playing by their own secret rules. UN agents do not 
seem to comprehend the basic social expectations that govern morality and neighborliness in 
communities they have occupied for over sixteen years. Beyond deficiencies in political 
maneuvering and military strategy, a slow boil crisis of relationality is making MONUSCO’s 
piecemeal engagement in eastern Congo increasingly untenable. This chapter traces how an 
                                               
468 This quote comes from Martin Kobler, the head of the UN Mission in Congo, in August of 2013 where he fought claims 
made by Beni’s residents that peacekeepers were eating local residents. The article suggests residents of Beni called the UN a 
“entité de cannibalisme.” See “Beni: Martin Kobler Dément Les Allégations de Cannibalisme Portées Contre Des Casques 
Bleus.” November 11, 2013. Radio Okapi. http://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/11/28/beni-martin-kobler-dement-les-
allegations-de-cannibalisme-portees-contre-des-casques-bleus. 
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irruptive claim of cannibalism in April, 2014 laid bare the persistent, historically-derived 
tensions that trouble relations between members of the Beni community and the UN personnel 
that inhabit their city. These incommensurabilities are perhaps most fraught when it comes to 
UN engagements with contemporary warriors in eastern Congo who using the kinds of mai 
medicines this dissertation traces.  
In 1999 the U.N. Security Council approved resolution 1279, establishing in Congo what 
is now the most extensive and expensive peacekeeping mission in UN history.469 Operational 
costs are nearly 4 million dollars per day.470 26,934 personnel, including over 18,000 uniformed 
peacekeepers, currently occupy Congolese soil. Since 2013, special operatives work under a 
uniquely “robust” mandate that calls for “peace enforcement” through “neutralizing” rebel 
groups under the auspices of a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB).471 The derogation of the FIB’s 
preemptive violence, however, seems to pose a direct challenge to basic precepts of the United 
Nations charter.472 Against objections voiced by member states to this unprecedented mandate, 
the “endless crisis” of Congo’s history was used to justify the FIB’s exceptionality.473 As the 
brigade eliminates those deemed antithetical to stability, a kind of supranational “commissarial 
dictatorship” unfolds, where international “law is temporarily suspended in order that it might 
ultimately be implemented.”474 MONUSCO’s attempt to restore the rule of law in Congo now 
                                               
469 MONUSCO was originally called MONUC: the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Its initial mandate was concerned largely with observation and monitoring ceasefire activities. 
 
470 Approved budget (07/2014 – 06/2015): $1,398,475,300 see UN publication number A/C.5/69/17. 
 
471 “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo.” 2015. S/2015/486. MONUSCO.  
 
472 Particularly by stipulations outlined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter concerning military participation with Member States.  
 
473 The term used in Rene Lemarchand. 2011. The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. University of Pennsylvania Press. 
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paradoxically requires neither serious external oversight nor a diligent application of Congolese 
government participation and authorization.475  
Despite this uniquely capacious mandate and tremendous cost in blood and money, the 
MONUSCO project can claim limited success. Billions are spent, thousands of soldiers 
deployed, and legions of global technical experts engaged; meanwhile rampant insecurity 
plagues the Kivu provinces, the epicenter of UN activities. The Congolese national army 
(FARDC) grapples with violent internal factionalism, new rebel movements coalesce, and long 
established militias splinter, take new forms, and forge troubling alliances.476 In the face of 
evidence of sustained failure, MONUSCO resolutely articulates its purpose as the “protection of 
civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical 
violence and to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation 
efforts.” Thus, in spite of surging violence in the east, government suppression of pro-democracy 
activism in Kinshasa, and nationwide political instability, MONUSCO leaders recently 
congratulated themselves for their “active engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 
service of peace.”477 For many in the town of Beni,  host to four large UN military encampments 
and a regional airbase, these celebratory sentiments sharply rankle, and the phrase “active 
engagement” carries with it potentially nefarious implications.  
                                               
474 Giorgio Agamben. 2008. State of Exception. University of Chicago Press. p 33. The category of “commissarial dictatorship” 
is Agamben’s elaboration of a concept he takes from Carl Schmitt. 
 
475 For a defense of the FIB, see Marget Mutisi’s analysis of this project at the Social Science Research Council’s Kujena Amani 
blog: http://forums.ssrc.org/kujenga-amani/2015/07/26/redefining-peacekeeping-the-force-intervention-brigade-in-the-
democratic-republic-of-congo/#.VmHyAt-rSRs 
 
476 Verweuen, Judith, and Calude Iguma Wakenge. 2015. “Understanding Armed Group Proliferation in the Eastern Congo.” 
Political Settlements Research Programme. Rift Valley Institute, p 30. 
 
477 “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo.” 2015. S/2015/486. MONUSCO. 
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Industrial Aid 
Few in Beni are reading UN press releases. MONUSCO’s self-fashioned profile does not emerge 
in local discourse around the UN’s role in eastern Congo. Their texts are displaced by more 
irruptive sensory experiences for most Beniciens. These include the continual rumble of UN 
trucks trundling over eviscerated roads to deliver imported food, water, and coffee to 
MONUSCO personnel. The squeals and sighs of these trucks play in incongruous harmony with 
the low, incessant drone of diesel generators providing 24 hours of electricity to UN bases in a 
context where less than seven percent of people have access to any form of power. In large 
swaths of town high walls securing MONUSCO’s international staff rise above the urban 
landscape and enclose three large UN bases, the offices of UNICEF, UNOCHA, World Food 
Program, UNDP, UNHCR and numerous other UN agencies. These red brick edifices do more 
than simply secure personnel: they obscure the quotidian practices and activities of an 
unknowable parallel population. Severine Autessere’s description of these NGO spaces as 
“fortified bubbles” is apt.478 It misleads only in that it implies a transparent membrane. Even 
more accurate might be to imagine the walls as occluded one-way glass, simultaneously 
concealing the inner workings of MONUSCO’s operations while heavy gates and watch towers 
functions as apertures for the observation of the people of Beni.  
From behind the veil various technical staff emerge: circulating through town in NGO-
branded vehicles as they interpellate the people of Beni into a population—calling them into 
                                               
478 Autessere, Severine. 2015. “Trouble in Peaceland.” Foreign Policy. October 6.  
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being as a subject for developmental intervention.479 The demographic techniques deployed to 
produce a portrait of this population are often profoundly intimate. Surveys and observations 
probe the most private domains of life: sexual habits and transgressions,480 childcare and 
abuse,481 and the vagaries of extreme poverty and disease.482 Beni, and many communities like it, 
is a “development laboratory” for humanitarian experimentation: the people both control and 
variable.483  
The epistemological approach most in vogue in contemporary development is not 
command of local history or mastery of vernacular language, such as was prized by international 
agents in the imperial age, but rather “thematic expertise” exercised by short-term technocrats.484 
Aggregating and acting on relevant themes is necessary if an entity wishes to demonstrate 
“optimal development” strategies—i.e. ones most likely to be funded by groups like the World 
Bank— that are socially “equitable and environmentally sustainable” while touching on 
“multiple sectors.”485 A compelling single development project must now claim the capacity to 
                                               
479 Borrowing from Althusser, the subject of development is called into being as they are hailed as such and recognize 
themselves as being the ones addressed: this being the act of interpellation. Althusser, Louis. 2001. Lenin and Philosophy and 
Other Essays. NYU Press. 
 
480 For instance: Jocelyn Kelly, Justin Kabanga, Will Cragin, Lys Alcayna-Stevens, Sadia Haider, and Michael J. Vanrooyen. 
2012. “‘If Your Husband Doesn’t Humiliate You, Other People Won’t’: Gendered Attitudes Towards Sexual Violence in Eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo.” Global Public Health 7 (3): 285–98.  
 
481 For instance, Malemo Kalisya, Luc, Paluku Lussy Justin, Christophe Kimona, Kavira Nyavandu, Kamabu Mukekulu 
Eugenie, Kasereka Muhindo Lusi Jonathan, Kasereka Masumbuko Claude, and Michael Hawkes. 2011. “Sexual Violence 
Toward Children and Youth in War-Torn Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.” PLoS ONE 6 (1): e15911. 
 
482 At the forefront are Norwegian Refugee Council, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, the McCain Institute, and Solidarités in 
Beni.  
 
483 Tilley, Helen. 2011. Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge, 1870-
1950. University of Chicago Press. In particular chapter 2.  
 
484 Autesserre, Séverine. 2014. Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention. 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
485 See for example the cited World Bank project in Brazil that received over 700 million dollars of funding called “SWAp for 
Parana Multisector Development Project” where these themes are articulated.   
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simultaneously intervene in domains such as “general public administration, general agriculture, 
fishing, forestry, health, sub-national government administration, general education, 
environmental management, education for all, health system performance, managing for 
development results, and administrative and civil service reform.”486 The burden of proving the 
success of a high-impact multi-sector projects requires intensive data gathering activities to, at a 
minimum, establish an initial baseline and demonstrate the purported efficacy of the 
interventions.   
The results of such data gathering are not encouraging. Despite decades of multi-billion-
dollar interventions, the lives of people in the region are increasingly less secure, less stable, and 
less prosperous. At the same time the MONUSCO enclaves from which much of this information 
is generated are further entrenched with funding from seemingly unending reserves of 
development resources. In relative terms, these comprise islands of extreme wealth in tantalizing 
proximity to sites of desperate poverty. Food, equipment, expertise, power, data, water, and 
salaries move behind MONUSCO’s veil of security and privacy in Beni. Among community 
members angry, persistent questions recur concerning what, exactly, UN personnel are doing and 
why their work is so egregiously expensive when compared to the experience of others living in 
a region ranked by the UN’s own Human Development Index as among the “least developed” on 
earth.487  
                                               
 
486 Ibid.  
 
487 United Nations Development Programme. 2014. Human Development Report 2014: Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing 
Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience. United Nations Publications. 
 
 205 
Throughout Beni’s sprawling neighborhoods, raucous clubs like Le Bourgeoisie, and 
often even more raucous churches such as the Audacious Gospel International,488 much debate 
revolves around comprehending this paradox of a massive, and massively expensive, UN 
presence against a long, inexorable decline in local security and prosperity. One obvious 
explanation predominates: UN personnel are not interested in peace in Congo, quite the opposite. 
They profit on Congo’s instability as agents of consumption, not protection. MONUSCO’s 
operatives, like so many others in the past and present, are outsiders “eating” Congo’s wealth, 
leaving nothing for local people.489 This framing fits neatly within the vernacular historical 
imagination of Congo, as documented in locally produced documentary films available on cheap 
videodiscs. This narrative suggests that Congo’s riches of rubber, copper, uranium, diamonds, 
coltan, and gold have long drawn rapacious predators. MONUSCO are simply taking their place 
at the end of a line of opportunists. They have mastered the art of manipulating what is now 
eastern Congo’s most abundant commodity: suffering—both materially experienced and 
discursively constructed. This framing is shared by some development workers themselves; one 
told me in a moment of startling (perhaps ironic) candor that his USAID contract would be 
renewed because he was “in the business of human suffering and, in Congo, business is very 
good.”490  
                                               
488 An example of the “eglises de reveil” described by Filip de Boeck, 2011. “Inhabiting Ocular Ground: Kinshasa’s Future in 
the Light of Congo’s Spectral Urban Politics.” Cultural Anthropology 26 (2): 263–86. 
 
489 Theodore Trefon. 2004. Reinventing Order in the Congo: How People Respond to State Failure in Kinshasa. Zed Books. See 
the section on “eating” specifically page 14. 
 
490 This was communicated to me in this words by an American security officer for one of the largest multi-sector relief projects 
taking place in eastern Congo in 2015.  
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Scholars like Jean Francois Bayart centralize eating as a foundational political metaphor 
for corruption and rent seeking behaviors.491 The UN’s “eating” of misery can be placed within 
this domain. Anger towards MONUSCO marks the outlines of what Raymond Williams calls a 
“structure of feeling”—a “nexus of social relations and experiences”—present in the 
contemporary community of Beni, engaged and entangled with developmentalist “official 
consciousness” represented by the acts and speech of MONUSCO and its partners.492 This 
structure of feeling exists in contradistinction with, even as it is partly constituted by, the 
presence of a developmental orthodoxy endorsed by multiple third sector actors.  
 
Peacekeepers and Cannibals 
Consider the following account. One morning in late April of 2014, UN peacekeepers arrived 
unexpectedly at a small banana farm just outside the city of Beni. Already present were two 
people: an older woman and her 5-year-old granddaughter, tending the trees and harvesting ready 
fruit. The peacekeepers were in full uniform: armed and equipped for patrol. Nothing could be 
communicated between the soldiers and the civilians as most UN troops speak neither French nor 
Swahili, the lingua francae of Beni territory.493 The granddaughter was some distance away 
when the soldiers arrived, so began walking toward her grandmother to see why the troops were 
there. As she passed behind a stand of trees, she heard a scream, then her grandmother’s 
panicked voice shouting, “They are killing me!” Hearing this the girl raced into the forest to 
                                               
491 Bayart, Jean-François. The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly. Polity, 2009. 
 
492 Williams, Raymond. 1977. Marxism and Literature. Oxford University Press. See p. 130, though I share Mitchum Huehms 
critique found in his review essay in Contemporary Literature 51, 2 “Structures of Feeling: Or, How to Do Things (or Not) with 
Books” (2010) critique of these as being “imprecise and provisional” by virtue of the fact that they are unfolding in the present.  
 
493 Autesserre, Séverine. 2014. Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention. 
Cambridge University Press. 
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hide. From the shelter of the bush she watched uniformed UN personnel carry the wounded 
woman into a marked white Land Cruiser Prado and drive toward town. The girl knew 
immediately what was going to happen to her grandmother: she was to be eaten.  
 The hysterical granddaughter shared this story, or a version of it, hours later in the main 
commons near the mayor’s office in the center of town. The report of her startling testimony 
came to me by radio trottoir (pavement radio) from multiple sources within hours of her 
telling.494 Friends stopped by throughout the day, breathlessly adding some new detail, disputing 
some fact, and analyzing the story with whomever happened to be there. Some claimed to be part 
of the crowd that gathered as the young girl screamed to anyone who would listen that her 
grandmother was taken. Most championed her call for an audience with the mayor, the only 
individual perceived to have the power to force the UN to return the grandmother. Towards the 
end of the day a number of motorcycle taxi-men drove to the UN’s Nepalese Battalion base three 
kilometers away from town center—the purported location of the kidnapped woman—to force 
her release. The motards threw rocks at the bristling guard towers and the huge blue metal gate. 
Local police arrived to disperse the crowd. Shots were fired into the air and the riot dissipated.  
Later that evening the grandmother was found to be a patient at a local hospital. UN 
spokespeople reported that while on patrol les casques bleu saw the woman chop down a banana 
tree that then accidentally fell on her, so they took her to a hospital for treatment.  This story 
convinced few. For my interlocutors the ultimate safety of the grandmother was never the UN 
soldiers’ goal. Her eventual reappearance was interpreted as a desperate ruse when the plot was 
uncovered. The UN soldiers, they intimated, were planning to eat the women until the riot broke 
                                               
494 See Stephen Ellis and Gerrie ter Haar. 2004. Worlds of Power: Religious Thought and Political Practice in Africa. Oxford 
University Press for a summary of the literature on Radio Trottoir especially page 39. Radio trottoir can be summarized as 
publically performed rumor network.  
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out. The soldiers only unveiled the old woman to protect themselves from community ire. The 
granddaughter saved her grandmothers life by marshalling the community against the would-be 
cannibals in uniform.  
To my friends the suggestion that MONUSCO agents might kidnap a woman in broad 
daylight with the intention of eating her was not difficult to believe. Whatever obscure motives 
compelled such desires could be placed on the continuum of MONUSCO’s apparatuses of 
concealment and consumptive excess. No longer content to literally capitalize on Congolese 
suffering during war and violence, it was seen as reasonable that peacekeepers would finally be 
feasting on the physical flesh of their charges. Shades of stories of the public consumption of a 
Simba warrior’s body by a state official, some fifty years prior, recurred.  
Indeed, these kinds of claims are not new. Accusations of cannibalism have a deep 
genealogy in Congo, long before the Simba rebellion. Congo was a nexus for the trope of jungle 
peoples eating fellow humans, particularly in the remote northeast, where MONUSCO’s 
operations are targeted today. Cannibalism became a generic hallmark in travelogues of 
precolonial Congo. Henry Morton Stanley’s account of travel in Congo, Through the Dark 
Continent, is so replete with tales of “running the gauntlet through cannibal lands” that it 
functions as something of a motif in the work.495 Cannibalism was then reportedly used by 
concessionary forces as a tactic against resistant communities during the Red Rubber period.496  
                                               
495 Stanley was an agent for King Leopold II’s International African Association in Congo, and his account was used to provide 
one justification for colonial intervention in the region. From Henry Morton Stanley. Through the Dark Continent: Or, The 
Sources of the Nile Around the Great Lakes of Equatorial Africa, and Down the Livingstone River to the Atlantic Ocean. Harper 
& Brothers, 1878. 
 
496 Hunt, Nancy Rose. “An Acoustic Register, Tenacious Images, and Congolese Scenes of Rape and Repetition.” Cultural 
Anthropology 23, no. 2 (May 1, 2008): 239. 
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In 1909, military officials in northeastern Congo maintained that their outposts were “surrounded 
by cannibals.”497  
This fixation became enmeshed in the popular imagination of the region. Tintin au Congo 
for instance, by famous Belgian comic artist Hergé, is rife with what Nancy Rose Hunt identified 
as a trope of “ribald cannibal humor.”498 Western missionaries to Congo also participated in this 
form of humor. Some sent images of themselves sitting in cooking pots surrounded by their 
Congolese colleagues to family in the United States and Europe.499 Others framed cannibalism as 
an example of the most forms of spiritual degradation, evidence of the tremendous need for the 
gospel. Missionaries with the Congo Balolo mission in 1905 sent a newsletter to supporters in 
the United States inviting them to “think of the centuries of darkness and heathenism, including 
cannibalism, in which these people lived,” and described with horror how converts confessed to 
participating in “cannibal feasts.”500 This was evidence, they argued, of “the grossest forms of 
evil” present among people “so low and material that it would seem impossible to raise them to 
spiritual beings.”501 In both mockery and condemnation, cannibalism indexed the opposite pole 
of civilization—humanity at its most extreme form: carnal, wild, self-destructive, irredeemably 
corrupted.  
                                               
 
497 See Pottier, Johan. “Rights Violations, Rumour, and Rhetoric: Making Sense of Cannibalism in Mambasa, Ituri (Democratic 
Republic of Congo).” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 13, no. 4 (December 1, 2007): 825–43. 
 
498 See Nancy Rose Hunt. “Tintin and the Interruptions of Congolese Comics.” Images and Empires: Visuality in Colonial and 
Postcolonial Africa, 2002, 90–123, and this specific term Nancy Rose Hunt, A Colonial Lexicon of Birth Ritual, Medicalization, 
and Mobility in the Congo. Duke University Press, 1999: 134.  
 
499 One example in the Trumpets book. See also Jan Pieterse. White on Black: Images of Africa and Blacks in Western Popular 
Culture. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992. where he connects this cannibal images of images of conquest.  
 
500 RBMU Archive, University of Edinburgh. Congo Balolo Mission Record, CSCNWW 33/35/1. 
 
501 Ibid. 
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Peter Kitson calls cannibal accusations “the most notorious form of colonial ‘othering’ 
both as alleged practice and critical construct.”502 From the colonial era through the postcolonial 
period, cannibal claims comprised “a lively oral genre” among Congolese, becoming the grist of 
accusation and purported evidence of immorality and witchcraft throughout the country.503 In the 
area around Beni witchcraft accusations and cannibal claims were historically blurred as women, 
in particular, were accused of traveling by night to “eat organs” of their victims—a way to 
describe the hidden effects of a potent curse.504 Long-term dictator Mobutu Sese Seko was 
doggedly accused of cannibalism in rumors—including those recounted by his Belgian son-in-
law Pierre Janssen—a charge that served as a political critique for the consumptive excesses of 
his kleptocratic regime.505  
As the country descended into chaos during the Congo wars, cannibalism accusations 
repeated yet again, perhaps most strongly in the Ituri Conflict in the early 2000s, where Johan 
Pottier traces claims of human consumption levied by militia groups against one another. A 
moral threshold was crossed when one group purportedly “authorized the consumption of human 
flesh”—a grievance held as seriously as claims of genocide by opposing fighters.506 If 
cannibalism as accusation is persistent in Congo’s past and present, and “eating” as a social and 
political act is a broad metaphor for corruption found across Africa, the consumption of bodies is 
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only the most egregious example of antisocial action: the paragon of morally bankrupt 
expressions of political power.  
But what to make of the particular account of cannibalism shared above? How could the 
seemingly outrageous claims of this child be so readily accepted by many in the community of 
Beni? One explanation is that individuals find the charge of cannibalism reasonable because it 
links MONUSCO to the kids of unbounded corruption the cannibal metaphor so potently 
indexes. The quotidian, conspicuous and spectacular consumption of the UN is simultaneously 
closed off and hidden from local people.  The millions of dollars spent by the UN come into Beni 
in a kind of consumption cul-de-sac represented by MONUSCO infrastructure. Seemingly 
limitless money flows into Beni, but only into nodes behind walls, inside cars, on planes and 
helicopters branded with two black on white letters. Vast sums of money are thus present but 
never integrated into local economies. There is no membrane for exchange, for opportunities to 
gain. All this while violence against members of the community, the pretext for MONUSCO’s 
presence, occurs just meters from UN patrol routes and outposts.  
Tracing these dynamics sheds light on why the UN is more often the target of protest and 
outrage in Beni than the egregiously incompetent, consumptive, and impotent state. Certainly, 
the UN provides a safer outlet for critique and the venting of frustration than potential vengeful 
state officials. Citizens can openly critique MONUSCO without fear of reprisal. This is not true 
of the government. Outspoken political critics are routinely threatened and sometimes killed.507 
Members of the government themselves recognize the political utility of framing MONUSCO as 
a scapegoat. In March of 2015 President Joseph Kabila called for a drawdown of UN forces, 
vaguely implicating the UN in ongoing instability in the east.   
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Even so, it is important to note that the anger against the UN is not simply about its 
purported structural role in perpetuating war. As the account above indicates, the violence, 
unfairness, and selfishness of MONUSCO emerges in stories of personal, visceral, embodied 
violence. The consumptive excesses of the UN are perceived as continually enacted by evil 
individuals, not functions of disembodied global political dynamics or bureaucratic inefficacies.  
In a way, the cannibal critique is a refusal to accept the UN’s self-fashioned apolitically. In 
MONUSCO literature attempts are made to analyze “local” conditions to guide interventions that 
inexplicably exclude the UN as a local actor. Drawing MONUSCO agents into the moral 
economy of the community of Beni via cannibal accusation demonstrates an impulse towards 
inclusion by the people in the city. In a region with a deep history of debates about inclusion and 
exclusion, this cannibal debates slots in as only the most recent manifestation of an intense 
genealogy of disputation.   
Riot was used across Africa as a method for reminding powerful actors of their relations 
of obligation, as Jonathan Glassmon’s work on upheaval on the Swahili coast describes.508  The 
confusion wrought by these actions further reveals the depth of the gulf between how the UN 
interprets the Congolese subject and shapes interventions in their lives, and how recipients and 
observers of that intervention perceive these intentions and actions.  
 
Consuming Child Soldiers  
This profound interpretative incommensurability generates ongoing tension, confusion, and 
conflict. There is perhaps no more volatile and intense point of specific disputation than over 
how to interpret and manage violent children. As Filip de Boeck argues, in Congo “children 
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increasingly emerge as the focal point of… social and cultural” contestations.509 These disputes 
are perhaps most intense in Beni around the cases of UNICEF intervention in the 
Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) of former child soldiers. 
If the cannibal emerged as trope at the nexus of global and local discourses around 
immorality and inhumanity in Congo, the child soldier category has a more exclusively 
international and temporally shallow genealogy.510 For many decades in international law the 
child at war was only legible as a category of potential victim, a key element of the civilian 
population. The first serious legal efforts to frame children as potential perpetrators of violence 
came in 1977 when members of the International Committee of the Red Cross attempted to 
amend the Geneva Conventions with the so-called Additional Protocols in order to include the 
mobilization of children in conflict as a war crime, prosecutable under international law. This 
was controversial not least because the mobilization of young men was the foundation of most 
national armies, and squabbles over the exact age and definition of a child soldier complicated 
the ICRC’s intervention.  
As the legal category emerged as a subject of debate so did the child soldier as a figure in 
popular discourse and academic inquiry. In the mid 1980s the category first appears as a 
significant subject of study, its prevalence intensifying partly due to broader child protection 
movements and the presence child soldiers in conflicts in Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone and El 
Salvador. Between 1980 and 2000 mentions of the term “child soldier” increased by over 500% 
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in published materials.511 In the 1990s the first NGOs dedicated to eradicating child soldier 
mobilization came into being: War Child was established in 1993 and Child Soldiers 
International in 1998. The most significant legal development after the 1977 Additional 
Protocols was the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court making it a war crime 
to “recruit or enlist children under the age of 15.”512 It is this statute that has been used as the 
keystone war crime accusation against Congolese warlords like Tomas Lubanga (including a 
conviction for child soldier recruitment in 2012), Jean-Pierre Bemba, and Bosco Ntaganda (trial 
ongoing). Proving in a court of law that a warlord engaged in the mobilization of children has, in 
relative terms, a much lower evidentiary threshold than demonstrating the murder of civilians, 
rape, or other war crime accusations.  
In Congo it is MONUSCO that bears the primary burden for implementing international 
law in the country. Due to the exceptionality of the legal category of the child soldier, and the 
evidentiary power of child soldier mobilization in ICC trials, special procedures exist around the 
management of child soldiers in MONUSCO’s stabilization activities. These are described as 
“specific obligations regarding child protection” in official literature. As rebel militia groups, for 
instance, are integrated into the national army (FARDC) after peace agreements, the troops are 
vetted to ensure that no children are present. If children are found in the ranks, as is the case 
more than 60% of the time in North Kivu, they are tracked into a separate DDR program 
administered by UNICEF.513 Combatants have no choice in the matter. Age at the moment of 
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processing determines an individual’s presence in one of two tracks: either “integration” into the 
FARDC or “demobilization” into civilian life.514 
While removing children from the field of war is an ethically necessary task, and 
effectively smoothing their paths toward civilian life vital, it must be acknowledged that the 
category of child soldier is complex and layered for people living in North Kivu. As previous 
chapters demonstrate, there is a deep history of child warfare in eastern Congo. Often, children 
provided a vital and powerful counter to elite venality and rejected exclusionary practices by 
recalcitrant elders. But there were, and are, diffuse forms of child soldiering. In contemporary 
Beni we can condense some of this complexity, in a heuristic sense, by dividing child soldiers in 
eastern Congo into three categories: les bandits, shege, and mai-mai.  
Les bandits (bandits) are children that are often violently coerced into armed groups run 
by warlords like Tomas Lubanga and Bosco Ntaganda, mentioned above—militia groups 
frequently linked with international political forces.515 Informants in Beni describe les bandits as 
predatory and dangerous. Where child soldiers within the national army or militia groups can 
occupy morally ambiguous positions, les bandits are seen as solely anti-social agents. Children 
involved in these movements are framed as pawns in political and economic games being played 
by “big men.” They serve as foot soldiers for brutally extractive warlords. The perception is that 
these young ones are broken: drugged up, used up, and cast aside when no longer necessary. 
Unable or unwilling to resist their coercion into violent anti-social militias, these children are 
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seen as another exploited Congolese resource lost to the whims and venality of powerful men 
displaying extraverted expansionist desires to control communities outside their own. 
This frame, too, comes with a deep genealogy, carrying traces of the pre-colonial ruga 
ruga in east Africa that John Iliffe called “wild young men without roots” mobilized by elites for 
theft and conquest. Beyond these figures, described in some detail in chapter two, les bandits 
also be connected to the imbangala Joseph Miller describes as key fodder for slaving raids along 
the central Atlantic coast.516 Les bandits are also in category that is comprehensible to global 
observers and audiences. These figures match well with popular representations of what a child 
soldier in a place like Congo is like. The emerging genre of child soldier memoir and fiction, and 
activism like the Invisible Children initiative, are concerned with experiences similar to those les 
bandits would endure.517 The Sierra Leonean combatants described in Danny Hoffman’s War 
Machines typify this framing: young people “made use of,” whose agency is located in using 
“war primarily as a violent way of fitting in today’s global economy.”518 Their primary purpose 
is to facilitate the political and economic projects of elites. That les bandits are said to be “not of 
us” ultimately forecloses avenues of reintegration that revolve around community perceptions of 
what constitutes kin.519  
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The second category of child soldier are shege (also shégues)—a name purportedly 
derived from Che Guevera, intended to evoke a nonconformist revolutionary spirit.520 Shege are 
described by Bob White as “undereducated unemployed youth” and Johan Pottier as the mass of  
“Kinshasa’s disowned children.”521 Filip de Boeck’s work frequently touches on these kinless 
youth, often as the targets of witchcraft accusations and other violence, who coalesce into gangs 
for protection and access to prestige and power.522 Unlike other street children, Katrien Pype 
argues that shege are seen to possess no boundaries in terms of who they target and the levels of 
violence they are willing to perpetrate.523 Penis stealing accusations and Pentecostal “child 
witch” exorcist movements often target the shege.524 Seen as wild, parasitic, unproductive, and 
unmanageable, many Kinois demand that the state remove shege from the city.  
After periodic round ups these children are press-ganged into the FARDC, removing a 
public menace in Kinshasa and attempting to redirect their violence in the service of the 
government. The perception of engagement with witchcraft, violence, and machismo associated 
with shege follows them into the ranks of the army. Many in Beni view the shege with fear, 
disgust, and suspicion. Shege are construed as criminals: armed, given legal protection, and then 
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not paid by the state, let loose to fend for themselves—echoing Mobutu’s call for his troops to 
“live off the land” by pillaging communities they were sent to protect.525 The shege are seen as 
agents of extraction and spectacular consumption—concerned only with their own immediate 
interests and needs, existing outside respectable forms of social reproduction. When my friend’s 
pregnant wife was accidentally shot and killed in her home during a neighborhood sweep by the 
FARDC, her murderer was said to be not a true soldier but a “drunk shege.” 
The third category of young combatants form a loosely affiliated group of militias called 
mai-mai. Les bandits are interpreted similarly across local and global scales. Shege are 
contextually distinct to Congo but self-consciously bear markers of global gang and youth 
delinquency cultures. Mai-mai, if viewed as insurgents who use medicines, require the most 
contextualized markers and meanings. In Beni, mai-mai child soldiers are seen in a more 
ambivalent light than les bandit or shege. Rather than “child soldier” I use the circulating term 
kadogo—little ones in Swahili—for this group. The soft, almost paternal meanings associated 
with kadogo speaks to the ambivalence—affection, protectiveness, fear, and concern—tied up in 
understanding these “little ones.”   
Where the immaturity of les bandits lends them to ready exploitation, and the shege’s 
unmoored youth is symptomatic of social breakdown, the mai-mai children derive their power—
as argued in chapter two and four of this dissertation—from notions of purity that are associated 
with immaturity and mobilized in response to threats to the community. Their capacity to wield 
the mai is continent, in part, on their age. Among contemporary veterans of mai-mai movement, 
echoing sentiments Henri expressed in chapter five, several informants reported that it was only 
the youngest participants in a mai-mai band were those with the keenest spiritual “sight,” able to 
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discern from among the brush those leaves containing the raw power of the wild—comprising 
the core of the mai ointment.526 As in 1964, these children, some as young as six, were giving the 
vocation of daktari (doctor) in the band. Though small, their work was foundational to social 
stability. Emma Wild-Wood argues that “the prime concern [of contemporary mai-mai] is the 
protection of their land from other groups.”527  
So unlike other child warriors kadogo are often mobilized from within kin groups in 
order to protect society. As argued previously, this can include protecting a social group from 
internal threats of venal elders. Given that their claims are tied to the material foundations of 
social reproduction and accumulation, kadogo warriors often possess a much broader array of 
reintegration possibilities when they seek to return home. Many are described as protectors of 
their homes and families. They can be forgiven, even respected, for their violence when it is 
interpreted as self-sacrifice. During my time in Beni I witnessed three separate mass 
mobilizations of mai soldiers of all ages—though all would be considered young men and boys. 
These were for brief periods against specific threats, and all were welcomed back into the 
community after their actions were completed. This avenue of homecoming is not open in the 
same way to les bandits and shege. At the scale of daily life in Beni mai-mai are not 
foundationally thought of as children, but as warriors—by themselves and others. Former kadogo 
I spoke with, though wrestling with elements of trauma and regret, most often parsed their 
violence as loyalty, defense of home, and duty.  Their violence was “classificatory” to use Derek 
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Peterson’s frame—conducted for an “internal audience… by which insiders are sorted from 
outsiders and natives are distinguished from interlopers.”528 
Tacking back to the sketch of legal history provided earlier: the operating definition of 
child soldier by UN agencies in eastern Congo does not allow for such gradations within the 
category. International law recognizes no “morally acceptable” or socially constitutive forms of 
child soldiering. All child combatants, whatever motivation or provenance, enter the protection 
regime of UNICEF upon demobilization. Chronologies and biology, not morality, is the 
foundational classificatory technique. Determining the age of demobilized soldiers to decide how 
to track their reintegration strategy evokes colonial doctors examining and sorting children 
destined for Niangara Penitentiary for moral re-education. 
As UNICEF brings children out combat, they flatten locally meaningful categorical 
distinctions between young combatants. Les bandit, shege, and kadogo all become former child 
soldiers after passing through the UNICEF DDR regime. The default formulation, the global 
child soldier frame most akin to the les bandit’s category, becomes the default. As individual and 
group trajectories are conflated, identities are transformed. In exchange for technical and 
financial aid, children are conscripted from militia groups into another politico-legal entity: the 
wildly unpopular para-political humanitarian regime at work in Congo under the auspices of 
MONUSCO. The long-term outcomes are not clear when a child goes through the DDR pipeline, 
purportedly equipped for vocation, counselled, and given a small sum of money.  
Placed against highly suspicious local perceptions of MONUSCO as an anti-social 
consuming force described earlier, these demobilized child soldiers can be interpreted as objects 
of exchange to justify the aid dollars that support the MONUSCO apparatus. Whatever notions 
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members of the community might have about these children, it is worth briefly mentioning that 
former child combatants’ themselves must also transition their own positionality, moving from 
variously constituted forms of warrior status subsumed into the single salient humanitarian 
category: victimized child through techniques of DDR.  
 
Conclusion 
Protecting children and ushering them safely through the transition to adulthood is a foundational 
moral responsibility for adults across time and place. But the contours of this moral obligation 
are contingent, contested, and complex. In the field of eastern Congo where multiple, 
incompatible actors are engaged in “peace building” of various shades, the child soldier has 
become a profoundly dense, even overdetermined, object of moral disputation between groups of 
people for whom there is a very slim overlap in the vocabulary, practices, and values of child 
protection.  
This paper argues for the “coevality” of agents of MONUSCO and members of Beni’s 
community.529 It frames cannibal claims as a method used by the people of Beni to attempt to 
integrate all members of the community—UN and other development personnel included—into a 
sticky relational web whereby individual fates are tied to corporate success or failure, where 
obligation and gain are entwined. For political, economic, social and historical reasons the UN 
assiduously avoids such implication in the Beni milieu. This move dramatically weakens the 
UN’s claims to legitimacy, morality, and neutrality for many in the community.  
While it is only heuristically useful to draw a distinction between “local” and “UN” ways 
of constructing the child soldier; such categories are more variegated and complex than I suggest 
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here. Maintaining the heuristic, however, permits two conclusions to be drawn. First, public 
critique, such as claims of cannibalism, are used by local actors to firmly situate MONUSCO 
within the moral economy of Beni rather than in a global humanitarian frame. Second, the 
assiduous apolitically of UN personnel justifies alienating ways of living and speaking that 
comprise the efficacy of work being done by MONUSCO. This issue is particularly acute with 
relation to how child soldiers are conscripted into MONUSCO’s DDR regimes.  
Finally, it is clear that the enduring logic of mai medicine, present in Congo since at least 
the mid 19th century, is still relevant and deployed today. The young in contemporary Congo 
maintain the ability to channel and harness powers from the wild. These movements both serve 
and challenge social order in domestic spaces of formal and family politics. Mai played an 
important role in all postcolonial conflicts in eastern Congo. From the Simba movement, to the 
1996 rebellion of Lauren Kabila, a former Simba, to the “self-defense” mai units operating in 
Second Congo War, including those I encountered in Beni in 2003, to the violence plaguing Beni 
and environs today. The mai endures. This dissertation attempted to sketch out a broad and wide-
ranging examination of this medicine and its roots. Nothing suggests that the mai, and the logics, 
discourses, and practices it draws upon, will not feature as centrally in Congo’s 21st century.   
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Chapter Eight: Conclusions 
  
 This dissertation attempts three broad interventions. First, it explores the complexity and 
value of writing an ethnographic history of war in an active conflict zone. Second, it deploys 
novel methodological and analytical strategies to examine therapeutic insurgencies grounded on 
the violent labor of youth in decolonizing and postcolonial African states. Third, this study seeks 
to reorient some preponderant questions in scholarship concerning the role of children in violent 
conflict. 
  
Complicating Fieldwork 
Late into the writing of this dissertation, the UN declared my field site to be among the world’s 
worst crisis zones. On October 26, 2017 the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid 
(OCHA) “activated its highest level of emergency” for the Democratic Republic of Congo. The 
DRC was one of four countries enduring a “Level 3 Emergency” alongside Syria, Yemen, and 
Iraq. Increasingly violent conflict, systemic instability and political disorder, economic decline, 
endemic food insecurity, and mass displacement compelled the classification. The OCHA press 
release declaimed that “the number of people who do not have enough food to eat has surged by 
30 percent this year to 7.7 million. The number of children suffering severe acute malnutrition 
stands at 1.9 million, exceeding those of Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan and Nigeria combined." 
The report’s authors briefly gestured toward explanations for the crisis but focused instead on the 
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staggering scope of degradation and human suffering, framed within a largely de-politicized, 
ahistorical register of immediate want and overwhelming need.   
With the emergency activation, the UN added its “largest ever funding appeal” for 
intervention in Congo. $1.68 billion for 2018 was requested to address the emergent 
conditions—equivalent to 4.6 million dollars a day of spending. These claims were made at 
scales illegible to most people living in the “L3 Emergency” zone, but the impact of such 
bureaucratic reclassifications would matter considerably on the ground. The UN’s largest 
operational base in Congo, for instance, is in the city of Beni, where I lived with my family for 
three years.  
Once considered an oasis of calm in a chaotic region, Human Rights Watch recently 
described Beni as a place where people “live in fear of the next attack and have all but lost hope 
that anyone can end the carnage.”530 Even the UN, with all the resources at their disposal, seem 
unable to exert control. In November 2017, a shadowy rebel group attacked an advance base in 
Beni territory of the UN’s elite Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) and killed 14 Tanzanian 
peacekeepers. This was the largest single loss of UN peacekeeper lives in 25 years.531 In the face 
of attacks against the hardest of targets in the region, anxiety permeates the city. Who is safe if 
not the Force Intervention Brigade? Was this evidence of the “long arms” but “weak fingers” of 
the UN, to appropriate Frederick Cooper’s description of empire?532 
As the security situation deteriorated I found myself revaluating the politics of this 
dissertation project. My research attracted interest I did not anticipate. Security officers affiliated 
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with international NGOs sought me out for analysis of the instability. Journalists approached me 
for soundbites. A member of a highly influential international research group requested a 
meeting to talk through the conflict. I demurred. Soon I was actively avoiding such interactions. I 
felt a strange sense of responsibility to be silent. Was my project meant to provide proscriptive 
counsel, in service of international organizations with intentions I did not fully understand or 
share? Was I being enlisted in what James Ferguson might call a development “structure of 
knowledge” to be leveraged for various interventions?533 Could my knowledge production 
unwittingly serve as a kind of “ethnographic intelligence” service for official and private security 
apparatuses?534 Is it possible that interpreting mai as a framework for recurrent therapeutic 
insurgency affect contemporary security interventions in eastern Congo? I began to worry that 
my analysis would somehow impact directly the subjects I studied in ways I could not anticipate 
or control. These possibilities troubled me. Questions that I wrestle with now barely registered as 
possible when I began my field work.  
When I first moved to Beni for research in September 2013 the city was a sleepy town, 
best known as a coffee processing hub and zone of refuge for displaced people in times of 
volatility. Phone, internet, and mail service were inactive when we first arrived. M23 rebels 
destroyed the regional communications hub. Beni itself, however, was calm. The first year in the 
city was characterized by signs of growth and the reconstruction of critical infrastructure. In 
October 2014, however, unknown forces launched a series of massacres against subsistence 
farming families within the city’s hinterland. The death toll climbed inexorably, relentlessly. 
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Over a thousand civilians were brutally murdered. Nearly 200,000 people were displaced by the 
violence. No one seemed able to stop, or even understand, the massacres.535 The city was gripped 
by fear, mistrust and violence.  
As tensions rose, townspeople I found universally warm and welcoming turned on 
someone accused of speaking “Kinyarwanda” and stoned and burned him alive in the middle of 
the day in the main commercial center.536 Not knowing Swahili or speaking with a strange accent 
could evoke deadly mob violence. Polyvalent xenophobia shook the city. Unknown agents 
started launching mortars at random into the city at night. One fell on a home and killed an entire 
family asleep in bed. An IED exploded on a main residential road near our home. Things 
improved for a time and then grew worse again. Our local host institution ordered the evacuation 
of my family and I three separate times after October 2014.  
At times the violence felt distant, almost surreal. National political crises were something 
of a relief, comfortably remote, suitable for conjecture and consideration. At other times the 
chaos felt so intimate it overwhelmed my ability to attempt any kind of analytical objectivity. 
One such moment occurred two days after UN OCHA’s “L3 Emergency” press release was 
published.  
It was early afternoon. I was riding a motorcycle taxi back to my home from an interview 
when the clouds suddenly loosed a thick slate of rain on the city. I was carrying a laptop with 
me, containing this dissertation, and asked the motard to pull over so we could seek shelter. The 
                                               
535 Perhaps the best study of this period of violence, the Congo Research Group’s “Mass Killings in Beni Territory: Political 
Violence, Cover Ups, and Cooptation” published in September 2017 suggested possible perpetrators but was largely 
inconclusive. The CRG lays the blame at the feat of a complex array of actors including ex-APC, ex-M23, local “ethnic militias” 
especially of the Vuba, the ADF, various “Kinyarwanda speakers” within the army, and other FARDC units under Gen. 
Munhindo Akili Mundos. Analysis including such a disparate aggregation of actors strikes me as of limited utility and clarity.  
 
536 Chloé Lauvergnier, “Deadly Mob Justice for a Suspected Rebel in North Kivu,” France 24, November 2, 2014. A close 
friend of mine who witnessed the killing verified the reportage claiming two individuals ate the victim’s flesh after the killing.  
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driver and I ducked into one of the ubiquitous mini-food roadside cafés specializing in kalangiti: 
a typical lunch of beans, plantain and cabbage, costing 700 Congo franc.537We squeezed onto an 
already crowded wooden bench to wait out the deluge. The rain hammered violently on the tin 
roof.  
We, a bedraggled group of interrupted travelers, stared blankly at each in the deafening 
roar. We watched as chunks of red earth, weakened in the torrent, crumbled from eroded 
embankments. All manner of detritus including plastic bags and discarded sleeves of Top Vin, a 
local alcohol, were caught up in gushing threads of rainwater. All was swept into the surging 
Munyabelu River that bisects Beni from east to west, coursing a few meters from our refuge. 
 The interminable din took a more restrained cadence. Movement resumed in Beni. 
Hundreds of people walked back onto the road to take up their business and plans. I joined the 
throng. Within a few moments, however, the deep thrum of thunder cut the air once again. I 
sighed, imagining further delays in my journey home. But quickly it became clear this was not 
thunder but something more mechanistic and unnatural. The rhythm was imperfect and imprecise 
but continual. It was also much too loud to be thunder.  
 Suddenly the physically perceptible low frequencies of heavy artillery explosions hit. The 
sounds felt almost as though they were emerging from within my own body. After an initial 
disorientation, I realized the source of the furor was very near my home. My family was there.  
 The streets emptied again, people ducking into the same cafés and shelters they left 
moments earlier. This time cold fear replaced boredom and resignation. Everyone speculated as 
to the proximity and source of fighting. I felt sick with worry for my family. No movement on 
the street meant I could not hail a motorcycle taxi to take me home. Even if I could convince 
                                               
537 Currently about $.045.  
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someone to take me, we might well drive directly into a battle. What good would that do my 
family? 
 An hour passed interminably. The sounds of war resounded. But as the rain, so too the 
booms and cracks slowed. Eventually calm returned. Tentative movement began again. I hailed 
the first motorcycle taxi I found on the road and went home. My family were deeply shaken but 
physically well. As anxiety subsided relief came, and along with it a kind of elation. We were 
safe. Someone stopped an invading force that may have been trying to take the city. We still do 
not know who the attackers were. But it was soon clear who held the line against the assailants, 
preventing them from entering the town.  
 “Those boys were the only ones to protect us” my friend Kitambala Georges, the director 
of a local security firm, told me in the hours after the attack. “Those mai-mai.” A UN battalion 
was only two kilometers away but did not respond. The Congolese national army, massively 
deployed in the town, took forty-five minutes to arrive at a site within the city limits. By the time 
they arrived the rebels were already retreating into the forest.  
 We shook our heads at the impotence of the massive formal security apparatus and the 
efficacy of filthy boys with sticks and shrubs facing down the heaviest artillery barrage I 
experienced during my years in Congo. I felt an instinctive surge of appreciation toward the mai-
mai. A group I spent years struggling to interpret now seemed to have protected my family from 
potential harm, albeit unintentionally. Kitambala Georges pointed in the direction of the recent 
fighting and asked, “What would we do without them? How would we survive?” I made no 
reply. 
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 What to make of this account? Is this data or evidence? If so, what kind? Or is this simply 
local color, little more than anecdote, establishing conflict research bona fides? What analytical 
value justifies such memory work?  
 This account functions partly as a disclaimer. It is important to acknowledge that 
experiences like this recurred during the field work and writing of this dissertation. It would be 
disingenuous to ignore the complex conditions underlying the production of this project. My 
analysis, methods, and focus were inflected—in ways I am simultaneously aware of and do not 
comprehend—by these experiences. It is logistically, psychologically, analytically, and 
emotionally relevant that this project was generated within a zone of active conflict. One 
contends with complex forces and influences that affect the entire work, not just elements that 
were gathered or interpreted in “the field.”  
 Words read on a page in a climate-controlled reading room in a Brussels archive sit 
awkwardly against the sickening zip and crunch of arms in Beni. Managing pressing concerns 
over ominous possible futures for oneself and loved ones becomes a quotidian reality—a quiet 
hum continually running in the background of acts like the consolidation of a bibliography. 
Frictions and incommensurabilities emerge across sources and evidence as visceral moments of 
fear and confusion seek to overwhelm the relevance of structural phenomena across scales and 
human experience.538 The process is both difficult and rich. Placing disparate forms of evidence 
and experience in the same field yields both incoherence and insight.  
 
                                               
538 Useful here is the idea of the capacity of being conscious of the present as a “space of experience” from Reinhart Koselleck, 
Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (Columbia University Press, 1985). This mode of being is placed against the 
“horizon of expectation,” that is ones approach toward future possibility. These stances toward and within the social construction 
of time form the conditions of possibility for any political imaginary. 
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 It is also worth noting that mai-mai discourses and practices, with genealogies wending 
deeply into the precolonial, were sharply relevant and urgent in eastern Congo as I wrote the 
dissertation. As recounted above, the “boys” that “saved us” explicitly placed themselves within 
the history of mai, harkening to antecedent movements and participating in its reinventions. 
While Jason Stearns once described mai-mai as “ramshackle” movements “of little military 
threat” to more professional militias in the Congo Wars, the situation is much different in Beni 
territory today.539 Placing mai-mai movements at the center of ongoing instability is a theme in 
contemporary scholarship and journalism on war in eastern Congo.540 So too vernacular 
language media, such as the popular Kinande-language Nindi film, explore the mai-mai mythos 
and celebrate its impact.541 International security experts focus on the mai-mai as agents of chaos 
and instability. The humanitarian alert messaging system, INSO, reported mai-mai involvement 
in over sixty percent of the conflicts reported in North Kivu in the last three months.542  
How do we approach the methodical and analytical challenges and possibilities of doing 
an ethnography of war during a time of intense conflict? One line of scholarship suggests 
viewing ethnography in conflict zones in a fundamentally pragmatic way, arguing that a 
                                               
 
539 Jason K. Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa (PublicAffairs, 
2011) p 367. 
 
540 Derek Bishton, “Viewfinder: Mai-Mai Militia Training, Democratic Republic of Congo,” The Daily Telegraph, August 5, 
2005, sec. Culture; Jeffrey Gettleman, “Mai Mai Fighters Third Piece in Congo’s Violent Puzzle,” The New York Times, 
November 21, 2008, sec. International / Africa; Jill Trenholm et al., “Constructing Soldiers from Boys in Eastern Democratic 
Republic of Congo,” Men and Masculinities 16, no. 2 (June 1, 2013): 203–27; Emma Wild, “’Is It Witchcraft? Is It Satan? It Is a 
Miracle.’Mai-Mai Soldiers and Christian Concepts of Evil in North-East Congo,” Journal of Religion in Africa 28, no. 4 (1998): 
450–467; Jocelyn Kelly, “Rape in War: Motives of Militia in DRC,” Report, June 16, 2010,; Luca Jourdan, “Mayi-Mayi: Young 
Rebels in Kivu, DRC,” Africa Development 36, no. 3–4 (2011): 89–112; Koen Vlassenroot and Frank Van Acker, “War as Exit 
from Exclusion? The Formation of Mayi-Mayi Militias in Eastern Congo,” Afrika Focus 17, no. 1 (2001): 2. 
 
541 Kambale Syayighanza, Nindi? (La Place Image Pro, Butembo, 2013). 
 
542 INSO email alerts. 17 of 26 alerts reported mai-mai involvement.  
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methodological imperative is self-preservation.543 This approach acknowledges that the tension 
and fear of these contexts produces a particular methodological “mood,” likely imperceptible to 
the researcher.544 Surely, however, survival alone does not justify the risks of such research. One 
might, as Christopher Kovats-Bernat, argue that enduring dangerous field work yields 
evidentiary rewards. Positions of proximity to conflict, in this view, make possible the 
perspective that “the bullet fired, the rock thrown, and the machete swung are all data insofar as 
they play a role in the construction of a culture of violence.”545  
There must be limits, however, to what constitutes data when we talk about violence. 
Must all acts of harm find a functionalistic link to culture? Is data a worthy enough object to 
endure insecurity—is it, in fact, the only material one can gather? I share Julie Livingston and 
Zoë Wool’s counter that “ethnography, a mode of writing-dwelling that is in itself inherently, 
awkwardly social, is particularly well suited to [capturing loss and brokenness], especially when 
it grounds itself in the haze, even the incomprehensibility, of experience.”546 The goal of this 
dissertation is not to “rationalize violence,” but rather to acknowledge both its fundamental 
slipperiness as a subject of inquiry and its conceptual power as a tool for social transformation 
                                               
543 J. Christopher Kovats-Bernat, “Negotiating Dangerous Fields: Pragmatic Strategies for Fieldwork Amid Violence and 
Terror,” American Anthropologist, New Series, 104, no. 1 (March 1, 2002): 208–22; Anna Hedlund, “Doing Fieldwork with 
Perpetrators in a Military Camp: The Routines of Everyday Violence in the Eastern Congo” (The Loose Ends of Fieldwork, 
Copenhagen, 2013); Nancy Howell, Surviving Fieldwork: A Report of the Advisory Panel on Health and Safety in Fieldwork, 
American Anthropological Association (American Anthropological Assn, 1990); Raymond M. Lee, Dangerous Fieldwork (Sage 
Publications, 1995); Carolyn Nordstrom and Antonius C. G. M. Robben, Fieldwork Under Fire: Contemporary Studies of 
Violence and Culture (University of California Press, 1995); Jeffrey Sluka, “Participant Observation in Violent Social Contexts,” 
Human Organization 49, no. 2 (1990): 114–126. 
 
544 Nordstrom and Robben, Fieldwork Under Fire, p 3. 
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and regulation.547 The fired bullet, like the word uttered, contains the potential to both amplify 
and undermine other forms of disputation. Bringing the word and sword together in a single 
analytical field follows Paul Richard’s insistence that conflict has been too readily disciplinarily 
“quarantined” to “security studies.” The value of interdisciplinary approaches, like this 
dissertation, is in the attempt to at once acknowledge, and methodologically and conceptually 
undermine, the “special status” of violence among other social phenomena.548 This project 
attempted to place violence alongside an array of other human interactions and activities even 
when, or perhaps particularly when, their connections were not obvious. Linking missionary 
catechisms and mai yields insights impossible when approached in isolation.  
The primary gains of attempting to write ethnographic history in a war zone come not 
from capturing the data that spill forth from the barrel of a gun, but rather being proximate to the 
deployment of vernacular frameworks used to interpret such events. How do interlocutors use 
language, history, story, religion, and community to navigate and explain violent phenomena? 
How and when do other forms of thought and action interface with violence? The irruptive 
experiences of conflict provide an urgency and shared commitment to such conversations. Being 
in place allows a researcher to, at least, listen to and witness such disputation. Debates, for 
instance, about generational conflict take on a sharp edge when the stakes are immediate and 
real—when youth surround the city with violent intentions. Fundamentally proximity allows 
participation in the meaning-making work that such anxieties produce.  
                                               
547 Nordstrom and Robben, Fieldwork Under Fire, p 10. Norstrom and Robben borrow the notion of the “slipperiness” of 
conceptualizing violence from Michael Taussig.  
 
548 Paul Richards, No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts (Ohio University Press, 2005). 
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 The scalar, formal, and methodological experiments attempted in this dissertation are, 
unfortunately, unusual in studies of conflict, where culture is too often seen as the progenitor of 
violence rather than the well of meaning from which all, victim and perpetrator, draw language 
and interpretative frameworks.  
 
Neoliberal Africa and Post-colonial Conflict 
Danny Hoffman’s War Machines is an incisive study of violent youth movements in neoliberal 
Africa. His framework offers a compelling alternative approach to the one taken in this 
dissertation. Where this study focuses on sub-national forces, Hoffman’s interest is in the 
“relations, practices, and modes of operating that emerge to contest the ‘interiorizing’ practices 
of the modern state” in Sierra Leone. Violence is cast primarily as a category of “work:” young 
men the pool of available labor. Hoffman borrows the notion of the “war machine” from Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari, anchoring his analysis on their formulation that “each time there is 
an operation against the State— insubordination, rioting, guerrilla warfare, or revolution as act—
it can be said that a war machine has revived.”549  
Hoffman’s overriding interest is in “the exteriority of the state” and its attempts to 
interiorize dissident forces. Hoffman rejects the notion of the state as a “historical formation” but 
rather treats it as a “condition,” a “hierarchical mode of organizing power that appears as a 
tendency or impulse throughout history.”550 Statist powers are fundamentally committed to the 
production and management of “structures and codes, with stable identities…[operating within] 
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the space of bureaucracy, obsessed with charting its territory through cartography, conducting 
censuses, plotting the normal course of affairs, fixated on taxation and protocol.” The war 
machine violently emerges to offer a challenge to these operations and actions.  
While Hoffman offers a useful framework for interpreting youthful rebellion in neoliberal 
Africa, his decision to use the state to set the scale of analysis obfuscates dynamics relevant to 
the figures within the “war machine.” In foregrounding stories like Henri’s, this dissertation 
complicates such state-centric framings. While not treating Henri’s experiences as typical this 
dissertation nonetheless demonstrates how dynamics of “interiorization” where neither legible 
nor resonant to figures engaging the Simba rebellion in 1964. If, as I argue, the logic of mai, its 
durable discourses and practices, persist to this day, then so too do aspects of its animating 
frameworks. Mai did not emerge to counter the state. It was leveraged to revivify failing moral 
order—to reassert the demands of responsibility from venal elites. The state in Congo did not 
seek to interiorize these forces: when the government gained the upper hand against the Simba in 
late 1964, they sought simply to erase the movement through massacre rather than capture 
dissident youth. In following Mbembe’s formulation that the modern state in Africa seeks the 
“generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human 
bodies and populations” Hoffman’s focus on state again elides other, powerful non-state 
structures of authority and maturity that mark most Africans’ experiences of power and 
possibility.551 
 Eastern Congo’s recent mai-mai movements, in light of the deeper history drawing on 
notions of therapeutic insurgency—violent movements anchored by charms and war medicines–
charted in earlier chapters, require an alternative framework to Hoffman’s approach. The core 
                                               
551 Hoffman, War Machines, p 17. 
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concern is not how a “grassroots civil defense militia is transformed into a mercenary army,” but 
rather why and how such movements—like Anioto and ruga-ruga before it—proved exceeding 
difficult, even impossible, for the state to coopt and control. History suggests that the authority of 
the medicine exceeded the interiorizing capacities both the state and local elites. The renewing 
force of the mai was to be leveraged against wayward elder kin and figures misappropriating 
responsibility in the economy, church, and customary authority. The mai itself regulated trust 
and authority. Attempting to locate tactical objectives and articulating strategy beyond 
eliminating social evil might overstretch what evidence exists.552  
Mai-mai militia movements in eastern Congo thus cannot be interpreted as exemplars of 
the war machine which Hoffman argues is characterized by “solely exterior relations. A war 
machine’s properties are contingent and flexible… not confined to transit between fixed points 
or along given routes.” Mai, by contrast demanded adherence to rigid, inviolable rules, strict 
codes of behavior, including precise regulations about targeting, consumption, bodily 
management, authority, and language. Mai was not invoked through improvisation, even if its 
codes were continually violated.  
While on the surface mai-mai movements in contemporary eastern Congo might bear 
resemblance to movements like the ones Hoffman studies in Sierra Leone, their logics are 
radically different, even antithetical. Mai-mai’s belligerent exteriority to the state and state-like 
entities demands its own analytical and scalar approaches. Fundamentally, interpreting mai-mai 
requires analysis grounded in sub-national scales. The most relevant primary relations are not 
with or against the state, or state-like entities, but follow the sinews of kith and kin. Strained 
forms of reciprocity frame the foundational questions, not tactics of governmentality. This 
                                               
552 Kasper Hoffmann, “The Ethics of Child-Soldiering in the Congo,” Young 18, no. 3 (August 1, 2010): 339–58. 
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dissertation interprets mai-mai as existentially committed to upholding and revivifying the moral 
authority of hierarchy and ultimately bolstering the power of responsible elders, albeit through a 
path of violence. It is always and at once in and out of what Hoffman calls the “impulse” toward 
hierarchy. Ma- mai is defined by its interstitial status.  
 
Childhood studies  
Beyond questions of scale, this dissertation also suggests alternative approaches to framing the 
core subjects of inquiry: violent young people. This is most relevant in providing new analytical 
itineraries for scholars exploring child soldiering. Much of this body of scholarship focuses on 
the question of “What is a child?” The question is urgent as it addresses the fundamental issue of 
responsibility for violence. David Rosen, in his Armies of the Young: Child Soldiers in War and 
Terrorism, writes “thousands of children and youth today are caught up in armed warfare and are 
committing horrible crimes. How should we see them? As innocent victims of political 
circumstances who should be protected and forgiven? Or as moral agents who should be held 
responsible for their actions?”553 This dyad, child soldiers are either victims or criminals, 
ultimately reduces the range of possibilities for analysis. Much ink is spilled wrestling with 
questions of biology, sociology, and capacity, where I argue more can be gleaned by thinking 
first with the question of opportunity.  
The more useful, but far less frequently deployed question should be “Why a child?” 
Even if we can establish a definitive category of “childhood” in a given context, one is still left 
                                               
553 David M. Rosen, Armies of the Young: Child Soldiers in War and Terrorism, Rutgers Series in Childhood Studies, p 155. 
This particular quote is pulled out by Barbara Harrell-Bond in her review of Children and Youth on the Front line: Ethnography, 
Armed Conflict and Displacement by Jo Byden and Joane de Beery, Berghan Books, 2004.  
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with the essential issue of why that particular category of person was mobilized for conflict. This 
line of inquiry demands that scholars consider the unique constellation of cultural, social, and 
political dynamics that would make children attractive candidates to become warriors. It 
refocuses attention upon complex issues of power and opportunity, rather than global/universal 
frameworks of jurisprudence and culpability. 
In most scholarship on child soldiering the reasons for the deployment of children in 
conflict are imagined to be obvious. If victims, children are pawns of the powerful. If criminals, 
children are the dangerous byproducts of social collapse. Alternative possibilities, such as 
imagining children as agents of renewal or protection, are foreclosed. If adjudicating culpability 
is the goal, then alternative frameworks are potentially morally dubious to consider—they 
present the possibility of suggesting children may exist somewhere between or beyond the 
bounds of culpability and criminality. While the questions of victimization and perpetration are 
worth consideration, other possible paths to understanding why the young make war are also 
important and potentially fruitful to consider.  
 Some scholars examining these dynamics in eastern Congo are beginning to address such 
lines of inquiry. Kaspar Hoffman’s work explores the ethics of mai-mai child soldiering in 
eastern Congo. Hoffman’s approach is broad. His formulations bears echoes of Quetelet’s social 
thought when he writes that prototypical mai-mai is “the ‘uneducated young male,’ a person 
who, by reason of a causal chain, carries a particular high index of danger; he might be a 
‘psychopath’, but he does not need to be.”554 Hoffman’s exploration is temporally shallow, he 
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traces the roots of child soldiering in eastern Congo to 1997.555 While he seeks to identify 
children’s reasons for engagement in the movement, he ultimately finds motivations to be 
incoherent. The child soldier, in his work, is ultimately a confused victim of a complex context. 
He argues that “the subjectivity of the kadogo was forged in a piecemeal manner by often 
contradictory moralities, rationalities and practices.”556 There is no “project” behind mai-mai, 
just confused youth.  
This dissertation argues that the perception that child soldiers possess “piecemeal” 
identities is an artifact of insufficiently pursuing the “why a child” question in this context. 
Indeed, it seems clear that one reason analysis is too diffuse is due to conflating all manner of 
child warrior in eastern Congo together. It speaks to an insufficient attempt to locate the 
categories of experience at work in the region. The disaggregated modes of violent childhood 
offered in chapter seven of this dissertation suggest that there is are depths and complexities 
within youth violence yet unplumbed in other research.557   
  In general, seeking integration and lines of intentionality and continuity within the logic 
and practices of the mai links young warriors to deep wells of meaning, history, and durable 
language. Far from “piecemeal,” these child soldiers strive to be integrated individuals, finding 
shared meaning and practices around the power of a war medicine. As one of Hoffman’s own 
sources says: “No one called me into the mai mai. We left our work, we went into the bush. Into 
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the park, following along the Semliki River.”558 In 1964, as now, adult figures struggled to exert 
control and establish authority within mai-mai bands. This is evidence of a powerful alternative 
organizing logic at work beyond individual charisma or gerontocratic authority.  
 When placed in a lineage of legal and development-driven interventions child soldiers in 
Congo strain to emerge clearly within social science literature. Straying from analyses grounded 
within such global social and legal norms animates this dissertations line of inquiry. I argue that 
mai-mai child soldiers participate, albeit incompletely and sometimes coercively, within deep 
norms of power, violence, disease and medicine in communities in eastern Congo. Exploring 
culpability takes a new valance: the focus is on violations of the mai’s règlements and not UN 
statutes. Failure of responsibility is the crime which mai-mai avoid, both in terms of social 
obligation and accountability to the strictures of the mai itself.  
 In short, this study imagines children engaged within the mai-mai not primarily as victims, 
nor perpetrators, nor caught in the machinery of war, but as figures whose immaturity affords 
particular opportunities for access to power. Scholars studying violent childhoods in places like 
eastern Congo must look not just etic categorizations of childhood and conflict but to those 
incompatible, borderline incoherent notions of the child that yield rich analytical and interpretive 
possibilities. I argue here that mai is such a medicine predicated on the power of an emic 
category of action that enables us to reframe childhood violence in Congo. 
 
Scale and Sources 
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This dissertation sought to be attentive to scale, genre and form. One goal was to link 
diverse and sometimes unconventional sources. The study sought to include complicating 
experiences and forms of evidence that challenged its own arguments. To further evade totalizing 
frameworks, it makes unexpected moves. Pulling from disparate sources: this study examines 
Belgian demographers, epic folk tales, kingship ethnography, and security archives to frame the 
role of children of combat in Congo’s 20th century through today. To work against the 
metanarrative tendencies of historical argument this dissertation moved into the most intimate 
scales of life history to run counter to the broader moves of the project.  
This study attempted a wide focus incorporating disparate dynamics such as the 
deployment of war medicines, practices of baptism, the creative work of writers working in 
martyrdom registers, and processes of class and ethnicity formation. These moves sought to 
complicate the possibilities of settling in at a single scale and opened up a variety of 
methodological opportunities. Microhistory, for instance, helped locate space for individual 
experiences against moments when “sociality fails to redeem experiences of injury, vulnerability, 
and loss” across a lifespan.559 The rewards of attempting to hold phenomena together while 
moving across form, method, and—especially—scale, are many. It is also necessary for this type 
of study. When faced with something as overwhelming as violence by children and against 
children on a mass scale the temptation is to pull out to the broad view for clarity, perspective, 
and even emotional space. But if my experience of attempting to conduct ethnographic and 
historical research is any guide, the rewards and possibilities of leaning closer to these stories are 
plethora. The goal is not narrower but rather deeper histories. The focus is not on individual lives 
but the experience of living and creating possible futures in complex times and violent places. It 
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is about locating the outer bounds of social phenomena as much as defining what belongs on the 
inside.  
 
A Fragment  
I close with a memory that resides within “the haze, even the incomprehensibility, of experience” 
and memory.560 It is late October, 2017. I do not know this at the time, but it is one of my last 
days in Beni before I am evacuated again. I am on my way to the market. Hailing a motorcycle 
taxi with an upward twitch of my chin, I slip onto the seat behind a motard driving a battered 
bike. He greets me in a friendly way but pulls his sleeve down over his forearm when he notices 
me examining the telltale cicatrized scars of where the mai was once administered to him. He 
seems to be weighing in his mind whether I could identify such markings or not. We chat in 
Swahili for a time. He changes the subject abruptly to tell me that the mai-mai are 
misunderstood. They are protectors of the population, not les bandits. I do not respond quickly so 
he kicks the engine into life and pulls the throttle hard so the whirr of the engine drowns out 
further conversation. Our bodies are pressed together as the city races by. We are strangers but 
bound, for a moment, in a kind of embrace. The Beni that we pass through writhes, in one view, 
in a stew of violence and fear. Market prices are rising and people, already among the poorest on 
earth, struggle to survive. Tension is everywhere. As shops and people blur past, they form 
indeterminate swaths of color and shape, and the strains of music fill the air. In motion another 
city emerges. There is life and loveliness here too. The mix of pain and beauty is hard to hold 
together. But nonetheless there it is, and there it will be.   
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Byensi Patrick 
Thembo Lebu 
 
In Congo 
 
Anyesi Kahindo 
Erasto Kambale 
Mashauri Lusenge Deo 
Mbale Israel 
François Muhindo 
Mumbere Gustave 
Shafiko Etulu 
Mumbere Thomas 
Kinyata Kasereka,  
Lwanzo Katuka 
 252 
Kahindo Pierre 
Kambale Syayighanza 
Vikatsira Kalalahire 
Paluku Katsavu 
Paluku Makasi Mremba 
Pilo Ndianabo Fidele 
Paluku Makasi Mremba 
Muhindo Matufali François 
Obadiah Mumbere 
Injilisti Paulo 
Kitambala Kasereka 
Kasereka Bolingo 
Ana Kasali 
Mbusa Manasee 
Kavira Manasee 
Andreas Nikoleidas 
Kaserka Thierry Mubenze 
Kasereka Kambale 
Kistali Muyayalo 
Aniesi Kahindo 
Kinyata Kasereka 
Kahi Kambale 
Papa “Yuma” 
Deogratias Mumbere 
Paluku Mwasema 
 
 
 
